I Want You! The Evolution of the All-Volunteer Army

Chapter Four

The President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force – the Gates Commission – and Selective Service Reform (1969-1970)

The President Has Decided…

Martin Anderson was given the job of preparing an issue paper for the President incorporating the views of the Gates Commission and DoD, the National Security Council, the Bureau of the Budget, and other interested administration parties.⁵² He had very little time to do it, especially since the paper needed to be a joint project, combining the results of the working group on draft reform, which Peter Flanigan chaired, and the results of the working group on the all-volunteer force, which Anderson chaired (Anderson, 1970m^{3.5 MB}).⁵³ While the original plan had “a decision memorandum . . . ready for the President by February 23, 1970 to anticipate a possible message [to Congress] in the third week of March 1970” (Anderson, 1970^{0.6 MB}), the issue was not taken up by the President until March 25, 1970, at a special meeting of the National Security Council.

In preparation for the March 25, 1970, meeting, Kissinger’s staff prepared a “red book” (with backup materials) for the President. It contained “a brief summary of the issues and alternatives prepared by Peter Flanigan and Martin Anderson, [and] Secretary Laird’s views on the all-volunteer army and draft reform,” e.g., Laird’s March 11, 1970 Memorandum (Kissinger, 1970b^{3.4 MB}). At the meeting, Nixon made several critical decisions. He rejected the recommendation of the Gates Commission to end the draft June 30, 1971, noting that it “can’t be done,” and changed the target date for ending the draft to January 1973 (Kissinger, 1970b^{3.4 MB}).⁵⁴ After the March 25, 1970, meeting, Anderson prepared a decision memorandum on an all-volunteer force and draft reform that incorporated the results of the meeting and sent it to John Ehrlichman on March 31, 1970 (Anderson, 1970m^{3.5 MB}).⁵⁵ On April 9, 1969, Ken Cole reported to the White House senior staff the President’s decision.56 Figure 4.2 shows Cole’s memorandum reporting Nixon’s decision.

It fell to Kelley to tell Laird of the President’s decisions. His memorandum to Laird did not, however, stress the “provisos” which started Cole’s memorandum to the White House staff. Kelly summed it up by saying that

The President has decided as follows:

1. He accepted the DoD plan for eliminating draft calls.
2. He defers extension of induction authority, doctor draft and related matters until next year.
3. He will go ahead now with an Executive Order to phase out occupational and paternity deferments.
4. He will recommend to Congress legislation to institute a direct national call and authority to phase out student deferments.
   The President’s message to Congress on the above will probably be next week.

(Kelley, 1970e^{0.2 MB})

Figure 4.2 President Nixon’s Decisions About the All-Volunteer Force

SOURCE: Cole (19700.6 MB).

⁵² This issue paper went through a number of drafts: March 2, 1970 (Anderson, 1970i^{2.6 MB}); March 17, 1970 (Anderson, 1970j^{4.6 MB}) and (Anderson, 1970k^{1.7 MB}); March 20, 1970 (OASD[M&RA], 1970a^{0.1 MB}); March 22, 1970 (OASD[SA], 1970b^{1.8 MB}); March 23, 1979 (Davis, 1970^{5.3 MB}); and March 25, 1970 (OASD[M&RA], 1970b^{0.6 MB}).

Kelley laid out the “tight timetable” in his memorandum of March 3, 1970 (1970d^{0.1 MB}).

⁵³ The first meeting of Anderson’s Task Force on All-Volunteer Armed Force was held on February 7, 1970, well before the commission briefed the President (Anderson, 1970^{0.6 MB}). On March 2, 1970, Bill Meckling, the Staff Director of the Gates Commission, shared with Anderson that they were confronting “three types of uncertainty . . . in planning the transition to an All-Volunteer Force” (Meckling, 1970^{1.7 MB}).

⁵⁴ The following day, March 26, 1970, the Budget Director, Robert Mayo, was still pressing for the lowest-budget option. He told Nixon, “this approach affords a reasonable possibility of ending draft calls early in FY 1973 without the major budgetary problems created by all the other options with their emphasis on FY 1972 or earlier expenditures” (Mayo, 1970^{0.4 MB}).

⁵⁵ Anderson’s decision memorandum records that the meeting took place on March 24, 1970, although the documents prepared for the meeting state that it was to take place on March 25, 1970. Subsequently, on April 14, 1970, the National Security Advisor, Dr. Henry Kissinger, published National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) number 53, which recorded Nixon’s decisions. “Pertinent extracts” were provided the senior staff at the Pentagon on April 17, 1970 (ASD[ISA], 1970^{1.0 MB}).

⁵⁶ In 1968, Cole was director of scheduling for Richard Nixon’s successful presidential campaign. Immediately after the election, Cole worked in the presidential transition office at the Pierre Hotel in New York City. On President Nixon’s Inauguration in 1969, Cole became staff secretary, reporting to H. R. Haldeman, Chief of Staff. In 1970, Cole became Deputy Assistant to the President and coordinated the activities of the Domestic Council for the Presidential Domestic Assistant John Ehrlichman and for Melvin Laird, Ehrlichman’s successor. On Laird’s departure from the White House, Cole was appointed Assistant to the President and Head of the Domestic Council. Cole continued leading the Domestic Council when President Ford assumed the presidency. During his time of service, he headed the Governors’ Council and the White House Fellows Program among other duties.

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