Timely Lessons of History : The Manchurian Model for Soviet Strategy.
The Soviet invasion of Manchuria was the last large-scale combat operation of World War II. Soviet analyses of the Manchurian campaign reveal an important strain of modern Soviet military thought, suggesting that published studies of the campaign may have been deliberately used in the 1960s and early 1970s to promote a model of modern, combined-arms operations that has significant implications for Soviet strategy, military development, and foreign policy. To make the illusions, ideals, and interests of Soviet authorities more accessible, this report describes and appraises the peculiarities of their perceptions and evaluations of the campaign. It focuses on distilling the contents of certain Soviet military publications and on identifying the strategic concerns, institutional preoccupations, and political initiatives that were most closely associated with Soviet military interest in the Manchurian model.
- Copyright: RAND Corporation
- Availability: Web-Only
- Pages: 84
- Document Number: R-1825-NA
- Year: 1976
- Series: Reports
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