Download

Download eBook for Free

Full Document

FormatFile SizeNotes
PDF file 2.6 MB Best for desktop computers.

Use Adobe Acrobat Reader version 7.0 or higher for the best experience.

ePub file 8.7 MB Best for mobile devices.

On desktop computers and some mobile devices, you may need to download an eBook reader to view ePub files. Calibre is an example of a free and open source e-book library management application.

mobi file 5.2 MB Best for Kindle 1-3.

On desktop computers and some mobile devices, you may need to download an eBook reader to view mobi files. Amazon Kindle is the most popular reader for mobi files.

Summary Only

FormatFile SizeNotes
PDF file 0.3 MB

Use Adobe Acrobat Reader version 7.0 or higher for the best experience.

Purchase

Purchase Print Copy

 FormatList Price Price
Add to Cart Paperback518 pages $42.50 $34.00 20% Web Discount

Abstract

The difficulties encountered by the United States in securing Iraq and Afghanistan despite years of effort and staggering costs raises the central question of the RAND Counterinsurgency Study: How should the United States improve its capabilities to counter insurgencies, particularly those that are heavily influenced by transnational terrorist movements and thus linked into a global jihadist network? This capstone volume to the study draws on other reports in the series as well as an examination of 89 insurgencies since World War II, an analysis of the new challenges posed by what is becoming known as global insurgency, and many of the lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan. The report’s recommendations are based on the premise that counterinsurgency (COIN) is a contest for the allegiance of a nation’s population; victory over jihadist insurgency consists not of merely winning a war against terrorists but of persuading Islamic populations to choose legitimate government and reject violent religious tyranny. The authors evaluate three types of COIN capabilities: civil capabilities to help weak states improve their political and economic performance; informational and cognitive capabilities to enable better governance and improve COIN decisionmaking; and security capabilities to protect people and infrastructure and to weaken insurgent forces. Gompert and Gordon warn that U.S. capabilities are deficient in several critical areas but also emphasize that U.S. allies and international organizations can provide capabilities that the United States currently cannot. The authors conclude by outlining the investments, organizational changes within the federal government and the military, and international arrangements that the United States should pursue to improve its COIN capabilities.

Related Products

Table of Contents

  • Part I

    The Challenge

  • Chapter One

    Defining the Problem

  • Chapter Two

    Framing the Problem

  • Chapter Three

    Countering Type III Insurgency

  • Part II

    Complete and Balanced Capabilities

  • Chapter Four

    Overview of Capabilities Needed to Counter Type III Insurgency

  • Chapter Five

    Civil Capabilities

  • Chapter Six

    Information Capabilities

  • Chapter Seven

    Perception and Cognition

  • Chapter Eight

    General Security Capabilities

  • Chapter Nine

    Local Security Capabilities

  • Chapter Ten

    U.S. Security Capabilities

  • Part III

    Organizing and Investing

  • Chapter Eleven

    Multilateral Counterinsurgency

  • Chapter Twelve

    Investment Priorities

  • Chapter Thirteen

    Organization: Unsettled Structures for Unsettled Times

  • Chapter Fourteen

    Implications and Recommendations

  • Appendix A

    Eighty-Nine Insurgencies: Outcomes and Endings

  • Appendix B

    Multilateral COIN Capacity

  • Appendix C

    Indicators and Warnings

  • Appendix D

    Ground-Force Tasks and Improvements

The research described in this report was prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The research was conducted in the RAND RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the OSD, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community.

This report is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series. RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND monographs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity.

Permission is given to duplicate this electronic document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Copies may not be duplicated for commercial purposes. Unauthorized posting of RAND PDFs to a non-RAND Web site is prohibited. RAND PDFs are protected under copyright law. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit the RAND Permissions page.

The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.