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Lessons Learned from the F/A-22 and F/A-18 E/F Development Programs

Cover: Lessons Learned from the F/A-22 and F/A-18 E/F Development Programs

By: Obaid Younossi, David E. Stem, Mark A. Lorell, Frances M. Lussier

How can the Air Force and the other services profit from the experience of these two very different development programs? The F/A-18E/F is a new platform, but it incorporates some of the key components of the legacy platform. The F/A-22, on the other hand, is completely new, but the authors believe the divergent histories of the two-the F/A-22 has been delayed 52 months and has experienced cost overruns while the F/A-18E/F was developed on time and on budget-have lessons to teach future acquisition decisionmakers. In this report, the authors present a detailed history of the two programs and conclude that these decisionmakers can take several steps to reduce risk and improve the acquisition process, including setting realistic schedule and cost estimates, establishing a stable and experienced development team, being aware of the risks entailed in concurrent development of new technology, and carefully monitoring airframe weight.

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Paperback Cover Price: $20.00

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Pages: 98

ISBN/EAN: 0-8330-3749-8

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Contents

Chapter One:
Introduction

Chapter Two:
Acquisition Strategies and Industrial Base Issues

Chapter Three:
Potential Contributors to Cost and Schedule Growth

Chapter Four:
Use of Cost Performance Data

Chapter Five:
Conclusions and Lessons Learned

Appendix:
DoD and Congressional Oversight

The research reported here was sponsored by the United States Air Force and conducted by RAND Project AIR FORCE.

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