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I Want You! The Evolution of the All-Volunteer Army

Front Matter Preface Figures Tables Foreword Acknowledgments Chapter One Introduction The Move to End Conscription A Model for Other Countries Effects on the Military: From 1973 to the Present The Final Chapter Has Not Been Written Then, Now, and the In-Between: The Plan for This Book References Chapter Four Acting on a Campaign Promise A Special Commission Selective Service Reform The Gates Commission The Gates Commission Reports to the President Laird's Turn The President Has Decided The President Addresses Congress Congress Moves to End Conscription and Reform Selective Service References

The Gates Commission Reports to the President

On February 21, 1970, the Gates Commission forwarded its recommendation to end conscription to President Nixon. The commission unanimously found the cost of an all-volunteer force was “a necessary price of defending our peace and security [and that conscription was] . . . intolerable when there is an alternative consistent with our basic national values” (Gates, 1970, p. 10^{6.7 MB}). The commission made three recommendations to the President for implementing an all-volunteer force: (1) raise military pay, (2) improve the conditions of military service and recruiting, and (3) establish a standby draft system by June 30, 1971.

With Kissinger’s backing, Anderson suggested the President meet with the commission to formally receive the final report in person, since “members of the Commission, most of them of great distinction, can be extremely helpful — if they are properly motivated” (Anderson, 1970c^{0.2 MB}).⁴⁵ On February 21, 1970, the President met with the commissioners in the Cabinet Room (Figure 4.1).⁴⁶ Anderson recalled that the President spent 90 minutes with the commissioners rather than the planned 30 minutes:

While . . . [he] did not commit himself to my specific recommendations . . . he did express enthusiasm and sympathy for an all-volunteer force, making the point that even a reformed draft is unfair, i.e. some go, some do not go. (Anderson, 1970h^{0.3 MB})

Following the meeting with the President, the White House Press Office released a summary of the Presidential commission’s report on an all-volunteer armed force (White House Press Secretary, 1970c^{0.2 MB}).⁴⁷ The commission had designed, and the White House had agreed to, a public-relations campaign that included a private printing of the report by the Macmillan Company, with an initial press run of 100,000 in paperback and 5,000 to 7,000 in hardback, with distribution of the paperback copies starting on March 6, 1970 (Callard, 1970b).⁴⁸

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⁴⁵ Anderson had provided Kissinger with a summary of the commission’s findings, noting that they had “concluded that the armed forces including reserve forces, can and should be raised by voluntary means” (Anderson, 1970e^{0.2 MB}). Kissinger’s only concern was to “ensure that this meeting is not over-publicized and that the President’s remarks are not interpreted as a public endorsement of the Commission’s findings” (Kissinger, 1970a^{0.2 MB}). Anderson provided an attendance list (Anderson, 1970f^{0.1 MB}).

Several options for the meeting were presented to Nixon, who personally decided on 30 minutes with a “photo opportunity” (Chapin, 1970a^{0.2 MB}).

⁴⁶ At Laird’s request, the meeting was moved from Friday, February 20, to Saturday, February 21, 1970, to avoid congressional questions on Friday (Chapin, 1970b^{0.2 MB}). Anderson prepared a set of talking points for the President (Anderson, 1970g^{0.7 MB}).

⁴⁷ The White House Press Office also prepared the transcript of a press conference involving Thomas S. Gates, Chairman, Presidential Commission on All-Volunteer Armed Forces; members of the commission; Dr. Martin Anderson, Special Assistant to the President; and Ronald L. Ziegler, Press Secretary to the President (Gates et al., 1970^{0.8 MB}).

⁴⁸ The commission had considered a number of publishing alternatives but had wanted to “contract a paperback book distribution” in addition to the standard press run from the Government Printing Office (Callard, 1969b^{0.2 MB}). Even before the report had been presented to the President, the White House agreed to have it published as a paperback (Anderson, 1969f^{0.2 MB}).

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