Sunken Treasures
The Economic Impetus Behind Modern Piracy
AP IMAGES/DEFENSE MINISTRY OF SPAIN
Alleged Somali pirates cling to their capsized vessel moments before being rescued by the Spanish navy in the Gulf of Aden on May 6, 2009. The Spanish ship participating in a European Union antipiracy flotilla rescued the group members after their small boat flipped over while they allegedly tried to hijack a Panamanian-flagged freighter.
Piracy is, above all, an economically driven phenomenon, both for the profiteers who engage in the practice and for those who are its victims. The desire of ship owners to keep operating costs as low as possible has often outweighed the imperatives for more concerted onboard security. This core economic dimension sets piracy apart from maritime terrorism, which is primarily aimed at leveraging or otherwise undermining the oceanic environment to promote political, ideological, or religious beliefs.
Traditionally, the two main factors feeding piracy have been the enormous volume of commercial freight moving by sea and the necessity of ships to pass through congested maritime chokepoints. The emergence of modern-day piracy reflects the continued relevance of these drivers in addition to seven other contributing variables: a trend toward the use of skeleton crews, pressure to invest in land-based homeland security measures since 9/11, lax coastal and port security, corruption, the anarchic situation in Somalia, the willingness of ship owners to pay large ransoms, and the global proliferation of small arms.
The resultant dangers threaten human, economic, political, and environmental security, with the nightmare scenario being a mid-sea collision involving a heavily laden oil tanker. In response, the international community should boost the coastal monitoring and interdiction capabilities of states in the vicinity of the Horn of Africa, expand the efforts of public-private sponsorships to market communication and defensive technologies, give the maritime industry greater financial incentives to adhere to basic security protocols, and devote greater efforts to restoring a semblance of stability to Somalia.
While Somalia has been the focus over the past nine months, many of the same factors feeding piracy there have relevance elsewhere.
From Panama to Malacca
The rash of pirate attacks off the Horn of Africa and Gulf of Aden in 2008 and 2009 has cast into sharp light an enduring problem that affects not only that region but also many other areas of the world. The Gulf of Aden and waters around the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula have stolen the majority of international headlines, accounting for about 38 percent of all piracy attacks in 2008. Other high-risk zones include the waters off Nigeria, Indonesia, Tanzania, Bangladesh, and India, which collectively accounted for 57 percent of incidents last year that were not related to the Horn of Africa (see the figure).
Outside the Horn of Africa, Incidents of Piracy in 2008 Occurred Mostly off Nigeria, Indonesia, Tanzania, Bangladesh, and India
SOURCE: ICC International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: Annual Report 2008.
NOTES: Total actual and attempted incidents in 2008: 293. The Horn of Africa includes 19 incidents off Somalia plus 92 in the Gulf of Aden, all committed by Somali pirates. India/Sri Lanka includes 10 incidents off India plus 1 incident off Sri Lanka.
A total of 1,845 actual or attempted acts of piracy were registered around the world between 2003 and the end of 2008, which equates to an average annual rate of around 308. The true figure is undoubtedly greater because in many cases (possibly as many as 50 percent), ship owners are reluctant to report attacks against their vessels out of concern that this will merely trigger higher maritime insurance premiums and result in lengthy and costly investigations.
The scale and sophistication of piracy have jumped markedly in recent years, especially in the waters off East Africa. The Somali-based gangs that routinely hijack large ocean-going vessels in this region have exhibited a proven capacity to operate as far as 500 nautical miles from shore, with some attacks taking place closer to the Seychelles than to the Horn of Africa. There has also been a discernible spike in hostage-taking. In 2008, 889 crewmembers were abducted, the highest figure on record and a 207-percent increase above the 2007 total. This year, of course, Somali pirates held Maersk Alabama Captain Richard Phillips, of Vermont, hostage for five days before U.S. Navy Seals rescued him.
While Somalia has been the focus over the past nine months, many of the same factors feeding piracy there have relevance elsewhere. The enormous volume of commercial freight being funneled through congested and ambush-prone maritime bottlenecks around the world creates age-old opportunities for pirates in and around places such as the Panama Canal, Suez Canal, Strait of Hormuz, Strait of Bosporus, Strait of Malacca, and Strait of Bab el-Mandab at the mouth of the Red Sea.
Skeletons Adrift
The first additional contributory factor in today’s maritime economy is the growing reliance on skeleton crews, both as a cost-cutting measure and as a reflection of advanced navigation technology. Although this reduced manning is undoubtedly more efficient, the smaller number of sailors now on board many vessels has reduced the options for antipiracy watches and made the pirates’ task of seizing control of ships that much easier.
Second, the usual difficulties associated with maritime surveillance have been intensified as a result of 9/11 and the concomitant pressure exerted on many governments to invest in expensive land-based homeland security initiatives. This diversion of funds has further reduced what in many cases were already limited resources for monitoring territorial waters, particularly in the Philippines, Indonesia, Turkey, Eritrea, and Kenya.
Third, lax coastal and port security has played an important role in enabling low-level pirate activity, especially harbor thefts against ships at anchor. Problems of this sort have been particularly evident in Brazil and East Africa, and across South and Southeast Asia. In many cases, either there is no functioning maritime police presence at all or the police units in place are devoid of adequate staff, boats, equipment, and training.
Fourth, corruption and easily compromised judicial systems have opened opportunities for complicity of government officials, bureaucrats, and security forces in high-level pirate rings. The nature of this involvement has been extensive, from giving pirates intelligence on ship movements and locations to helping pirates with the rapid discharge of stolen cargoes.
Fifth, the endemic anarchic situation in Somalia has directly contributed to the rampant scale of piracy that we are currently witnessing off the Horn of Africa. With no sovereign government in place, gangs have virtual free run of the area, enjoying widespread latitude to enforce “rules” that further and protect their own vested interests.
Sixth, the ready willingness of ship owners to pay increasingly large sums of money for the return of their vessels and cargoes has raised incentives to engage in maritime crime. Somali pirates netted at least $20 million in ransoms last year, with the negotiated release of the Saudi-registered Sirius Star allegedly running to an unprecedented $3 million. For many gangs, the prospect of windfall profits such as these far outweighs any attendant risk of being caught or confronted by naval and coast guard patrol boats.
Finally, the global proliferation of small arms has given pirates, among others, the means to operate on a more destructive and sophisticated level. Originating from a variety of sources in Africa, Asia, and Europe, these munitions include everything from pistols, machine guns, and automatic assault rifles to antiship mines, hand-held mortars, and rocket-propelled grenades. The availability of these weapons — most of which are readily transportable, easy to handle, cheap, and durable — is one of the main underlying causes of the growing level of violence that has come to typify piracy in recent years.
Dangers: Beyond Blackbeard
The dangers of contemporary piracy are complex and multifaceted. At the most basic level, pirate attacks constitute a direct threat to the lives and welfare of the citizens of a variety of maritime nations. Apart from the risk of death or injury, many who have been subjected to an attack suffer considerable mental trauma and may never go to sea again.
Economically, piracy has a direct impact in terms of fraud, stolen cargo, and delayed trips and could undermine a maritime state’s trading ability. Today, the overall annual cost of piracy to the maritime industry is estimated to be anywhere between $1 billion and $16 billion. The true figure could be far higher, especially when factoring in the expenses incurred from implementing mitigation efforts.
Politically, piracy can play a pivotal role in undermining and weakening governing legitimacy by breeding corruption among elected officials and bureaucrats. This has been a recurrent problem in Indonesia, which until 2008 was consistently designated as the most pirate-prone hot spot in the world.
AP IMAGES/TOFAYEL AHMED
Local people carry the body of a fisherman after it is recovered from the ice chamber of a fishing trawler about 185 miles south of Dhaka, Bangladesh, in October 2004. Pirates had attacked the trawler, killing 14 of its crew before stuffing them into an ice chamber.
Finally, piracy has the potential to trigger a major environmental catastrophe, especially if an attacked vessel is left to drift in a congested sea-lane. In the nightmare scenario of a mid-sea collision involving a loaded oil tanker, not only would the resulting discharge of petroleum irreparably damage offshore resources and marine life, it would also seriously degrade long stretches of fertile coastal lowlands if the oil were to drift ashore. This would pose significant difficulties to any state that relies on the oceans as a primary source of food, either for domestic consumption or for regional or international export.
Laws of the Seas?
The rapid escalation of armed attacks off the Horn of Africa has prompted unprecedented counter-piracy action by the international community, mostly of a military nature. In January, the United States announced the formation of Combined Task Force 151, a flotilla of naval ships with planned assets from more than a dozen nations, to monitor and patrol maritime corridors in the Gulf of Aden. This force will supplement a yearlong European Union (EU) flotilla that was deployed late last year, with contributions from the United Kingdom, France, Spain, Germany, and Greece. Several other nations have also sent ships to the region, including India, China, Russia, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, and South Korea. Expected to add to these forces later this year are Australia, the United Arab Emirates, and possibly Turkey. The United Nations Security Council has also authorized all these so-called “cooperating states” to do whatever necessary to counter pirate gangs operating in Somalia’s territorial and maritime space.
Although these initiatives have ensured the delivery of relief supplies to African Union peacekeepers in Somalia and thwarted several attempted hijackings, their overall utility is somewhat questionable. The area to be monitored — over a million square miles — is huge. Issues of national interest are bound to arise. It is not apparent how the EU flotilla will be funded and whether the potentially thorny issue of cost-sharing has even been broached. Questions of legal jurisdiction have yet to be settled, particularly in terms of prosecuting detained suspects, and appropriate rules of engagement have still to be fully fleshed out.
Employing force against pirate dens in Somalia also raises the specter of large-scale civilian damage and concomitant accusations that the West is intent on destroying innocent Muslim lives. Most fundamentally, the deployment of naval frigates will address piracy only at its end point, on the sea, rather than at its root, on the land.
To overcome these limitations, the international community should balance its hard-line initiatives with more innovative, nonmilitary strategies. To begin, it should focus more adroitly on boosting the coastal monitoring and interdiction capabilities of all the littoral states in the vicinity of the Horn of Africa and Arabian Peninsula. A good start would be to provide these states with surveillance assets, training, and technical support.
The deployment of naval frigates will address piracy only at its end point, on the sea, rather than at its root, on the land.
The international community should also expand public-private efforts to market and sell the requisite defensive technologies. Three of these show particular promise: ShipLoc (an inexpensive satellite tracking device that allows shipping companies to use a dedicated Web site to monitor the exact locations of their vessels anywhere in the world), Secure-Ship (a nonlethal electrical perimeter fence designed to prevent unauthorized boarding), and a suite of long-range acoustic devices that emit loud and disorienting blasts of sound upon intruder entry.
Meanwhile, the maritime industry must be given greater financial incentives to adhere to basic security protocols, such as avoiding dangerous routes, maintaining constant antipiracy watches, keeping in close contact with nearby vessels, and maneuvering at sufficient speed. Incentives could include the offer of lower insurance premiums or, if there is noncompliance with security protocols, the threat of higher ones.
Finally, and admittedly most vexing — because piracy off the Horn of Africa is essentially an extension of the land-based violence, corruption, and lawlessness that has plagued Somalia since the collapse of the Mohamed Siad Barre dictatorship in 1991 — greater effort must be devoted to restoring a semblance of stability to this war-torn country. Until this void in governance is decisively filled, the waters off the Horn of Africa and Arabian Peninsula will remain a highly attractive theater for armed maritime crime, given the expanse, lack of regulation, and importance of these waters as a vital maritime corridor linking the Mediterranean Sea with the Indian Ocean. 
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