
CONCLUDING REMARKS

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**Urban Operations:
The Road Ahead**

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If history is a guide, and I think it is, and I think most people in this room would agree, in the coming years and decades we are going to see more operations in urban terrain rather than fewer. And we are going to see American casualties taken. The work of the people in this room, through their pulling together joint, interagency, and international expertise, can make a big difference, a big difference not just in reducing casualties but also in mission success.



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Historical Examples


- Peloponnesian Wars (Syracuse & Athens)
 - Punic Wars (Rome & Carthage)
 - Napoleonic Wars (Vienna & Moscow)
 - American Civil War (Richmond, Atlanta, DC)
 - World War II (Berlin, Manila)
- Cold War (Seoul, Hue City, Kabul, Beirut)
 - Post Cold War (Kuwait City, Mogadishu, Sarajevo, Mitrovica, Belgrade, Grozny...)

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The historical record is clear. Built-up areas have been central to conflict since the time cities were created. The control of cities has been central to success in conflict. Wick Murray, an historian, has written a nice short paper summarizing the role of cities in 19th-century and 20th-century conflict. Because most of you concur regarding the importance of cities I won't go into the details of these conflicts.

In preparing to speak, I reviewed something I hadn't looked at for 20 years: Thucydides' *Peloponnesian Wars*. One might be tempted to draw an analogy between the over-stretched great power Athens and the United States today. However, the analogy is very imperfect. One difference offers insight into urban operations for the United States. Athens was attempting to impose its will by coercion— ironic as that is considering that it was the birthplace of democracy. What the United States is trying to do in its national security strategy is support human rights, support democracy, and support free trade. The fact that we hold these values, and that we are attempting to

uphold these values internationally, imposes serious restrictions on how we conduct conflict—particularly on urban terrain.



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Why Cities Are Important

- Political, Economic, Psychological Centers of Gravity
- Key Logistical and Operational Hubs/Landscape
- Possible Sanctuary for Adversary Forces
- “Because That’s Where They Keep the People”

U.S. Military Dominance in the Open but
Significant Limitations in Cities

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Cities have been important in the past. They are important today, and they will be at least as important in the future. With U.S. dominance in open terrain, more opponents are going to look at moving conflicts into the cities.

Cities hold most of a nation’s worth and logistical support. They are a center of gravity. However, that statement doesn’t capture the full importance of urban areas. Cities are a central focal point for national and ethnic identity. Think about what it means if you’re fighting for your city, for your country, for your tribe.

You may recall the famous bank robber Willie Sutton. When asked why he robbed banks, he said, “Because that’s where the money is.” In part, that’s why conflicts will occur in the cities, because that’s where the people are. A significant number of future operations are going to be humanitarian. To deliver that aid you have to go into the city, where the people are. Peacekeeping operations will require going into the cities to protect the people. Disaster relief operations will require entering cities to restore normalcy for the people there.

Even during major theater wars we could expect to find significant conflict taking place in cities.

The “CNN effect,” which was coined around the time of Mogadishu, will only increase with globalization, including the growth of the Internet. That trend is going to make it more difficult to win urban conflicts at the strategic level.



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Some Urban Missions

- Destroy Key Targets in a City (Baghdad, Belgrade)
- Peacekeeping (Mitrovica)
- Capture a City (Kuwait City, Grozny)
- Defend a City (Seoul, Srebrenica)
- Humanitarian Assistance (Port-au-Prince)
- Point Defense (Ports/Airfields, Embassies)
- Point Offense (WMD sites, Raids, NEOs, Rescues)
- Civil Support (LA Riots, Olympics, Seattle)


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Here are some of the key missions we have found ourselves executing in the past. Together they amount to the full range of military conflict. Everything we find ourselves doing, we'll be doing in cities.

At the bottom of the chart you'll notice that not all of these missions have been done outside of the United States. Some lessons learned from urban operations are applicable to operations in which the military support civilian authorities in American cities. The National Guard in particular has taken on a number of roles, to include disaster relief and WMD consequence management.


All of the missions on the chart share a few features:

- Interagency planning and execution are required for success, and all but that last category require coalition operations.
- All of them put a premium on rapid and decisive response.
- All of them put a premium on force protection and minimizing noncombatant casualties to win at the strategic level.



Destroy Key Targets

- Precision attack
 - Minimize risk to friendly forces
 - Preferred approach



Challenges

- Need accurate real-time intel
- Hidden/buried/co-located targets
- Collateral damage
- Affecting events on ground

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I'm going to go through a few of the missions to show where we stand today and what some of the difficulties are.


Precision Attack is a good way to minimize both friendly and non-combatant casualties—when it is in fact possible. If it can be done, this is obviously the preferred approach. Shown here is a bomb damage assessment image from Operation Desert Fox (Iraq), where we took out some command-and-control facilities and had limited success in taking out a WMD facility.

Aerial attack—and even .50 caliber sniper rifles—have significant challenges and serious limitations in urban terrain. You often need boots on the ground to be successful in applying precision force, and to seize and hold terrain. Rules of engagement and the desire to minimize noncombatant casualties limit the use of lethal force.

There are some new concepts for applying precision force in cities, and this is an area where further work is warranted. I recommend to

you the recent RAND paper¹ that explores new concepts for air operations in urban terrain.


¹A. Vick et al., *Aerospace Operations in Urban Environments: Exploring New Concepts*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, MR-1187-AF, 2000.


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Peacekeeping

Challenges


- Combatant/ Noncombatant Mix
 - Timely threat ID
 - Minimize innocent casualties
- Risks to friendly forces
- Coordination with NGOs/ PVOs/local authorities
- Maintaining support (local, domestic, int'l)



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Here we see American soldiers in Kosovo doing door-to-door weapons searches. The women do not seem overawed; that's a good sign when you're doing peacekeeping operations.


There are significant differences in how the different contingents in Kosovo are conducting their peacekeeping operations. How each does force protection and how proactive each is at preventing conflict provides lessons for the others. A continued international effort outside of real world operations, i.e., concept development and experimentation, would facilitate overcoming these challenges.


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Capturing a City

Challenges

- Force protection
- Combatants hiding among innocent
- Defeating adversary without destroying the city—and adding to strategic problem
- Maintaining popular support



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Capture a City

These pictures are from Grozny, the lessons of which are still being debated. We've seen a big shift in Russian tactics from 1994 to this latest conflict.

There were significant casualties on both sides. Some of you may have seen the recent news reports for the funeral of 86 Russian paratroopers in Moscow. The CNN effect has been suppressed in Grozny, but it has had some effect in Russia.

If you look at the Russian operations in Grozny you'll see that there were significant civilian casualties and much of the city was destroyed. It is seriously open to question as to how long-term Russian national security interests are being advanced and how this will play out.

There is an opportunity to work with the Russians and learn from each other.




The slide shows the result of one failed attempt to defend a city because of a lack of capabilities. At the bottom of the slide is a picture of General Krstic on trial at The Hague.

The first lesson is to avoid getting into a situation like that of the Dutch peacekeepers: outnumbered and outgunned. It would be useful to think about how to defend against a larger force that is technologically inferior. Nonlethal weapons may hold some promise. Lethal weapons would have certainly been called for in this case.

One could also think about a small force defending against a technologically inferior population, as was in part the situation in Mogadishu.

If we and our allies are more prepared in the future, then perhaps we will be less likely to have to look again at images like this.



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Challenges (A Partial List)

- Restrictive ROE
 - Risks to U.S./Allied Personnel
 - Intermingling of Noncombatants
- Coordination with NGOs/PVOs/Local Authorities
- Geospatial Representation & Navigation
- Urban Intelligence Collection/Dissemination
- Communication in Urban Canyons
- Non-Lethal Weapons Issues

POTENTIAL FOR STRATEGIC IMPACT

A Daunting Challenge Nobody Wants

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This is just a partial list of the challenges in conducting urban operations.


The bottom line is that urban operations are tough to do, whether during peace operations or warfighting. There will be a serious risk of casualties to all parties involved, but it's a job that we will be doing in the future and will have to do well.

A comment on non-lethal weapons, which some see as a panacea. I think they have some real potential if we can work through the tricky policy and legal issues involved. I would like to encourage those involved in that to press on. Through field experimentation, including policy and legal reviews, we can work through some of the more difficult issues.

The focus of this chart is on the tactical and operational levels. However, each of the challenges listed could cause something to happen very quickly at the strategic level.

The CNN effect, globalization, and the rapid dissemination of information and images are going to be more important in the future. We think of Operation Allied Force as an air war. The Washington Post ran a series on the conflict that featured 27 photographs. Five photos were about diplomacy and showed decision makers. Five were on airpower and pictured aircraft. The rest were of people suffering.

The strategist saw the conflict in geopolitical and national interest terms, looking at issues such as the coherence of NATO and the effectiveness of airpower. But a lot of people—most people in the U.S. and likely overseas—saw the conflict as a human interest story rather than a national interest one. That fact has strategic implications and is essential to understand if one wants to win at the strategic level.



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National Defense Panel

- Findings
 - Increasing likelihood of operations in cities
 - Difficult conditions include noncombatants, skyscraper “jungles”
 - Possible contingencies include targeting and strike, urban control, urban defense, eviction operations
 - Make every effort to avoid unilateral urban operations
- Recommendations
 - Expand research on urban warfare
 - Establish a Joint Urban Warfare Center

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This chart shows what some outside of DoD, the congressionally mandated National Defense Panel in 1997, have had to say about our efforts in urban warfare. The NDP was trying to be very forward looking, out to 2025. It had a section on space warfare and a section on missile defense. You can see their recommendations relating to urban operations.

One of the key conclusions was that urban warfare was going to be more of a problem in the future and that the DoD needed to take significant coordinated action to get better at it.



*US Commission on National Security
Vol. 1: Future Threats*


- Fragmentation or failure of states will occur with destabilizing effects on neighboring states
- Foreign crises will be replete with atrocities and the deliberate terrorizing of civilian populations
- The United States will frequently be called upon to intervene militarily in a time of uncertain alliances

“The emerging security environment in the next quarter century will require different military and other national capabilities.”

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The next major external review of the Department is underway: The Hart-Rudman Commission. It has produced the first part of its report that looks at future security issues and future threats.

Shown are three of the twelve principal recommendations from the first part of the report. Each is directly relevant to urban operations. One of several key conclusions appears at the bottom, which I think also has direct application to urban warfare. It really is going to require the effective integration of all elements of American national power as well as effective interagency and coalition operations.



General Accounting Office Review
February 2000

- SECDEF should designate lead for MOUT
- Designated lead should:
 - Develop DOD-wide strategy
 - Expedite development of training standards
 - Estimate required resources
 - Establish priorities
 - Examine integration of joint experimentation
 - Develop game plan for facilities
- Need to determine MOUT intelligence requirements

DoD agreed

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Now, going from the strategic level to the level of the bean counters. The GAO released a report in February; you can see some of their findings here. DoD agreed with the GAO, with a few minor qualifications.

GAO noted a lot of positive efforts going on: significant Army and Marine Corps efforts, the work of the Joint Staff's Joint Urban Working Group and the considerable progress it has made. What GAO found lacking were resources and a focal point for allocating those resources.



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Some Emerging Capabilities

- Accurate, Up-to-Date Digital Maps
- Real-Time Fused ISR for the Urban Battlespace
 - e.g., UAVs, robotics, unattended sensors
- Navigation Aids
- Minimal Collateral Damage Weapons
- Improved Non-Lethal Capabilities
- Secure, Reliable Comms
- Technologies for Improved Force Protection

Questions:

- How quickly will these capabilities emerge?
- How well will they be integrated to meet operator needs?


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New technologies can help, even if they can't solve the problem on their own, or in concert with new techniques.

The Marine Corps, Army, and SOCOM all have significant efforts under way to try out these new tools and operational concepts. I think it's significant that the Air Force has for the first time recently been involved in experimentation to improve its capabilities in urban operations. The Navy, in one of its most recent fleet battle experiments, supported the Marine Corps during Urban Warrior. So we're moving to better joint concept development and experimentation.

We need to exploit new technologies—and the good work done on the ground by operators. This calls for an integrated joint concept development and experimentation activity to identify the most promising technologies, how can they be exploited for new operational concepts, and to set priorities. A lot of that is going on at the squad and platoon level today. But by integrating various parts of the Department's efforts we can move faster and more effectively.

A second thing we need is a focus on the problem from the perspective of the joint force commander, one that brings together all the component capabilities, agencies, and international partners. As earlier briefers have shown, we saw this work well in some parts of Somalia but work not so well in other parts of that country. The failure to look at what tools the joint force commander needs is a critical missing piece in DoD efforts today. I think we are close to moving ahead on that, as the next slide will show.



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Build a Roadmap to the Future

- Establish Baseline Capabilities
- Identify New Concepts and Emerging Capabilities
- Build on Service, Other Efforts
 - Concept Development and Experimentation
 - Investment in ISR, communications
 - Non-lethal and other technologies
 - Doctrine and training
 - Facilities
- Establish Key Mission Needs and Deficiencies
- Plan Interagency, International Outreach


ENDSTATE: A Plan for Significant Improvement in Joint Capabilities

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The Joint Urban Working Group has laid the foundation for an integrated DoD-wide roadmap. That effort is now underway and being led by the Joint Advanced Warfighting Program. You can see some of the key goals it means to achieve.

The roadmap approach is very simple. Look at what we are doing today and how we are doing it. Establish what the baseline capabilities and concepts are. Identify shortfalls and opportunities, and then prioritize efforts to get better across the board: acquisition, concept development, experimentation, research & development, and then, most importantly, identify new operational concepts.


I want to emphasize the importance of interagency and international participation that includes NGOs and PVOs, or at least proxies for them. Future operations are going to involve them; we need to train with them.



The Joint Urban Working Group reports to the JROC. You can see some of the members arrayed around the JUWG. The JUWG was set up in May 1998.

I think it's incredible what they have accomplished given limited resources. The JUWG has spurred joint doctrine development, and in the meantime developed an operational handbook. It is now reviewing mission needs. It has identified a number of relevant requirements, to include modeling, concept development, and experimentation. That's significant progress.

But it's clear to me that the JUWG has been under-resourced and that we need a focal point in the DoD with greater resources. The JUWG has been appropriately focused at the tactical and operational levels, but I think we need an OSD effort focused on the strategic level, one that drives interagency and international cooperation on both the military and policy sides. Two groups stand out here as shown on the right of the slide: OSD and the JAWP Urban Ops cell, which I'll talk about next.




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An Intermediate Solution...

- DOD ROADMAP
- MODELS AND SIMULATIONS
- CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT
- EXPERIMENTATION

**JAWP URBAN
OPS CELL**



- POLICY
- S&T/ACQUISITION
- READINESS
- PPBS
- C3I
- INTERAGENCY
- INTERNATIONAL
- CONGRESS


**NEEDED SOON:
A SINGLE FOCAL POINT FOR DOD**

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I'll start with the bottom line. We need a single, authoritative focal point in the DoD. I'm not talking about a czar that tells the services what to do, but rather a group with sufficient resources to accelerate joint doctrine development, joint concept development and experimentation—one that can really work the problem from the joint force commander's perspective. His needs are critical in developing new technologies, new concepts, and experiments.

The Joint Urban Working Group has done a great job, but it has had to work with extremely limited resources. The path ahead for the near term is fairly well set: the JAWP is working on a DoD roadmap.

An OSD UWG, as shown on the right in the slide, doesn't really exist today, and I'm not sure if it will exist tomorrow either. Currently we are not optimally organized for this. It's the OSD urban operations champion that we need to cut across all the areas within and outside of OSD.


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Next Steps for DOD...


- **Roadmap** to synchronize activities, set priorities
- **Training** standards, tools, and facilities
- **Joint Experimentation**
 - Investigate New Concepts & Capabilities
 - Leverage New Technologies
 - Conduct Rigorous Red Teaming
 - Recommend Changes in DOTMLPF
- **Integrated effort**—joint, interagency, and multi-national—to improve capabilities

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The next step for DoD is going to be hard. It's going to be hard to get the resources necessary to set up a focal point, develop new technologies, and explore new training approaches. It's going to be hard to deal with the view of some in DoD that we shouldn't be going into cities and shouldn't waste resources improving our capabilities to do so. That view is not a rare one in the department.

The good news is that the Joint Urban Working Group has gotten the department started. There are some impressive activities going on in the services, particularly in the Army and Marine Corps. The amount of joint work is growing and we are developing a roadmap that will synchronize the department's activities.

We are close to having a critical mass of knowledge and people working on the problem to move things ahead.




The Road Ahead

Think

- **Joint, Interagency, Multinational**
- **Tactical, Operational, Strategic**

Work

- **As part of a Team**



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The future will bring American forces into conflicts in cities. We will have casualties. Our success in the operation overall, at the strategic level, will depend on how well we do in the cities. That is going to be a big challenge.

The urban problem won't go away. At the tactical level we have some new approaches to improve our capabilities, but at the strategic level the problem is going to get harder and harder for the reasons I've talked about.

No single person, service, agency, or organization has the complete answer. But the prospects for future improvement in capabilities are good over the next few years given the cooperation of all the parties involved.

Thanks to Russ Glenn and to RAND for sponsoring this important conference. And thanks go to all of you in the room who are working to improve our capabilities for urban operations. Keep pressing hard.