RAND > Reports & Bookstore > Monographs > MG-718

HomeGo to RAND HomeReports and Book Store Book Sale: Selected publications 40% off
Share

Document Information

Analysis of Strategy and Strategies of Analysis

Cover: Analysis of Strategy and Strategies of Analysis

By: David C. Gompert, Paul K. Davis, Stuart E. Johnson, Duncan Long

In a fluid global security environment such as ours, assessing the costs, risks, and likely consequences of alternative national defense strategies is as hard as it is essential. The “Global War on Terror,” for example, has cost as much as $800 billion more than was first projected. Too often, strategies are chosen without disciplined analysis in response to external events and under pressures of time and politics. The authors show how, even in the face of uncertainty, the costs and other implications of any strategy can be assessed by examining the capabilities needed by U.S. combatant commands — the chief agents of strategy — to fulfill what the strategy expects of them. They then demonstrate how such “outside-in” strategy assessment can be integrated with “inside-out” analysis of how core national strengths can best be exploited in national defense.

See Also:

Support RAND Research — Buy This Product!

Paperback Cover Price: $30.50

Discounted Web Price: $27.45

Pages: 96

ISBN/EAN: 9780833045034

Free, downloadable PDF file(s) are available below.

Download PDF Full Document

(File size 0.6 MB, 2 minutes modem, < 1 minute broadband)

Download PDF Summary Only

(File size 0.2 MB, < 1 minute modem, < 1 minute broadband)

RAND makes an electronic version of this document available for free as a public service. If you find this information valuable, please consider purchasing a paper copy of the full document to help support RAND research.

Use Adobe Acrobat Reader version 7.0 or higher for the best experience.

Contents

Chapter One:
Introduction

Chapter Two:
The Operating-Unit Perspective

Chapter Three:
Illustrating and Analyzing Strategy

Chapter Four:
Basing Strategy on Core Strengths

Chapter Five:
Conclusion

The research described in this report was sponsored by the Joint Staff. The research was conducted in the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community.

This product is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series. RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND monographs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity.

Permission is given to duplicate this electronic document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Copies may not be duplicated for commercial purposes. Unauthorized posting of RAND PDFs to a non-RAND Web site is prohibited. RAND PDFs are protected under copyright law. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit the RAND Permissions page.

The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.

* RAND research is conducted across divisions, centers, and projects; these organizational components are represented in the "Related RAND Divisions" section above.

Stay Informed Subscribe to RSS Feeds Search RAND Publications View Cart