An alternative to the present strategy in Vietnam that views counterinsurgency as composed of three levels of applied countertactics to be simultaneously satisfied: police action; police protection from small squad and platoon-size guerrilla forces; and the containment, dispersal, and destruction of company and larger-size enemy units. What should dominate decisions about the employment of forces is their potential for providing protection to the population in the villages, hamlets, and urban areas. This village defense by combined U.S./Vietnamese units, along with small unit patrolling in the contested and enemy territory, must be part of a larger system that provides support through artillery, air, or ground forces.
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