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Core Principles

With the Nonproliferation Regime Unraveling, a Refresher Course Is in Order

By James A. Thomson

James Thomson is president and chief executive officer of the RAND Corporation.

PHOTO: DIANE BALDWIN

Is it time to dust off the old textbooks of nuclear deterrence that have been relegated to the upper shelves for almost two decades? Much of the fundamental work on deterrence in the nuclear age was carried out at RAND in the 1950s and continued into the 1980s, as the United States and its allies sought to deter potential Soviet aggression and to counter the political influence of Soviet military power, including its vast nuclear arsenal. During this same period, analysts worried about the prospects of unconstrained nuclear proliferation and grappled with the nightmare of 20 to 30 nuclear-armed states spread across almost every continent.

Until recently, all this old analysis seemed irrelevant. The Soviet Union disintegrated; the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty put a stop to proliferation worries; states such as South Africa gave up nuclear weapons programs; and others with nuclear weapons, such as Ukraine, gave up the weapons themselves. Of course, Pakistan and India tested nuclear weapons a decade ago, but, as mutual rivals, they had never agreed to the nonproliferation regime, and their ultimate acquisition of the weapons had been seen by most specialists as inevitable.

Now the nonproliferation regime seems to be unraveling. North Korea already has an unknown number of nuclear weapons. And Iran seems bent on obtaining the capability to build some. These two countries, unlike Pakistan and India, are part of regional security balances that involve other countries; and so the acquisition of nuclear weapons by North Korea and Iran affects the security of other countries, such as Japan and Saudi Arabia, respectively. Will the latter countries contemplate obtaining their own nuclear weapons, and will that contemplation lead yet others to try to acquire their own? And what about a resurgent Russia? That, too, could spur other countries to consider their nuclear ambitions. Are we looking toward the prospect of 20 to 30 nuclear-armed states once again?

To answer the question that opened this essay, yes, it is time to pull out the old deterrence texts. Yesterday’s analysis won’t fix today’s problems, but it offers a valid point of reference for new thinking. The old texts were written with precisely the problem of regional security balances in mind. It is easy to forget that 30 to 40 years ago, international security analysts fretted that Germany and Japan would seek their own nuclear deterrent in the face of Soviet nuclear weapons. They didn’t do so, at least in part because of U.S. nuclear guarantees. The Cold War doctrine of extended deterrence had been built around these guarantees.

Nations seek to acquire military capability, including nuclear weapons, to enhance their security. This is certainly what is driving North Korea and Iran. As the United States and its allies seek to roll back or prevent further proliferation, they will have to become students of regional security balances and assess what roles they can play in enhancing the security of regional actors, such as Japan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey.

Therefore, we at RAND have dusted off the old texts and are starting to develop new ones, appraising the differences between the old world and the new. It’s unfortunate that it has to be done. But it has to be done — and the sooner, the better.