Does the Army Have a National Land Use Strategy?
The Army and the Department of Defense (DoD) have a long-term need to access land for training and testing. Both have been criticized for failing to determine their overall land needs, and for pursuing land expansions without a rational strategy. Critics charge that the military is involved in "land-grabs" driven by the inability to share resources across organizational boundaries within DoD. This report examines the physical and organizational boundaries of the DoD and Army land base, and it uses the Army as a case study of how land requirements are determined. The authors conclude that physical — not organizational — boundaries, along with advances in weapon systems, create the need for additional land. However, organizational and institutional boundaries prevent DoD and the Army from explaining this and forming a clear statement of the overall approach to determining land requirements. The authors recommend that the Army make its implicit strategy explicit, and they provide recommendations for more efficient use of the land base between major commands and services.
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Document Details
- Copyright: RAND Corporation
- Availability: Available
- Format: Paperback
- Pages: 132
- List Price: $28.00
- Price: $22.40
- ISBN/EAN: 0-8330-2733-6
- Document Number: MR-1064-A
- Year: 1999
- Series: Monograph Reports
Contents
Preface PDF
Summary PDF
Chapter One
Introduction PDF
Chapter Two
Importance of a National Strategy PDF
Chapter Three
The DoD and Army Land Base PDF
Chapter Four
Land Requirement Assessment from the Installation-Level Perspective PDF
Chapter Five
BRAC, Simulation, and Army Visions PDF
Chapter Six
Conclusions PDF
Appendix A
Major Army Land Holdings PDF
Appendix B
Training Land Requirements and Acquisition-Model (ATLAM) PDF
Appendix C
Heavy (Mechanized Infantry/Armor) Division Maneuver Area Requirements PDF
Appendix D
Training Activity Within Marked Buffer Zones PDF
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