Download

Download eBook for Free

Full Document

FormatFile SizeNotes
PDF file 2.9 MB

Use Adobe Acrobat Reader version 7.0 or higher for the best experience.

Summary Only

FormatFile SizeNotes
PDF file 0.2 MB

Use Adobe Acrobat Reader version 7.0 or higher for the best experience.

Purchase

Purchase Print Copy

 FormatList Price Price
Add to Cart Paperback312 pages $38.00 $30.40 20% Web Discount

Abstract

This monograph begins by examining prewar planning efforts for postwar Iraq, in order to establish what U.S. policymakers expected the postwar situation to look like and what their plans were for reconstruction. The monograph then examines the role of U.S. military forces after major combat officially ended on May 1, 2003; the analysis covers this period through the end of June 2004. Finally, the monograph examines civilian efforts at reconstruction after major combat ended, focusing on the activities of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and its efforts to rebuild structures of governance, security forces, economic policy, and essential services prior to June 28, 2004, the day that the CPA dissolved and transferred authority to the Interim Iraqi Government. The authors conclude that the U.S. government was unprepared for the challenges of postwar Iraq for three reasons: a failure to challenge fundamental assumptions about postwar Iraq; ineffective interagency coordination; and the failure to assign responsibility and resources for providing security in the immediate aftermath of major combat operations.

Table of Contents

  • Chapter One

    Introduction

  • Chapter Two

    Military Planning Efforts

  • Chapter Three

    Civilian Planning Efforts

  • Chapter Four

    Task Force IV

  • Chapter Five

    The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance

  • Chapter Six

    Humanitarian Planning

  • Chapter Seven

    Combat Operations During Phase IV

  • Chapter Eight

    The Coalition Provisional Authority

  • Chapter Nine

    Building New Iraqi Security Forces

  • Chapter Ten

    Governance and Political Reconstruction

  • Chapter Eleven

    Economic Policy

  • Chapter Twelve

    Essential Services and Infrastructure

  • Chapter Thirteen

    Assessing Postwar Efforts

  • Appendix

    Strategic Studies Institute's Mission Matrix for Iraq

Research conducted by

The research described in this report was sponsored by the United States Army and conducted by the RAND Arroyo Center.

This report is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series. RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND monographs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity.

Permission is given to duplicate this electronic document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Copies may not be duplicated for commercial purposes. Unauthorized posting of RAND PDFs to a non-RAND Web site is prohibited. RAND PDFs are protected under copyright law. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit the RAND Permissions page.

The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.