The Conflict Over Kosovo
Why Milosevic Decided to Settle When He Did
This report examines the reasons Slobodan Milosevic, the then president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, decided on June 3, 1999, to accept NATO’s conditions for terminating the conflict over Kosovo. Drawing in part upon the testimony of Milosevic and other senior Serb and foreign officials who directly interacted with Milosevic, the report analyzes (1) the assumptions and other calculations that underlay Milosevic’s initial decision to defy NATO’s demands with regard to Kosovo, and (2) the political, economic, and military developments and pressures, and the resulting expectations and concerns that most importantly influenced his subsequent decision to come to terms. While several interrelated factors, including Moscow’s eventual endorsement of NATO’s terms, helped shape Milosevic’s decision to yield, it was the cumulative effect of NATO air power that proved most decisive. The allied bombing of Serbia’s infrastructure targets, as it intensified, stimulated a growing interest among both the Servian public and Belgrade officials to end the conflict. Milosevic’s belief that the bombing that would follow a rejection of NATO’s June 2 peace terms would be massively destructive and threatening to his continued rule made a settlement seem imperative. Also examined are some implications for future U.S. and allied military capabilities and operations.
- Format:
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- Year:
- 2001
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Document Details
- Copyright: RAND Corporation
- Availability: Available
- Format: Paperback
- Pages: 188
- List Price: $20.00
- Price: $16.00
- ISBN/EAN: 0-8330-3003-5
- Document Number: MR-1351-AF
- Year: 2001
- Series: Monograph Reports
Contents
Preface PDF
Figures
Figure PDF
Summary PDF
Acknowledgements
Acknowledgments PDF
Acronyms PDF
Chapter One
Introduction PDF
Part 1
Why Milosevic Didn’t Settle Earlier
Chapter Two
He Assumed Accepting Rambouillet Terms Would Endanger His Rule PDF
Chapter Three
He Assumed He Could Force NATO to Offer Better Terms PDF
Part II
Why Milosevic Decided to Settle on June 3
Chapter Four
He Realized That His Hoped-For Leverage on NATO Had Evaporated PDF
Chapter Five
Bombing Produced a Popular Climate Conducive to Concessions PDF
Chapter Six
Damage to “Dual-Use” Infrastructure Generated Growing Pressure PDF
Chapter Seven
Damage to Military Forces and KLA “Resurgence” Generated Little Pressure PDF
Chapter Eight
He Expected Unconstrained Bombing If NATO’s Terms Were Rejected PDF
Chapter Nine
He Probably Also Worried About Threat of Future Invasion PDF
Chapter Ten
He Believed NATO’s Terms Provided Him with Some Political Cover PDF
Part III
Concluding Observations
Chapter Eleven
Concluding Observations PDF
Bibliography PDF
The research described in this report was performed under the auspices of RAND's Project AIR FORCE.
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