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New Challenges for Defense Planning
Rethinking How Much Is Enough
This book is a collection of essays by senior defense analysts at RAND, all of whom have been deeply involved in post-Cold War defense planning studies for the Department of Defense. The essays cover a wide spectrum of issues, including alternative strategies and structures for defense planning, conventional deterrence of Third World opponents, modernizing weapon systems and force structures, and planning under uncertainty (a major theme of the book as a whole). Some of the essays are sympathetic to current U.S. methods and policies, whereas others are critical, arguing that radical changes are needed. Taken as a whole, the book provides a provocative cross section of work by experts who understand both the theoretical issues and the practical considerations that the Department of Defense must address. The book will be of interest to policymakers, students of defense planning, and other readers seeking to understand the challenges and choices confronting defense planners as we approach the end of the century.
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Paperback Cover Price: $20.00
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Pages: 780
ISBN/EAN: 0-8330-1527-3
Hardcover Cover Price: $35.00
Discounted Web Price: $31.50
Pages: 780
ISBN/EAN: 0-978-8330-1666-0
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Prefatory Material, Part One and Part Two
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Contents
Part One: Introduction
Chapter 1:
Introduction
Paul K. Davis
Part Two: Principles for Defense Planning
Chapter 2:
Planning Under Uncertainty Then and Now: Paradigms Lost and Paradigms Emerging
Paul K. Davis
Chapter 3:
Objective-Based Planning
Glenn A. Kent and William E. Simons
Chapter 4:
Institutionalizing Planning for Adaptiveness
Paul K. Davis
Chapter 5:
The Discipline Gap and Other Reasons for Humility and Realism in Defense Planning
Kevin Lewis
Part Three: Planning at the Strategic Level
Chapter 6:
Protecting the Great Transition
Paul K. Davis
Chapter 7:
Nonstandard Contingencies for Defense Planning
Richard L. Kugler
Chapter 8:
Improving Deterrence in the Post-Cold War Era: Some Theory and Implications for Defense Planning
Paul K. Davis
Chapter 9:
Operations Other Than War
Jennifer Morrison Taw and Bruce Hoffman
Chapter 10:
Priorities for Ballistic Missile Defense
Russ Shaver
Chapter 11:
Future U.S. and Russian Nuclear Forces: Applying Traditional Analysis Methods in an Era of Cooperation
Dean Wilkening
Part Four: Planning at the Operational or Campaign Level
Chapter 12:
Conventional Campaign Analysis of Major Regional Conflicts
by Fred Frostic and Christopher J. Bowie
Chapter 13:
The Use of Long-Range Bombers in a Changing World: a Classical Exercise in Systems Analysis
Glenn C. Buchan
Chapter 14:
A First Look at Defense Options for Poland
Charles T. Kelley, Jr., Daniel B. Fox, and Barry A. Wilson
Chapter 15:
Not Merely Planning for the Last War
Bruce W. Bennett, Sam Gardiner, and Daniel B. Fox
Chapter 16:
Extended Counterforce Options for Coping with Tactical Ballistic Missiles
Richard Mesic
Chapter 17:
Military Issues in Multinational Operations
Margaret Cecchine Harrell and Robert Howe
Part Five: Building the Defense Program
Chapter 18:
Assessing the Affordability of Fighter Aircraft Force Modernization
William Stanley
Chapter 19:
Modernizing Airpower Projection Capabilities: Looking to Get More out of Less
Edward R. Harshberger and Russ Shaver
Chapter 20:
Assessing the Structure and Mix of Future Active and Reserve Army Forces
Bernard D. Rostker, Bruce W. Don, and Kenneth Watman
Chapter 21:
Strategic Mobility in the Post-Cold War Era
David Kassing
Chapter 22:
Reinventing the DOD Logistics System for the Post-Cold War Era
Rick Eden, John Dumond, John Folkeson, John Halliday, and Nancy Moore
Chapter 23:
Defining a Balanced Investment Program for Coping with Tactical Ballistic Missiles
Richard Mesic
Most of the research underlying the papers in this book was accomplished in RAND's three national-security federally funded research and development centers (FFRDCs): Project AIR FORCE, the Arroyo Center, and the National Defense Research Institute (NDRI), which are sponsored by the Air Force, the Army, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff, respectively. The book itself was organized in RAND's Defense and Technology Planning Department and was made possible with substantial corporate funds and through the auspices of the RAND Graduate School of Policy Studies. RAND's national-security divisions also contributed research-support funds to cover some of the administrative expenses.
The monograph/report was a product of the RAND Corporation from 1993 to 2003. RAND monograph/reports presented major research findings that addressed the challenges facing the public and private sectors. They included executive summaries, technical documentation, and synthesis pieces.
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