Download

Download eBook for Free

Full Document

FormatFile SizeNotes
PDF file 0.7 MB

Use Adobe Acrobat Reader version 7.0 or higher for the best experience.

Summary Only

FormatFile SizeNotes
PDF file 0.1 MB

Use Adobe Acrobat Reader version 7.0 or higher for the best experience.

Purchase

Purchase Print Copy

 FormatList Price Price
Add to Cart Paperback186 pages $24.00 $19.20 20% Web Discount

Abstract

Over the past decade, Chinese military strategists have keenly observed changes in U.S. national strategy and military transformation. The acceleration of its own military modernization suggests that China is not dissuaded by U.S. military prowess but instead is driven by a range of strategic and military motivations to keep pace. This report examines the constraints, facilitators, and potential options for Chinese responses to U.S. transformation efforts, especially with respect to whether Taiwan moves toward or away from formal independence. The authors focus on four areas of counter-transformation options that China may pursue (which most likely would include all or portions of each strategy): Conventional Modernization “Plus”; Subversion, Sabotage, and Information Operations; Missile-Centric Strategies; and Chinese Network-Centric Warfare. The path China takes will depend on its key national security goals and the political and economic context within which these goals are pursued. That said, the authors offer possible U.S. counterresponses to such courses of action (e.g., planning defensive measures, augmentation of network-centric platforms) and emphasize that the ultimate “victor” of transformation will be that nation with the best combination of surprise, error control, fortune, and highly trained people.

Table of Contents

  • Chapter One

    Introduction

  • Chapter Two

    Contextual Factors Shaping China’s Response Options

  • Chapter Three

    Chinese Counter-Transformation Options: A Methodological Introduction

  • Chapter Four

    Option One: Conventional Modernization “Plus”

  • Chapter Five

    Option Two: Subversion, Sabotage, and Information Operations

  • Chapter Six

    Option Three: Missile-Centric Strategies

  • Chapter Seven

    Option Four: Chinese Network-Centric Warfare

  • Appendix

    Enhancing or Even Transcending Network-Centric Warfare?

The research described in this report was prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The research was conducted in the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the OSD, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community.

This report is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series. RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND monographs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity.

Permission is given to duplicate this electronic document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Copies may not be duplicated for commercial purposes. Unauthorized posting of RAND PDFs to a non-RAND Web site is prohibited. RAND PDFs are protected under copyright law. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit the RAND Permissions page.

The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.