Facing the Foe Without

The strategic calculations of 2006 differ greatly from those of 2001. Our counterterrorism efforts today should be governed by the following strategic principles.

Destroy the jihadist enterprise. The global jihadist enterprise remains the primary immediate threat to U.S. national security. Terrorist operational capabilities have been reduced considerably since 2001, but the jihadists have proven to be adaptable, resilient, and capable of continued action. Ideologically, they are still on the march.

Armed force alone cannot win this war. The real battle is ideological.

Conserve resources for a long war. It took Germany and Italy more than a decade to suppress the tiny terrorist formations operating on their territories. It took Britain a quarter of a century to persuade the Irish Republican Army to give up its armed struggle. A small group of Basque separatists continued their campaign of terrorism in Spain for nearly 40 years. The United States must conserve its resources for the long haul. This will take blood, treasure, the will of the American people, and the support of allies.

Wage more-effective political warfare. Armed force alone cannot win this war. The real battle is ideological. Al Qaeda’s jihadist ideology must be delegitimized and discredited. We must therefore wage political warfare, which is notably different from advertising American values or winning hearts and minds — efforts aimed at the broader population. Political warfare comprises aggressive tactics aimed largely at the fringes of the population, where personal discontent and spiritual devotion turn to violent expression.

AP PHOTO/RON EDMONDS   Secret Service Emergency Response Team officer stands guard on a steam grate at the White House on Feb. 13, 2003. That day, the administration increased the level of alert from yellow to orange, citing intelligence that it said suggested a growing threat from Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda terrorist network. Three days earlier, federal officials recommended that Americans take basic disaster-preparation steps, such as maintaining a three-day stockpile of food and water.

Political warfare targets those on their way into enemy ranks, those among the ranks who might be persuaded to quit, and those in custody. It sees enemy combatants as constantly recalibrating their commitments. It accepts no foe as having irrevocably crossed a line. It sees every prisoner not merely as a source of intelligence, but as a potential convert. It accepts local accommodations to reduce violence, offers amnesties to induce divisions and defections, and cuts deals to co-opt enemies. It is infinitely flexible and ferociously pragmatic. The United States today has no strategy for political warfare.

Break the cycle of jihadism. The U.S. strategy must be broadened to address the entire jihadist cycle, from entry to exit. The cycle begins with the radicalization of eager acolytes and ends with their indefinite imprisonment or death (see figure). U.S. efforts now focus on only the operational portion of this cycle, the visible tip of the iceberg: from late in the recruitment process to death or capture. Insufficient attention is paid to defeating radicalization, indoctrination, and recruitment at the front end or dealing with detainees at the back end. We have concentrated on eliminating jihadists but not on impeding recruitment, inducing defections, or persuading detainees to renounce jihad.

American Counterterrorist Efforts Focus on Jihadist Operations but Overlook Phases in the Jihadist Cycle That Fall Below the Surface

Impede recruitment. Respected communicators can be deployed to warn of jihadist recruiters and to counter their messages. Informants can be enlisted to gather information; even their suspected presence obliges recruiters to move with greater care. False recruiting sites can be used to circulate repellent material. Recantations and denunciations can be elicited and broadcast.

Known recruiting sites can be shut down or so obviously kept under surveillance that potential recruits see them as unsafe. As part of the campaign to reduce Ku Klux Klan violence in America, FBI agents conducted aggressive interviews informing Klan members that their identities were known, that there were informants in their ranks, and that, if trouble occurred, they would be under suspicion. The technique removed the cloak of clandestinity and created uncertainties and suspicions.

Encourage defections and facilitate exits. The ranks of even the most fervent fanatics include potential defectors who might quit if offered a safe way out. They might come to fear the mad leaders who would happily have them die. Yet they also fear what might happen to them in American hands. The images of Abu Ghraib should not be seen as the only alternative to martyrdom.

The Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) program during the Vietnam War persuaded more than 100,000 enemy soldiers to defect to the South Vietnamese side by offering them amnesty, cash, job training, and homes. Some of the “ralliers,” as they were called, eventually drifted back to the Communist side, but overall the program was an economical and certainly less dangerous way of removing a sizable number of enemy combatants.

Persuade detainees to renounce terrorism. Turning detainees against violence should be considered as important as interrogation. Rehabilitation, especially if it can be used to discourage jihadist recruiting, is more important than prosecution. Those in custody should be offered the opportunity to quit jihad, repent, publicly recant. We should not let our desire for revenge or our determination to see justice done get in the way. We must be pragmatic. We are not settling blood debts; we are waging a political war.

Other countries offer examples. British authorities compiled evidence to justify the release of those Irish Republican Army detainees whose family or community backgrounds suggested that they could be persuaded to turn against violence. This reduced both the population of detainees and the alienation in the communities from which they came.

The images of Abu Ghraib should not be seen as the only alternative to martyrdom.

Italy, a Catholic country, used an appropriate religious term to encourage Red Brigade prisoners to renounce terrorism and cooperate with authorities. Those who did so were called “repentants,” and their sentences were reduced accordingly. The mere fact that some repented dismayed those still at large, and the information the repentants provided was crucial in cracking the terrorists’ campaign.

In Yemen, Islamic scholars challenged a group of defiant al Qaeda prisoners to a theological debate. “If you convince us that your ideas are justified by the Quran, then we will join you in the struggle,” the scholars told the terrorists. “But if we succeed in convincing you of our ideas, then you must agree to renounce violence.” The scholars won the debate, and a number of the prisoners renounced violence, were released, and were given help in finding jobs. Some have since offered advice to Yemeni security services. A tip from one led to the death of al Qaeda’s top leader in the country.

Americans have not done well in this area. Despite holding hundreds of detainees, some for more than four years now — including many whose participation in jihad was minor — not one detainee has been publicly turned against jihad. Is it because the interaction is limited to confinement and interrogation, which produces only resistance and radicalization? It would not be easy, but would it not be better to try to enlist at least a few detainees as spokesmen against al Qaeda’s brand of jihad, having them tell their stories to would-be jihadists — explaining their initial illusions and their eventual disillusionment? Doing so would shift the public debate from “terrorists versus government spokesmen” to “terrorists versus former terrorists.”

We have learned the lesson of neglecting Afghanistan once. We cannot walk away again.

Maintain international cooperation. One of the major reasons for the successes that have been achieved in the struggle against the jihadist network is unprecedented international cooperation among intelligence services, law enforcement agencies, and military forces. The United States cannot afford to waste the support of allies. The United States simply cannot defeat its terrorist adversaries by itself. In the long run, international cooperation is a prerequisite to success, a precious commodity not to be squandered by bullying, unreciprocated demands, indifference to local realities, or actions that repel even America’s closest friends.

The war against terrorism should not be America’s war. Having captured the world’s sympathy immediately after 9/11, the administration in Washington fumbled by claiming the war as its own. The message “You’re either with us or against us” may have been initially useful to get the attention of some uncommitted states, but as a constantly repeated refrain, it was insulting and it complicated cooperation, which could then be perceived as only yielding to American ultimatums.

AP PHOTO/FRAIDOON POOYAA   A young Afghan refugee carries her sister at the Maslakh refugee camp, in Herat, western Afghanistan, on May 8, 2006. Afghan expectations for a better life soared following the Taliban’s ouster by U.S.-led forces. But more than four years later, impoverished Afghanistan cannot provide work for millions of its own while Taliban-led violence hinders development and claims lives.

Rebuild Afghanistan. Afghanistan is an initial success that could easily slip away. A representative government rules in Kabul, though not far beyond the city. The insurgency in the country has been growing. Ethnic and tribal antagonisms remain an obstacle to national unity. The country’s population is so poor and its infrastructure so undeveloped that the investment of even modest resources could have a significant effect. We have learned the lesson of neglecting Afghanistan once. We cannot walk away again.

Preserve but narrow the principle of preemption. The determination of today’s terrorists to carry out large-scale attacks, together with their growing destructive power, requires that preemption be preserved as an option, but it is important to distinguish between preemptive action and preemptive war. The invasion of Iraq has called into question U.S. intelligence capabilities, raised the issue of possible government misuse of information as a pretext for bringing down a foreign government, and allowed foes of the United States to portray preemption as disguised aggression. The subsequent problems in Iraq have further discredited the principle of preemption. Nonetheless, this option should be preserved. However, it should be limited to precise actions, not regime changes, and it should be taken as a measure of last resort when no other options are available.

Reserve the right to retaliate — a muscular deterrent. Either a bioterrorist or nuclear terrorist attack would unleash unprecedented fury and would fuel a demand for all-out warfare against any group or government known to be or perhaps even suspected of being responsible. Everyone, including our adversaries, should understand that.