Chapter Six: Conclusions and Recommendations
CONCLUSIONS
Four broad conclusions can be drawn from this review. First, a militarily
effective dose of any of the agents considered in this review would not have
escaped notice. Such a dose would have produced symptoms requiring treatment
or would have killed the soldiers exposed. While there might have been some
difficulty identifying a specific agent, no symptoms consistent with exposures
to large doses of any of the agents included in this review were reported. One
individual was apparently exposed to mustard gas residual.
Second, low-level exposures to many of these agents could have produced
symptoms that were simply overlooked or attributed to other, more commonplace
sources, such as irritation from dust and sand, upper respiratory infections,
gastroenteritis, asthma, or the flu. The possibility of exposures to low
levels of more than one agent either simultaneously or in relatively close
proximity makes diagnosis difficult. Therefore, on clinical grounds alone, it
is not possible to dismiss low-dose exposures to one or more of the agents or
the possibility that such exposures contributed to some of the symptoms
experienced by the Gulf War veterans. That said, it is difficult to accept
that exposures affecting large numbers of troops would have escaped clinical
notice. Furthermore, the literature reports no clinical symptoms developing
years after exposure, which was the case for about half of the veterans
reporting health problems.
Third, the literature suggests that some interaction may occur between chemical
warfare agents and other factors. Several factors, such as stress, PB, and
anticholinesterase nerve agents, that may contribute to the symptoms seen in
the veterans can activate regulatory genes (such as c-fos) in the brains of
animals. Because of the potential long-term effects of these genes, this
observation may be important. However, the long-term effects in animals and
the clinical significance for humans remain to be determined. Epidemiological
studies of illnesses in the veterans might consider the possibility of
aggregate effects. Since mustards, trichothecene toxins, and nerve agents also
inhibit AChE, it may be useful to examine their effects on regulatory gene
expression as well.
Fourth, very little of the literature treats long-term effects of exposures to
doses below those that would cause acute clinical symptoms. Considerably more
research is needed in this area before even preliminary suppositions can be
formulated.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The primary recommendation is that research be conducted to fill the gaps noted
here. The most obvious area needing additional research is the heath effects
of low-level exposures to agents or toxins. We would note that, since the Gulf
War, DoD and the VA have begun to fund a good deal of research. Research in
other areas would also be beneficial, including the following:
- understanding the effects of mustard agents on the central nervous
system
- long-term follow-up studies on the Japanese exposed to sarin in the
subway attack, particularly those exposed to low levels
- better understanding of the acute respiratory toxicity of aflatoxin in
nonhuman primates
- research to determine the long-term effects of converging cholinergic
activation of c-fos
- follow-up study of the duration of response of the convergent response
mechanism of nerve agent action that Kaufer et al. (1998) described
- extension of the observations pertaining to the downregulation of
nicotinic receptors in the brain from low-dose DFP
- making those involved in the epidemiological studies of accidents during
and immediately after the Gulf War aware of the observation that sarin workers
who had mild exposures were noted to have many industrial and vehicular
accidents.
Finally, interactions between the various chemical warfare agents and other
chemicals on the battlefield, as well as other psychosocial factors, such as
stress, will need to be examined to develop a more complete understanding of
the possible health consequences of exposure to chemical and biological warfare
agents.
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Appendix A