Shifting Terrain
Stabilization Operations Require a Better Balance Between Civilian and Military Efforts
The ongoing stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan have underscored the need for U.S. leaders to rethink the civilian and military components of such operations. In general, the balance of efforts needs to shift away from military services and toward civilian agencies better suited to the work. For the foreseeable future, though, U.S. military forces will need to continue performing some of these tasks, because a lack of security will severely hamper the ability of civilians to work in these areas.
AP IMAGES/B. K. BANGASH
Pakistani children and a young man, survivors of an October 2005 earthquake, peer from their tent, which was provided by the U.S. Agency for International Development, in January 2006.
To provide guidance for U.S. military forces involved in these activities, we identify the key civilian agencies that should be involved in the planning and implementation of stability operations. We also highlight some of the organizational and budgetary hurdles that lie ahead and recommend ways to surmount them. A prime example of such a hurdle is conducting international policing missions. We suggest that the United States create a high-end civilian police force rather than requiring U.S. military forces to execute these missions. In international policing missions, as in other areas of stability operations, the goals are to ensure a coordinated effort across all U.S. government agencies and to bring in some of the specialized expertise that exists in civilian agencies.
Building civilian capacity will be a long-term effort. In the meantime, the military services — particularly the U.S. Army, which has assumed the bulk of the duties for stability operations — can perform these missions in ways that are more likely to promote the long-term economic development and the stewardship of essential environmental resources necessary for stabilization.
Civilian Partners
Since 2003, in light of criticism of the initial U.S. reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, there has been a great deal of discussion among policymakers about revising the way that the United States plans and conducts its stabilization missions. The emphasis of this discussion has been on ensuring a common U.S. strategy rather than a collection of individual departmental and agency efforts and on mobilizing all available U.S. government assets in the operations.
The U.S. Army has great interest in the success of such an approach to stability operations. The army wants civilian agencies to become more capable partners in these operations. One of the most vexing problems, however, centers on the issue of civilian agency participation in strategic planning and implementation. For this reason, we sought to identify the civilian agencies with relevant capabilities and how the army can collaborate best with them.
Among the agencies that need to be heavily involved in providing economic assistance in stability operations, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is the crucial partner, because it is the only major U.S. government organization that focuses solely on international development. The U.S. Department of State is the other main partner, because it is responsible for developing the rule of law and building democracy. The U.S. Department of Justice provides training for foreign judges and police forces. The U.S. Department of the Treasury is a key supporter of USAID economic stabilization efforts. The U.S. Department of Agriculture promotes sustainable agricultural production and economic growth. And the Office of Management and Budget plays a critical role in coordinating the funding of stabilization efforts. Of course, the list of U.S. departments and agencies in which relevant expertise resides is far longer. But the list above includes the U.S. government organizations that are generally included in the strategic planning process for stabilization operations.
Compared with the U.S. Army, USAID and the State Department are relatively small organizations, with limited surge capacity to support large-scale, complex missions. Based on the current numbers and availability of appropriate personnel, the capacity of the army in stabilization operations dwarfs the number of employees in these two civilian institutions.
Figure 1 — More Than 80 Percent of U.S. Government Funding to Rebuild Iraq Was Controlled by the Defense Department
SOURCE: Integrating Civilian Agencies in Stability Operations, 2009.
Recent budgets reflect the preponderance of military efforts. Compared with U.S. Department of Defense budgets, the State Department and USAID budgets are very small. Even when it comes to stabilization missions only, the defense budget overwhelms that of the other civilian agencies. As shown in Figure 1, more than 80 percent of U.S. government funding for security, humanitarian, and reconstruction assistance to Iraq through fiscal year 2007 was controlled by the Defense Department, with the State Department and USAID playing much smaller roles.
Numbers tell only part of the story. There is also a different orientation between strictly civilian agencies and military ones. The focus of the former is on the steady state, whereas the focus of the latter is contingency response. In a nutshell, the difference boils down to a contrast between the ways a police department and a fire department operate. Civilian agencies operate on the police department model of continuous full employment and have little slack in the system, whereas the military operates more on the fire department model of preparing for and responding to emergencies. Police departments react to sudden major outbreaks of crime by redeploying personnel from their usual duties, meaning that some areas then have less police presence and are put at greater risk. In contrast, fire departments exist to deal with occasional but potentially catastrophic threats.
The difference boils down to a contrast between the ways a police department and a fire department operate.
The different orientations mean that most of the civilian personnel with expertise relevant to stability operations cannot be redeployed for such operations without harming other U.S. commitments, unless the United States were to abandon or to scale down some of its other responsibilities abroad. The creation of a Civilian Response Corps, as described in detail below, aims to address this problem. While promising, the Civilian Response Corps remains at an early stage of development.
Civilian Capacities
The most important step taken by the U.S. government in recent years to build its capacity for stabilization and reconstruction operations is the creation within the State Department of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. The mission of this office is to coordinate and lead U.S. government efforts across the full range of stabilization operations. The office’s most ambitious effort to date is the Civilian Stabilization Initiative, which includes the Civilian Response Corps as a deployable civilian capacity.
As planned, the Civilian Response Corps will have three components: an active component composed of 250 full-time U.S. government personnel from eight U.S. agencies who can deploy within 24 hours; a standby component composed of 2,000 personnel from the same agencies who receive training and can deploy within 30 days for up to six months; and a reserve component composed of 2,000 personnel from the private sector and state and local governments who have unique skills not found in the federal government. The biggest problem with the corps is that the U.S. Congress has only recently started allocating funds to make it fully operational.
AP IMAGES/HADI MIZBAN
Italian carabinieri train Iraqi National Police during an exercise in Baghdad on June 23, 2009.
Meanwhile, the funding mismatch persists between the Defense Department and the rest of the civilian agencies, perpetuating the lack of deployable civilian capacity and leading the military to take on many stabilization missions by default. Further impeding coordination, no fewer than eight U.S. congressional committees oversee matters of stabilization and reconstruction. Therefore, in addition to emphasizing civilian over military capabilities, the other top priorities for U.S. stabilization and reconstruction operations should be to realign the roles of U.S. government agencies and to fund the full implementation of the Civilian Stabilization Initiative.
If the development of military capabilities in the Defense Department continues to outpace the development of civilian capabilities in the State Department and USAID, this would strengthen the global perception that the U.S. military is the nation’s primary instrument of power, raising concerns internationally that would not be raised by developmental and assistance agencies. This trend would also likely prove ineffective, because the expertise for stabilization and reconstruction missions lies mostly outside the military. The organization best equipped to conduct these operations is USAID, which already has an expeditionary culture and controls the majority of programs related to these missions.
USAID capabilities will require significant upgrading, however, to allow the agency to assume the leadership role in implementation. The upgrades will involve transformations of recruiting, training, management, and deployment practices in addition to significant new resources. The National Security Council, which is part of the Office of the President, should continue to take overall responsibility for the interagency coordination of military and civilian efforts, and the State Department should develop longer-term strategies and policies to support USAID-led operations.
Although the Civilian Stabilization Initiative is currently the U.S. government’s most important effort to build civilian capacity, it still exists mostly as a promise. The Obama administration should work closely with the U.S. Congress to convince the relevant appropriations committees that relatively small investments in this area will provide large returns in ensuring that the United States can adequately respond to the global challenges of stabilization and reconstruction.
Stability Police Force
Unlike other Western countries, the United States lacks a “stability police force,” which is a rapidly deployable civilian force that engages in high-end police tasks such as riot control, special weapons and tactics, and the investigation of organized criminal groups. Good examples of high-end police forces are those often deployed overseas by the Italian carabinieri or the French gendarmerie.
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States and other Western powers have been involved in an increasing number of stability operations, from the Balkans and Haiti to Afghanistan and Iraq (see Figure 2). These operations generally require the deployment of international forces, both military and police, to help establish security until indigenous forces can take over.
Figure 2 — The Number of U.S. and Non-U.S. Stability and Peacekeeping Operations Has Risen Since the End of the Cold War
SOURCE: United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations.
NOTE: These cases include the entirety of stability and peacekeeping operations since 1948.
Most military forces are not trained to conduct policing tasks in a civilian environment. In Kosovo and Bosnia, the United States has relied on other countries or international organizations to provide police. But in Iraq and Afghanistan, few or no civilian police officers have been used. The United States has a mixed track record in establishing law and order in international environments, partly because it lacks this policing component.
While the allies make important contributions, the United States should not depend on allies to supply police. Doing so would limit U.S. freedom of action on the world stage. It is time for the United States to build its own high-end civilian police capacity for international missions.
Historically, policing functions in the United States have been carried out at the state and local levels, with only limited law enforcement powers granted to federal agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. Limits on federal power are constitutionally rooted in the Tenth Amendment and have been recognized, especially in the policing arena, since the earliest days of the country.
AP IMAGES/RAHMAT GUL
An Afghan worker packs honey cans at a honey production company in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, on May 12, 2009. The U.S. Agency for International Development helped establish the honey facility through financial and technical assistance.
Nonetheless, we identified four potentially suitable headquarters for a federal U.S. stability police force: the U.S. Marshals Service in the Department of Justice, the U.S. Secret Service in the Department of Homeland Security, the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs in the Department of State, and the Military Police of the U.S. Army. We concluded that the U.S. Marshals Service would be the most likely to succeed in fielding a stability police force and would thus be the agency best suited to take on this mission.
Created by the Judiciary Act of 1789, the U.S. Marshals Service is the nation’s oldest federal law enforcement agency and has the broadest of mandates: to be the chief law officers of the federal courts. Best known for maintaining law and order in the Wild West, the service more recently promoted civil rights by helping to integrate the University of Mississippi and the New Orleans public schools. Although building a stability police force would be challenging for the service, it has many of the needed skills and could develop the remaining ones with a hybrid staffing plan.
Our proposed hybrid force, as opposed to a reserve or standing force, would retain some personnel in a ready posture for immediate deployment, while others would work in federal, state, and local police agencies to gain crucial experience in their core areas of responsibility when not deployed. The federal government would pay some or all of the salaries and benefits of personnel when not deployed, yielding thousands of additional police officers across the United States, and all of the salaries and benefits of personnel when deployed. This hybrid personnel model would provide the optimum mix of readiness opportunities and skills development, while offering substantial domestic policing and homeland security benefits.
Agencies that benefit from the nondeployed personnel would agree in advance that the federal parent agency could “call up” the personnel whenever needed. Their deployment rates would be approximately the same as for the U.S. military — no more than one year out of three.
We estimated the annual costs for a stability police force of three different sizes — 1,000, 4,000, and 6,000 police officers — and four different personnel options (full-time military, military reservists, full-time civilians, and the hybrid civilian plan). As shown in Figure 3, the reserve option (which, by definition, is not rapidly deployable) is the cheapest at $396 million per year for the large force size. The hybrid civilian option is the next least expensive at $637 million per year. Because of the additional costs of providing facilities, the full-time civilian option is $870 million per year, and the military option is the most expensive of all at $907 million per year.
Figure 3 — Fielding a New U.S. Stability Police Force Could Be Cheaper Than Using Military Forces
SOURCE: A Stability Police Force for the United States, 2009.
A new U.S. stability police force would provide a net savings for the U.S. government during periods of persistent conflict, because deploying the civilian force would be cheaper than using military units for international policing tasks. The cost of creating such a force is probably less than the cost of not having this capability at all. Had the United States been able to establish law and order in any one of several of its interventions since the early 1990s, it is likely that this step would have decreased the duration of operations and saved money and lives.
A stability police force based in the U.S. Marshals Service would not only act as a force multiplier in critical situations overseas but would also contribute to federal government efforts in the event of disasters within the United States. Had such a force been available at the time of Hurricane Katrina, law enforcement efforts in New Orleans might have been performed better.
Economic Development
Even if the army can leave many high-end policing duties and other reconstruction tasks to others, army personnel will most likely remain involved in supporting economic development in stability operations for the foreseeable future. Army officers can play important roles in six economic development areas: humanitarian assistance, infrastructure, agriculture, finance (currencies, budgets, banking, and foreign trade), private-sector development and employment generation, and natural resource management. RAND offers a guidebook and checklists for commanders overseeing these areas, based on U.S. experiences in Afghanistan, Iraq, Liberia, and the Balkans.
The potential army tasks associated with humanitarian assistance go beyond distributing food, setting up shelter, offering medical care, and securing populations at risk. Also important are protecting roads, ports, airports, warehouses, and relief personnel. It is equally important for military units to repair the infrastructure required for humanitarian assistance, from electrical utilities to water and sewage systems.
AP IMAGES/GREG BAKER
Refugees from the fighting in Swat Valley sit with their livestock and belongings in the back of a truck as they pass through a checkpoint at Sher Gar, in northwest Pakistan, on May 15, 2009.
Maintaining infrastructure should usually be the responsibility of the host government and private companies, but U.S. Army forces might have to step in if essential services are not being provided. The army can protect transportation, telecommunications, and energy grids; give host governments engineering support; coordinate construction projects, select priorities, award contracts, and monitor progress; and remedy damage caused by U.S. operations. Safeguarding the infrastructure can spur private-sector activity and win the support of the local population.
In the area of agriculture, the U.S. Army has become increasingly involved in helping farmers earn higher incomes. In the future, the army can expect to be involved in conducting assessments of important crops, livestock, locations of major markets, transportation routes, and storage facilities in areas that are being stabilized. After coordinating with other actors, army units can also provide agricultural supplies; protect markets, stocks, and transportation routes; initiate local irrigation, veterinary, and breeding programs; and return arable land to production.
For tactical commanders, the first issues that come to mind typically do not include exchange rates.
For tactical commanders, the first issues that come to mind typically do not include exchange rates, inflation, national budgets, finance, and foreign trade. But if inflation is high, the exchange rate is collapsing, or government employees (notably soldiers) are not receiving paychecks, then local residents lose faith in their government, and U.S. forces face a taller order. Among the potential army tasks in this domain are securing looted or diverted stockpiles of currency, securing key financial institutions, ensuring the timely distribution of a new currency, bolstering electronic payment systems, and making sure that ports of entry are run safely and efficiently.
In situations in which army forces are supporting private-sector development, the focus should be on improving the investment climate and enabling entrepreneurs. Possible army tasks include identifying obstacles to economic activity; relaying information about harmful regulations or corrupt officials to commanders and civilian agencies; using public works programs to hire key populations (able-bodied workers who cannot find jobs, widows, or people maimed in the conflict); and scheduling programs for maximum effect, avoiding the harvest or planting seasons.
Economic recovery will falter if the host government and private companies cannot extract, ship, and sell natural resources because of a lack of security. The U.S. Army could identify the forces — government, insurgent, or private — that are protecting or attempting to control important natural resources; secure mines, forests, oil fields, processing plants, and other natural resource infrastructure; repair roads or bridges to facilitate logging operations and oil or gas deliveries; and enforce bans on illicit trade in resources such as gems, metals, or timber.
Environmental Stewardship
The trend over the past 15 years toward longer deployments and greater involvement in stability operations raises the importance of addressing environmental concerns: clean water, sewage treatment, hazardous-waste management, soldier health, sustainability, agricultural and natural resources, historical and cultural sites, and compliance with local environmental laws. By better managing these issues during deployments, U.S. Army units can gain advantages that will help throughout the combat and post-conflict operations and boost the likelihood of mission success.
Even during combat, army leaders can take steps to preserve the environmental infrastructure and resources that will be vital once combat ends. Determining what to preserve will demand that army leaders expand their range of view to encompass what the end result ought to look like.
The priorities of local inhabitants are often clean drinking water, effective sewage and trash collection systems, and arable farmland.
For example, U.S. forces should not worsen environmental problems by disposing of their waste improperly, failing to clean up their fuel spills, or damaging farmland, water supplies, or other essential resources. Conversely, reconstruction projects that improve environmental conditions can foster a positive attitude toward the United States and the host-nation government it supports. This goodwill can yield tangible benefits, aiding the economic and social development necessary for long-term stability and improving the cooperation with locals, which in turn can improve intelligence, reduce security risks, and speed construction projects and the transition to a civilian government.
In countries in which environmental conditions and infrastructure have been severely degraded, the priorities of local inhabitants are often clean drinking water, effective sewage treatment and trash collection systems, and arable farmland. U.S. soldiers have helped to build wells, sewage treatment plants, and other water infrastructure systems in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Balkans. The experience in Iraq suggests that safeguarding these and other life-sustaining resources can influence whether the inhabitants support the local government and U.S. goals (see Figure 4).
Figure 4 — Iraqis Think Environmental Issues Are Important
SOURCE: Green Warriors, 2008; opinion poll of the Iraqi public in February 2005.
Environmental consequences can easily transcend national borders, spilling over into neighboring or even distant countries. Poor environmental practices can hinder diplomatic relations with these countries and jeopardize U.S. access to foreign bases.
Environmental issues can also affect soldier health and safety. Long deployments and extended operations such as those in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Balkans expose U.S. forces to a variety of environmental problems. At one base camp in Afghanistan, longstanding pollution caused respiratory illnesses for U.S. soldiers until the problem was identified and addressed. Such conditions increase the cost of operations and the logistical burden of supporting the troops.
Despite the effect that environmental conditions can have on troop health, safety, and security, and despite their importance for the local population and neighboring countries, environmental concerns are inadequately considered in the planning and conduct of U.S. Army operations today. The principal reason for this shortfall is the lack of emphasis — by army leadership and in army training and doctrine — on environmental matters as critical components of overseas operations. The army also has too few qualified environmental officers for these operations, insufficient funding for environmental programs and equipment in the field, and insufficient oversight of its own private contractors during these operations.
Balancing environmental factors with other factors that contribute to mission success will require changes in army policy, planning, training, soldier attitudes, resource allocation, and overall awareness. Commanders and soldiers should understand that good environmental practices make good mission sense, even in combat operations. As long as the army remains involved in stabilization and reconstruction operations, it needs to promote environmental stewardship as a core function of these operations. It does no good to win the war only to forfeit the peace. 
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