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**OVERVIEW OF OPERATIONS, 1990–1996**

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“Force Access,” the database we developed during Phase One of the project, supports an overall assessment of requirements for peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief. This chapter gives an overview of operations from 1990 through 1996 that are contained in that database. (See Appendix B for a technical description of Force Access.)

The database and associated analysis consider forces that are deployed or directly employed, including, for example, forces that accomplish disaster relief near their home stations. They do not consider forces that remain at their home stations and are not directly employed but direct much of their effort to supporting other forces that are involved directly. Contingency operations demand many supporting efforts that are not easily captured. Some efforts are sporadic—for example, support at ports of embarkation and debarkation during an initial deployment. Other efforts are continuous—for example, the flow of sustaining supplies from home bases to the area of operations. In many instances, it is difficult to assess how much additional effort is occasioned by contingency operations as distinguished from normal day-to-day operations that must be supported anyway.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>In his review of the draft report, Charles Barry offered these distinctions: “First, the impact on the workload of units that continue to perform their routine duties at the same base, but who have altered how they do it and whom they do it for. Second, what forces are so affected that the operation has become a major consumer of their time, personnel and resources. . . . These may be units that have themselves deployed for the operation or have simply been tasked for high priority or dedicated support.”

## **CONUS HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE**

CONUS (continental United States) humanitarian assistance operations involve support by military forces of civil authorities within the contiguous 48 states following those natural disasters that briefly overwhelm the ability of civil authorities to respond. Such disasters include storms, floods, forest fires, earthquakes, and catastrophic accidents. In addition, military forces may initially assist in restoring civil order.

### **Frequency**

U.S. forces may be called upon at any time to provide limited humanitarian assistance on a local level, almost always in the form of disaster relief. Some of this assistance occurs so frequently and at such a low level as to fall beneath the threshold of this report. For example, the National Guard frequently assists at the local level and the Coast Guard constantly offers assistance to mariners in distress.

U.S. forces respond to certain types of natural disasters that recur quite predictably. Each fall, hurricanes threaten the southeastern United States. About every other year, one or more of these storms cause enough damage to require military assistance. With about the same frequency, spring thaws and heavy rains can cause flooding, especially in the Missouri, Ohio, Mississippi, and Sacramento River valleys. Dry summers and falls lead to dangerous forest fires in the northwestern United States and California. Earthquakes are extremely common along the California fault lines but require military assistance infrequently. Overall, U.S. forces conduct operations providing humanitarian assistance within CONUS 1–3 times annually.

### **Duration**

CONUS humanitarian assistance usually lasts 2–14 days. An exceptionally ruinous storm may demand longer efforts. For example, the joint task force formed in response to Hurricane Andrew remained in existence for 52 days (August 25–October 15, 1992). As another exception, a wide debris field and difficult diving conditions caused search efforts following a 1996 Transworld Airways crash off Long Island to last from July into November.

### **Level of Effort**

CONUS humanitarian assistance usually requires small joint task forces (JTFs) that may include fixed-wing airlift, helicopters, amphibious ships, Coast Guard cutters, naval construction battalions, and various Army and Marine units. These JTFs are typically tasked to assess damage. They provide search and rescue, emergency communications, electrical power, medical care, food, potable water, and shelter. They may also remove debris and sometimes lift grounded ships (for example, following Typhoon Omar, August–September 1992).

Since 1990, the highest level of effort has been for JTF Andrew, which was built around elements of the 10th Mountain Division and XVIII Airborne Corps and was supported by extensive airlift and some Navy and Marine support. At peak, almost 22,000 Army troops drawn from at least 84 units participated in this operation.

### **Higher Level of Effort**

Previous efforts do not set the upper limit for CONUS humanitarian assistance. There might be a major catastrophe within the United States, necessitating a far larger relief operation than has been experienced previously. Hurricane Andrew would have been far more destructive had it passed through the greater Miami area, and would have required a commensurately larger operation in response. As other examples, California could experience massive movement along the notorious San Andreas Fault (“the big one”) or the south-central United States could be devastated by movement along the Madrid Fault. In these cases, the ensuing disaster relief operation could be an order of magnitude greater than that required for Andrew.

### **OCONUS HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE**

In OCONUS (outside the continental United States) operations, military forces render humanitarian assistance to civil authorities in areas outside the contiguous 48 states following those natural disasters that briefly overwhelm the ability of civil authorities to respond. In Alaska, Hawaii, and U.S. territories, U.S. forces may initially assist in

restoring civil order. In foreign countries, the local authorities are normally responsible for restoring civil order.

U.S. military forces provide humanitarian assistance outside the continental U.S. when civil authorities in Alaska, Hawaii, U.S. territories, and sometimes in foreign countries are temporarily overwhelmed by disasters such as typhoons, hurricanes, droughts, famines, epidemics, oil fires, earthquakes, catastrophic accidents, and dislocation caused by political turmoil, as in the former Soviet Union. Very often, such assistance is limited to airlift of equipment and supplies.

### **Frequency**

Not counting brief uses of airlift, U.S. forces usually provide OCONUS humanitarian assistance 1–3 times per year. The most frequent type of operation is relief following typhoons, which regularly inflict damage along the Pacific Rim, throughout the South Pacific, and in the Caribbean.

### **Duration**

Most responses have lasted 2–4 days, but some operations have extended beyond that. For example, FIERY VIGIL (evacuation of personnel and dependents from the Philippines following the eruption of Mount Pinatubo) took 22 days (June 8–30, 1991). SEA ANGEL (disaster relief to Bangladesh following a typhoon) took 34 days (May 11–June 13, 1991). Both PROVIDE HOPE (the former Soviet Union, April 3–July 24, 1992) and PROVIDE RELIEF (assistance to refugees in Somalia, August 15–December 2, 1992) lasted over three months, but they were almost exclusively airlifts.

### **Level of Effort**

Because of limited tasks and restrictive rules of engagement, humanitarian assistance usually requires only small ground forces. For example, SUPPORT HOPE (Rwanda) included a Marine infantry company (A Company, Battalion Landing Team 1/4) and an Army airborne infantry company (C Company, 3–325 Infantry). Noncombat Army forces in this operation included elements of two

transportation battalions, elements of a support company, a signal detachment, an engineer platoon, an ordnance team, a water-purification team, and a preventive-medicine detachment.

Humanitarian assistance can demand large numbers of aircraft missions. PROVIDE HOPE (the former Soviet Union) totaled 700 missions. PROVIDE RELIEF (Somalia) totaled 3,094 missions, an average of 28 missions per day.

SEA ANGEL was an exceptional operation. It was possible because the 5th Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) was fortuitously under way from the Persian Gulf following the war there. This operation was accomplished primarily by elements of the 5th MEB and Naval Task Group 76.6, plus elements of the Air Force's 374th Tactical Airlift Wing, the Army's 4/25 Aviation Battalion, and small numbers of special operations forces.

## **MILITARY SUPPORT TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES**

In the context of this report, military support to civil authorities (MSCA) includes all support other than humanitarian assistance and counterdrug operations rendered to civil authorities in the United States and its territories.

### **Frequency**

Aside from humanitarian assistance and counterdrug operations, the only MSCA since 1990 has been GARDEN PLOT (Joint Task Force Los Angeles), conducted in May 1992 to restore civil order during the riots following the first trial of police officers accused of beating Rodney King.

### **Duration**

GARDEN PLOT lasted 13 days (May 1–12, 1992).

### **Level of Effort**

Three Army heavy brigades from the California National Guard were alerted for GARDEN PLOT, but the riots subsided before substantial assistance was required.

### **OPERATIONAL AIRLIFT**

This category includes military airlift of personnel and equipment in support of military intervention or peace operations. The United States frequently airlifts forces controlled by the U.N. and nationally controlled forces of its allies in such operations.

### **Frequency**

Since 1990, the United States has airlifted allied forces on one occasion: 600 French troops into the Central African Republic on February 26–27, 1991. On six other occasions (IMPRESSIVE LIFT I and II [Pakistani forces to Somalia], QUICK LIFT [allied rapid-reaction force to Croatia], other UNPROFOR [U.N. Protection Force] lift, lift in support of U.N. peace operations in Rwanda, the Second United Nations Operation in Somalia [UNOSOM II] lift, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia [UNTAC] lift), it airlifted personnel and equipment committed to U.N. operations. On the basis of these precedents, we figure that the U.S. Air Mobility Command (AMC [Air Force]) is likely to provide operational airlift 1–2 times per year.

### **Duration**

Most examples of operational airlift have been accomplished in one to three weeks. For example, QUICK LIFT, transport of the Anglo-French Rapid Reaction Force to Croatia, took five days (June 30–July 4, 1995).

### **Level of Effort**

The level of effort has varied from several sorties to larger efforts, such as QUICK LIFT, which involved 80 missions lifting 4,700 passengers and 1,504 tons of equipment and supplies.

### **MIGRANTS**

The United States has employed military force to intercept and detain foreign nationals attempting to enter this country illegally.

### **Frequency**

Since 1990, the United States has conducted six operations to prevent illegal migration to the United States from China, Cuba, and Haiti (SAFE HARBOR, DISTANT HAVEN, ABLE VIGIL, PROVIDE REFUGE, PROMPT RETURN, and SAFE HAVEN/SAFE PASSAGE). In two operations (PROVIDE REFUGE [1993], PROMPT RETURN [1995]), Chinese nationals were attempting to flee their country. The other four operations involved Cubans and Haitians. Projecting this rate into the future, the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard could expect to conduct one operation of this type each year.

### **Duration**

Considered individually, these operations have lasted months to years. The longest has been SAFE HARBOR (also known as JTF GTMO), which lasted about 20 months (November 1991 to June 1993). But if SAFE HARBOR, ABLE VIGIL, DISTANT HAVEN, and SAFE HAVEN/SAFE PASSAGE are considered phases of one protracted operation, the duration exceeds three years (November 1991 to February 1995).

### **Level of Effort**

These operations typically have involved a small surface action group, composed of several destroyers and frigates, an amphibious ready group (ARG), and several Coast Guard cutters. They also have required small numbers of Army and Marine Corps units to screen,

control, house, feed, and otherwise care for tens of thousands of Cubans and Haitians at camps in Guantánamo, Panama, and Surinam.

## **SANCTIONS**

The United States has enforced sanctions declared by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), primarily by interdicting maritime traffic.

### **Frequency**

Since 1990, the United States has conducted four operations to enforce UNSC sanctions. Beginning in August 1990, Maritime Interception Operations were conducted by a multinational force to enforce sanctions against Iraq. SEA SIGNAL/SUPPORT DEMOCRACY was conducted in the Caribbean to enforce economic sanctions against the Cedras regime in Haiti. MARITIME MONITOR and SHARP GUARD/MARITIME GUARD were conducted in the Adriatic to enforce a prohibition on arms shipments to states of the former Yugoslavia. Given this record, U.S. forces might have to conduct up to two such operations annually.

### **Duration**

Sanctions are likely to extend for months and years. SEA SIGNAL/SUPPORT DEMOCRACY lasted 11 months (October 18, 1993–September 19, 1994) and had little apparent effect on the Cedras regime. MARITIME MONITOR, conducted without coercion, and its successor, SHARP GUARD/MARITIME GUARD, conducted forcibly, lasted over four years (July 1992–October 1996.)

### **Level of Effort**

Enforcement of sanctions usually requires maritime surveillance aircraft and a surface action group. It may also require boarding parties (Sea, Air, Land troops [SEALs], specially trained Marines, and Coast Guard personnel) to take control over (“take down”) ships that respond unsatisfactorily to challenge.

## **TRADITIONAL PEACEKEEPING**

Traditional peacekeeping implies observation and monitoring by military forces, normally under the authority of resolutions of the United Nations Security Council. The United States has participated in three traditional peacekeeping operations since 1990 (Multinational Force, ABLE SENTRY, SAFE BORDER). Prior to the collapse of European Communism in 1989, great powers usually did not participate in peacekeeping because Cold War rivalries would have mitigated against their impartiality. As an exception, the United States participated in the Multinational Force. (The United States would have preferred to send a U.N. force, but the Soviet Union, angered by the Camp David Accords and its consequent loss of influence, blocked action in the Security Council.)

### **Frequency**

After 1989, participation of the great powers became less objectionable and the United States has participated in two other peacekeeping operations (ABLE SENTRY, SAFE BORDER).

### **Duration**

Traditional peacekeeping lasts months and years. The more important operations tend to become open-ended. SAFE BORDER (support to the Military Observer Mission in Ecuador and Peru) lasted 16 months (March 1995–June 1996). The Multinational Force (monitoring certain areas of the Sinai Peninsula), established in April 1982, sees no end in sight, nor does ABLE SENTRY (monitoring the northern border of Macedonia), established in July 1993.

### **Level of Effort**

Usually, traditional peacekeeping is built around light and mechanized infantry battalions. The United States currently deploys one light infantry battalion each in the Sinai and in Macedonia; these battalions are supported by elements of rotary-wing aircraft.

## **NO-FLY ZONE**

The United States has employed military force to establish no-fly zones under the authority of the United Nations Security Council and declarations consonant with these UNSC resolutions.

### **Frequency**

Since 1990, there have been essentially three no-fly operations: PROVIDE COMFORT II/NORTHERN WATCH (Northern Iraq), SOUTHERN WATCH (Southern Iraq), and DENY FLIGHT/DECISIVE EDGE (former Yugoslavia, especially Bosnia-Herzegovina).

### **Duration**

No-fly operations have taken years and have tended to become open-ended. DENY FLIGHT (Bosnia-Herzegovina) lasted over two years (April 12, 1992–December 19, 1995). During DENY FLIGHT, U.S. and other air forces were also tasked to provide close air support and conduct punitive strikes as required. A large-scale air strike was conducted to protect “safe areas” declared by the Security Council (DELIBERATE FORCE/DEADEYE) and lasted 23 days (August 29–September 20, 1995). DECISIVE EDGE, the follow-on operation in support of the NATO-controlled Implementation Force, is currently in progress.

No-fly operations over Iraq have already lasted over five years, and there is no end in sight. PROVIDE COMFORT II/NORTHERN WATCH, begun in July 1991, was initially intended to protect the Kurdish population in northern Iraq. SOUTHERN WATCH, begun in August 1992, was initially intended to protect the Shi'ite population of southern Iraq. No-fly operations have not been very effective in protecting either group, but they do help keep pressure on the Iraqi regime to cooperate with the U.N. commission investigating the regime's projects to develop weapons of mass destruction.

### **Level of Effort**

No-fly operations usually have required one U.S. composite wing and several squadrons of allied aircraft. PROVIDE COMFORT II in-

cluded a U.S. composite wing of reconnaissance, air superiority, and ground attack aircraft deployed in southern Turkey, plus smaller numbers of French and British aircraft. SOUTHERN WATCH has involved the 4404th Composite Wing (Provisional), with squadrons of F-15 and F-16 aircraft, plus smaller numbers of French Mirages and British Tornados. In addition, these operations have required specialized aircraft, including E-3, EF-111, HC-130, KC-135, RC-135, and F-16 specialized in air defense suppression.

## **HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION**

*Humanitarian intervention* is use of military force to ensure that aid reaches the intended recipients during a crisis or conflict that disrupts civil order.

### **Frequency**

Since 1990, U.S. forces have conducted three operations that qualify as humanitarian intervention: PROVIDE COMFORT I (Northern Iraq), RESTORE HOPE (Somalia), and PROVIDE PROMISE (Bosnia-Herzegovina). At this rate, U.S. forces would conduct humanitarian intervention about every other year.

### **Duration**

These operations took months or years and often had no satisfactory conclusion. PROVIDE COMFORT I lasted about three months (April 6–July 15, 1991), but it was followed by a no-fly operation (PROVIDE COMFORT II/ NORTHERN WATCH) that had a similar aim and still continues. The best-known humanitarian intervention, RESTORE HOPE, lasted five months (December 3, 1992–May 4, 1993) and was followed by CONTINUE HOPE, which lasted another 11 months (May 5, 1992–March 31, 1994). However, U.S. forces had a very restricted mission during the last five months of CONTINUE HOPE. After the U.S. withdrawal in March 1994, the Second United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) continued for another year, ostensibly trying to implement peace accords, until it withdrew under U.S. protection (UNITED SHIELD). PROVIDE PROMISE lasted over two years (July 3, 1992–October 1, 1994).

### **Level of Effort**

Humanitarian intervention typically requires a joint task force built around the ground component, either Army or Marine forces. RESTORE HOPE included two brigades of the Army's 10th Mountain Division, as well as extensive divisional and nondivisional support, a Marine Expeditionary Brigade, a carrier battle group, an amphibious ready group, and a Maritime Prepositioning Squadron.

### **PEACE ACCORDS**

The United States has participated in two radically different types of operations concerned with peace accords: (1) use of military forces to facilitate peace accords without coercion, usually conducted under Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations, and (2) use of military forces to enforce provisions of peace accords, even against the will of a party, usually conducted under Chapter VII of the Charter.

### **Frequency**

Since 1990, U.S. forces have participated in at least six operations intended to implement or enforce peace accords: PROVIDE TRANSITION (Angola), CONTINUE HOPE (Somalia), UPHOLD DEMOCRACY/MAINTAIN DEMOCRACY (Haiti), RESTORE DEMOCRACY (Haiti), and JOINT ENDEAVOR and JOINT GUARD (Bosnia-Herzegovina). Depending on interpretation, VIGILANT SENTINEL (Kuwait) and UNITED SHIELD (Haiti) might also be included in this category. At this rate, U.S. forces would conduct such an operation yearly.

### **Duration**

Peace accords usually entail processes that take time to conduct, such as cantonment of forces, demobilization, reconstruction, and electoral activities, implying peace operations that last months and years. PROVIDE TRANSITION, an airlift supporting U.N. peace operations in Angola, lasted over two months (August 5–October 8, 1992). UPHOLD DEMOCRACY/MAINTAIN DEMOCRACY took six months (September 19, 1994–March 30 1995) and was followed by

RESTORE DEMOCRACY, which lasted over a year (March 31, 1995–April 15, 1996). JOINT ENDEAVOR, designed to enforce the Dayton Agreements, lasted one year (December 1995–December 1996) and was immediately followed by JOINT GUARD, a smaller operation with essentially the same mission.

### **Level of Effort**

The level of effort depends critically upon whether the operation is intended to implement or to enforce peace accords. *Peace enforcement*, as exemplified by UPHOLD DEMOCRACY/MAINTAIN DEMOCRACY and JOINT ENDEAVOR/JOINT GUARD, usually requires large joint task forces built around Army light or heavy brigades. CONTINUE HOPE is the exception that proves this rule. It was conducted with very limited forces in support of the much larger Second United Nations Operation in Somalia and incurred casualties that were considered unacceptable.

PROVIDE TRANSITION was an airlift in support of the Second United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II). UNAVEM II involved three C-130 aircraft from 37th Airlift Squadron and included 326 missions transporting demobilized soldiers and supplies in Angola and Zaire.

CONTINUE HOPE initially included one light infantry battalion as a Quick Reaction Force, and logistics units. During summer 1993, the United States deployed special operations forces, including a Ranger battalion, attack helicopters, and assault helicopters, in an attempt to apprehend Mohammed Farah Aideed. After October 3, 1993, when U.S. special operations forces suffered severe casualties, the United States deployed additional forces, which included a small armored task force (18 tanks and 44 infantry fighting vehicles), approximately 700 troops from 10th Mountain Division, and 4 AC-130H gunships. In addition, a carrier battle group, an amphibious ready group, and a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) were available.

UPHOLD DEMOCRACY initially involved large forces, including elements of 82nd Airborne Division (to force entry if the Cedras regime refused to consent), a carrier battle group, a Marine Expeditionary Unit, and a brigade of 10th Mountain Division. As it became apparent that neither the Cedras regime nor its paramilitary supporters

would offer resistance, this force was reduced to a core of Army light infantry and special forces.

During the initial phase of JOINT ENDEAVOR, U.S. land forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina were held below a ceiling of 20,000 troops, approximately one-third of NATO's deployed strength. The U.S. initially deployed two heavy brigades, each containing one armor battalion and one mechanized infantry battalion. These forces were supported by a composite air wing in Aviano and, at times, by a carrier battle group and an amphibious ready group in the Adriatic or Mediterranean. After the parties observed the cease-fire, withdrew from the zone of separation, and placed their heavy weapons at collection points, the United States withdrew its armor battalions and deployed additional military police companies. U.S. and other NATO forces conducted JOINT GUARD at approximately half of what their strength was during JOINT ENDEAVOR.


## **SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS, 1990–1996**

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has conducted operations more often and in greater force. With few exceptions, U.S. forces have accomplished their missions successfully.

### **Summary and Timeline**

At the “high end,” i.e., while conducting humanitarian intervention and peace enforcement, operations have been nearly continuous since 1992. Deployed combat strength has also risen, culminating in the two well-supported Army heavy brigades that initially entered Bosnia-Herzegovina (see Figure 2.1).

Land- and sea-based air forces have conducted continuous operations simultaneously in the former Yugoslavia and in Iraq to enforce no-fly zones, to conduct ground attacks, and to support land forces. The supported forces have included a multinational force in Northern Iraq during PROVIDE COMFORT I, the United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina during DENY FLIGHT, the NATO-led Implementation Force during JOINT ENDEAVOR, and the NATO-led Stabilization Force during JOINT GUARD. At the same time, U.S. forces continued to conduct battalion-sized peacekeeping



NOTE: CONUS = continental United States; JTF = Joint Task Force; MSCA = military support to civil authorities; OCONUS = outside the continental United States; UNPROFOR = U.N. Protection Force; UNSC = United Nations Security Council.

Figure 2.1—Summary of Operations Conducted 1990–1996

operations in Macedonia (ABLE SENTRY) and the Sinai (Multi-national Force and Observers). Despite their minuscule size, peacekeeping operations have large cumulative effects because they are protracted indefinitely.

### **Success and Failure**

How successfully have U.S. forces conducted these operations? Have there been failures that suggest shortfalls in capability? Over the seven years of interest here, U.S. forces have been consistently successful when deployed in sufficient strength. No significant shortfalls have been apparent. Indeed, it would be surprising if forces developed to withstand an onslaught of the former Soviet Union's vast forces and to prevail in major theater warfare were not able to secure humanitarian aid or to enforce peace agreements among small factions and minor regional powers. However, operational/tactical outcomes may be very different from strategic outcomes. Even the most successful peace operation may not yield the desired strategic result over the long term. For example, UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, the major U.S. operation in Haiti, was immensely successful, yet Haiti might revert to ill-governance and oppression. UPHOLD DEMOCRACY gave Haiti a chance for decent government, not a guarantee (see Figure 2.2).

At the tactical and operational levels, U.S. forces have enjoyed almost perfect success. There have been blemishes, such as the destruction of two Army helicopters by Air Force pilots during PROVIDE COMFORT II (now NORTHERN WATCH), but no failures except CONTINUE HOPE. Moreover, this apparent exception actually proves the rule: U.S. forces failed in Somalia not because they lacked capabilities but because some capabilities were withheld for political reasons.<sup>2</sup> Had CONTINUE HOPE been conducted with forces at the

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<sup>2</sup>Unduly complicated command arrangements and inadequate support from United Nations forces contributed to the losses suffered during CONTINUE HOPE, but the fundamental cause was an inadequate U.S. force structure. Maj. Gen. Thomas Montgomery, commanding U.S. troops in Somalia (less special operations forces) requested armored and mechanized forces, but his request was denied for political reasons. As a result, U.S. commanders in Somalia continued to conduct risky special operations that eventually suffered high casualties. Moreover, when U.S. special

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Operation	Tactical/Operational Outcome	Strategic Successes/Failures
PROVIDE COMFORT I	Provided relief supplies to Kurdish refugees, established refugee camps, compelled withdrawal of Iraqi forces, protected return of refugees.	Prevented many Kurdish deaths to starvation and exposure; temporarily curtailed Saddam Hussein's power in northern Iraq.
PROVIDE COMFORT II	Enforced no-fly zone over northern Iraq; inadvertently destroyed two U.S. helicopters.	Failed to protect Kurds: in September 1996, Iraqi ground forces entered the area, compelling an evacuation.
RESTORE HOPE	Secured ports, roads, and distribution points; dismantled checkpoints, confiscated unauthorized weapons; ensured receipt of humanitarian aid.	Ended mass starvation in Somalia, but did not end factional warfare, especially in the Mogadishu area.
CONTINUE HOPE	Provided Quick Reaction Force and logistics support to UNOSOM II; failed to apprehend Mohammed Farah Aideed.	Failed to make UNOSOM II viable; Somalia remained plagued by factional warfare; U.S. administration and U.N. were discredited.
UPHOLD DEMOCRACY	Restored Aristide government; provided security; monitored police; seized weapons.	Gave Haiti a chance for decent government; ended source of illegal migration to U.S.
SHARP GUARD	Interdicted weapons shipments by sea until U.S. unilaterally withdrew from the operation.	Worked to advantage of better-armed Bosnian Serbs; parties were supplied by air and land.
DENY FLIGHT	Prevented flight of fixed-wing aircraft; provided close air support to UNPROFOR.	Neutralized Bosnian Serb air forces, but UNPROFOR was too weak to benefit from close air support.
PROVIDE PROMISE	Airlifted humanitarian aid to Sarajevo; airdropped aid in Muslim-held enclaves.	Helped Muslims withstand siege of Sarajevo and retain enclaves for a time.
DELIBERATE FORCE	Destroyed Bosnian Serb military installations with little collateral damage.	Made Bosnian Serbs respect "safe areas"; helped lead to Dayton Agreements.
JOINT ENDEAVOR	Enforced cease-fire, withdrawal from zone of separation, cantonment of heavy weapons.	Brought peace to Bosnia; restored NATO's prestige; affirmed U.S. leadership in Europe.

NOTE: UNOSOM II = Second United Nations Operation in Somalia; UNPROFOR = U.N. Protection Force.

**Figure 2.2—Evaluation of Selected Operations**

same level as RESTORE HOPE, it would certainly have succeeded. Even at a reduced level, CONTINUE HOPE might have succeeded if the armor and mechanized infantry had been received as requested.

operations forces were pinned down by fire, the U.S. Quick Reaction Force could not reach them until U.N. forces eventually provided tanks and infantry fighting vehicles.

**In the following chapter, we use the historical record of past operations to construct vignettes, which are essentially archetypes that abstract from actual operations by developing simplified patterns.**