After Saddam
Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq
This monograph begins by examining prewar planning efforts for postwar Iraq, in order to establish what U.S. policymakers expected the postwar situation to look like and what their plans were for reconstruction. The monograph then examines the role of U.S. military forces after major combat officially ended on May 1, 2003; the analysis covers this period through the end of June 2004. Finally, the monograph examines civilian efforts at reconstruction after major combat ended, focusing on the activities of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and its efforts to rebuild structures of governance, security forces, economic policy, and essential services prior to June 28, 2004, the day that the CPA dissolved and transferred authority to the Interim Iraqi Government. The authors conclude that the U.S. government was unprepared for the challenges of postwar Iraq for three reasons: a failure to challenge fundamental assumptions about postwar Iraq; ineffective interagency coordination; and the failure to assign responsibility and resources for providing security in the immediate aftermath of major combat operations.
Download eBook for Free
Full Document
| Format | File Size | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| PDF file | 2.9 MB | Use Adobe Acrobat Reader version 7.0 or higher for the best experience. |
Summary Only
| Format | File Size | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| PDF file | 0.2 MB | Use Adobe Acrobat Reader version 7.0 or higher for the best experience. |
Purchase Print Copy
| Format | List Price | Price | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Paperback, 312 Pages | $38.00 | $30.40 Special 20% Web Discount |  |
Document Details
- Copyright: RAND Corporation
- Availability: Available
- Print Format: Paperback
- Paperback Pages: 312
- List Price: $38.00
- Paperback Price: $30.40
- Paperback ISBN/EAN: 9780833044587
- Document Number: MG-642-A
- Year: 2008
- Series: Monographs
Contents
Chapter One
Introduction
Chapter Two
Military Planning Efforts
Chapter Three
Civilian Planning Efforts
Chapter Four
Task Force IV
Chapter Five
The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
Chapter Six
Humanitarian Planning
Chapter Seven
Combat Operations During Phase IV
Chapter Eight
The Coalition Provisional Authority
Chapter Nine
Building New Iraqi Security Forces
Chapter Ten
Governance and Political Reconstruction
Chapter Eleven
Economic Policy
Chapter Twelve
Essential Services and Infrastructure
Chapter Thirteen
Assessing Postwar Efforts
Appendix
Strategic Studies Institute's Mission Matrix for Iraq
The research described in this report was sponsored by the United States Army and conducted by the RAND Arroyo Center.
This report is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series. RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND monographs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity.
Permission is given to duplicate this electronic document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Copies may not be duplicated for commercial purposes. Unauthorized posting of RAND PDFs to a non-RAND Web site is prohibited. RAND PDFs are protected under copyright law. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit the RAND Permissions page.
The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.
RAND® is a registered trademark. Copyright © 1994-2013 RAND Corporation.