Stephen T. Hosmer

Why Was the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion So Weak? - 2007

Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak - 2007

Counterinsurgency: A Symposium, April 16-20, 1962 - 2006

Operations Against Enemy Leaders - 2001

Operations Against Enemy Leaders - 2001

The Conflict Over Kosovo: Why Milosevic Decided to Settle When He Did - 2001

Why Milosevic Decided to Settle the Conflict Over Kosovo When He Did - 2001

Strategic Appraisal: The Changing Role of Information in Warfare - 1999

Bettering the Balance: Large Wars and Small Contingencies - 1997

Maximizing the Psychological Effects of Airpower: Lessons from Past Wars - 1996

Psychological Effects of U.S. Air Operations in Four Wars, 1941-1991: Lessons for U.S. Commanders - 1996

The Army's Role in Counterinsurgency and Insurgency - 1990

The Military and Political Potential of Conventionally Armed Heavy Bombers - 1987

Countering Covert Aggression - 1986

Constraints on U.S. Strategy in Third World Conflict - 1985

Constraints on U.S. Strategy in Third World Conflict: Implications for Certain Contingencies - 1985

Constraints on U.S. Military Strategies in Past Third World Conflicts - 1984

The Fall of South Vietnam: Statements by Vietnamese Military and Civilian Leaders - 1978

Viet Cong Repression and Its Implications for the Future - 1970

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