Cover: Mission Not Accomplished

Mission Not Accomplished

What Went Wrong with Iraqi Reconstruction

Published in: Journal of Strategic Studies, v. 29, no. 3, June 2006, p. 453-473

by Nora Bensahel

Read More

Access further information on this document at www.tandf.co.uk

This article was published outside of RAND. The full text of the article can be found at the link above.

Abstract

This article argues that the prewar planning process for postwar Iraq was plagued by myriad problems, including a dysfunctional interagency process, overly optimistic assumptions, and a lack of contingency planning for alternative outcomes. These problems were compounded by a lack of civilian capacity during the occupation period, which led to a complicated and often uncoordinated relationship with the military authorities who found themselves taking the lead in many reconstruction activities. Taken together, these mistakes meant that US success on the battlefield was merely a prelude to a postwar insurgency whose outcome remains very much in doubt more than three years later.

Research conducted by

This report is part of the RAND Corporation external publication series. Many RAND studies are published in peer-reviewed scholarly journals, as chapters in commercial books, or as documents published by other organizations.

The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.