Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003-2006)
RAND Counterinsurgency Study -- Volume 2
This monograph outlines strategic considerations relative to counterinsurgency campaigns; presents an overview of the current conflict in Iraq, focusing on counterinsurgency; analyzes counterinsurgency operations in Iraq; presents conclusions about counterinsurgency, based on the U.S. experience in Iraq; describes implications from that experience for future counterinsurgency operations; and offers recommendations to improve the ability of the U.S. government to conduct counterinsurgency in the future. For example, U.S. counterinsurgency experience in Iraq has revealed the need to achieve synergy and balance among several simultaneous civilian and military efforts and the need to continually address and reassess the right indicators to determine whether current strategies are adequate. The need to continually reassess counterinsurgency strategy and tactics implies that military and civilian leaders must have not only the will, but also a formal mechanism, to fearlessly and thoroughly call to the attention of senior decisionmakers any shortfalls in policies and practices, e.g., in Iraq, failure to protect the civilian population, as well as overreliance on technological approaches to counterinsurgency. The Iraq experience is particularly germane to drawing lessons about counterinsurgency. In essence, the conflict there is a local political power struggle overlaid with sectarian violence and fueled by fanatical foreign jihadists and criminal opportunists — a combination of factors likely to be replicated in insurgencies elsewhere.
- Format:
- Paperback, 134 Pages
- Year:
- 2008
- List Price:
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Document Details
- Copyright: RAND Corporation
- Availability: Available
- Format: Paperback
- Pages: 134
- List Price: $26.50
- Price: $21.20
- ISBN/EAN: 9780833042972
- Document Number: MG-595/3-OSD
- Year: 2008
- Series: Monographs
Contents
Chapter One
Overview of the Conflict in Iraq
Chapter Two
Armed Groups in Iraq
Chapter Three
Counterinsurgency in Iraq
Chapter Four
Accounting for Success and Failure
Chapter Five
Building Effective Capabilities for Counterinsurgency
Chapter Six
Recommendations
The research described in this report was prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The research was conducted in the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the OSD, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community.
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