For the Abandonment of Symmetry in the Theory of Cooperative Games
An argument that the pure “moveless“ bargaining game (analyzed by Nash, Harsanyi, Luce, Raiffa, and others) may not exist or, if it does, is of a different character from that generally supposed. In addition, it is argued that symmetry in the solution of bargaining games cannot be supported on the notion of “rational expectations.” The point of departure for this argument is the operational identification of irrational expectations.
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- Document Number: P-1386
- Year: 1958
- Series: Papers
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