
Evaluating the Civil Justice Reform Act
of 1990
The Civil Justice Reform Act (CJRA) of 1990 is rooted in more than a decade of
concern that cases in federal courts take too long and cost litigants too much.
As a consequence, proponents of reform argue, some individuals are denied
access to justice. In the late 1980s, several groups, including the Federal
Courts Study Committee and the Council on Competitiveness, began formulating
reform proposals. One of these--the Task Force on Civil Justice
Reform--initiated by Senator Joseph Biden, convened by the Brookings
Institution, and assisted technically by staff from the Institute for Civil
Justice (ICJ), produced a set of recommendations that ultimately took the form
of legislation.
The new legislation, the CJRA, required each federal district court to conduct
a self-study with the aid of an advisory group, and to develop a plan for civil
case management to reduce costs and delay. To provide an empirical basis for
assessing new procedures adopted under the act, the legislation also required
that ten pilot districts adopt six principles of case management and mandated
an independent evaluation of these procedural changes. The Judicial Conference
and the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts asked the ICJ to undertake the
evaluation.
In "Preliminary Observations on Implementation of the Pilot Program of the
Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990," (Stanford Law Review, Vol. 46, No. 6,
July 1994) Terence Dunworth and James Kakalik summarize the first phase of this
evaluation and describe how the procedures and case management policies were
implemented in the ten pilot districts.
Overview of the CJRA Pilot Program
The CJRA requires the ten pilot districts to incorporate six specific
case management principles in their plans:
- Differential management of cases
- Early and ongoing judicial control of pretrial processes
- Special monitoring and judicial control of complex cases
- Cost-effective discovery through cooperation and voluntary exchanges of
information
- Good-faith efforts to resolve discovery disputes before filing motions
- Diversion of cases, when appropriate, to alternative dispute resolution
(ADR) programs.
The ten pilot districts were required to implement their plans by January 1992;
the other 84 districts, including the ten used for comparison in the
evaluation, could implement theirs any time before December 1993.
Not everyone agrees that the mandated case-management principles in the pilot
program have merit. Some see them as overly rigid and controlling--a type of
assembly-line justice that prevents the system from adapting to the needs of
individual cases. Others think the principles so vague and permissive that
pilot districts will be able to comply with the legislative requirements by
retaining most of their existing policies.
Features of the ICJ Evaluation
The ICJ evaluation is designed to provide a quantitative and qualitative
basis for assessing how the management principles adopted in the pilot and
comparison districts affect costs to litigants; time to disposition; outcomes,
including participants' satisfaction with the process; and court resources
required. Comparisons are pursued along two dimensions: the ten pilot
districts versus the ten comparison districts, and the ten pilot districts
before and after the new plans were introduced.
Ideally, the pilot and comparison districts would be similar in every respect
except case-management policies. However, since these were not known at the
time the pilot and comparison districts were selected, the Judicial Conference
and the ICJ used factors such as district size, workload per judge, the number
of criminal and civil filings, and the time to disposition in civil cases to
select the comparison districts. Based on these features, the pilot districts
appear to be comparable to the comparison districts and reasonably
representative of all federal districts. Together, the 20 study districts have
about one-third of all federal judges and one-third of all federal case
filings. Thus, findings based on these districts will support generalizations
about the potential effectiveness of system-wide reform.
The evaluation requires massive amounts of detailed case-level data from the
period January 1991 through December 1995, which will be used in preparing the
report due to the Judicial Conference and Congress in late 1996. Data sources
include
- the plans and reports submitted by pilot and comparison districts
- federal court databases from 1970 to the present
- interviews with judges, lawyers, and court administrators
- surveys of judges, ADR providers, lawyers, litigants, and court dockets for
a sample of 10,000 cases to obtain information on case management, costs, time,
and satisfaction with process and case outcomes
- a survey of judge work time during the lives of 5,000 cases.
In addition, the ICJ is collecting similar data for a special supplementary
analysis of ADR programs in the six study districts with a sufficiently high
volume of ADR cases to permit evaluation.
How the Districts Have Implemented CJRA
Advisory Groups. A striking feature of CJRA was the requirement that
each district appoint an advisory group; its membership was to be balanced and
representative of the actors involved in litigation. The group's mandate was
to assess the condition of the civil and criminal dockets, identify the
principal causes of delay and excess cost, and make recommendations, which the
court was free to accept or reject, for dealing with these problems. The
advisory group was also to monitor the implementation of the plan and provide
input to an annual report.
In general, the advisory groups approached their mission with dedication and
conscientiousness. They met frequently and analyzed the data that courts
already had. (There was neither time nor resources to gather substantial new
data). Lawyers dominate the membership, although a few others representing
major categories of litigants were included. Despite the fact that in some
districts judges met with, or were members of, the advisory groups, the groups'
final reports reflected considerable independence from the court. Most courts
accepted their advisory group's recommendations for change.
Differential and Active Case Management. The first three principles
that pilot districts were required to adopt establish the court's
responsibility for managing its caseload. Before CJRA, most pilot districts
had special "tracks" for expediting cases that require minimal
management--typically, prisoner petitions, Social Security appeals, government
loan recovery, and bankruptcy. For all other cases, the districts used
"judicial discretion"--judges making case-management decisions on a
case-by-case basis according to their own schedules and procedures.
As Table 1 shows, four of the pilot districts interpreted the CJRA's
case-management requirement as being fulfilled by a continuation of the
judicial discretion model. However, in the other six districts, several
different case-management approaches were implemented, including rule-based
tracking (which assigns a case to a track on the basis of objective
characteristics such as the nature of the suit); judge-selected tracking;
attorney-selected tracking (in which the attorney opts for expedited, standard,
or complex tracking); and pretrial management with early settlement efforts by
a magistrate judge (which delegates nearly all cases to magistrate judges for
all pretrial management). This last approach represents a significant
expansion of the past responsibilities of magistrate judges in the area of
civil pretrial management.
Both the judicial-discretion approach and the new approaches appear to
meet the CJRA's loosely defined requirements for differential case management;
however, the pilot programs involve less explicit assignment of cases to tracks
than might have been anticipated. Interviews with judges and lawyers suggest
at least two explanations. First, it is difficult for the court to assign a
case to a track based on the limited information available at the time a case
is filed. Second, the rigidity inherent in a tracking system conflicts with
the desire of judges and lawyers to have schedules and other management
procedures tailored to the needs of each case.
Discovery Policies. Issues in managing discovery include how much the
court, rather than the lawyers, should control volume and timing of discovery,
and what types of information should be voluntarily or mandatorily exchanged
without formal discovery requests. Before CJRA, most districts left court
control of the volume and timing to the judge in each case; CJRA had little
effect on this arrangement. However, CJRA brought about substantial change in
early disclosure. Only one district required it before CJRA; after CJRA, all
ten pilot districts have adopted one of five approaches providing either
voluntary or mandatory exchange of information by lawyers, sometimes only for
specified types of cases.
Alternative Dispute Resolution Policies. The CJRA requires pilot
districts to adopt, and other districts to consider adopting, some type of
alternative dispute resolution program. The legislation does not specifically
define ADR, so districts may choose from a number of approaches.
Before CJRA, most judges in pilot districts held settlement conferences, but
eight of the ten districts had no formally structured ADR program involving a
substantial number of cases. After the pilot plans were implemented, five of
the ten pilot districts allowed individual judges to refer cases to some type
of ADR on a voluntary basis, but few such referrals have been made, and none of
these districts has a formally structured ADR program. The other five pilot
districts have instituted one or more formal ADR programs (see Table 2).
Will CJRA Make A Difference?
Based on the first phase of the CJRA evaluation, we can make the
following generalizations about how the legislation has been implemented:
- All pilot districts adopted plans that included the six principles required
by the act, and those plans appear to meet the CJRA's requirements. The
principles in the act were broadly and flexibly written to enable pilot program
experimentation and to allow different districts to adopt different approaches
to satisfying the principles. The pilot district plans that were adopted
sometimes involved major changes in the way civil cases were managed, but more
often they met the flexible definitions of the six pilot principles by
continuing and/or refining previously existing policies.
- Variation in how districts approach case management is great and has
increased since the pilot district programs went into effect. Some districts
have been relatively aggressive, while others have continued low-key
approaches. For example, one district uses differential management tracks,
imposes active judicial management on all cases, mandates early disclosure of
information bearing significantly on both sides of the case, and assigns a
substantial number of cases to mandatory ADR programs. This profile contrasts
sharply with a district that uses individualized case management, permits
voluntary early disclosure, and allows but does not require ADR. These large
differences between districts in case management policies give us the
opportunity to evaluate very different policies, even if the districts that use
them did not change significantly as a result of CJRA.
- Pilot programs in practice sometimes differ significantly from the pilot
programs on paper, for various reasons. Some districts felt the implementation
of one or more components of their plans would require additional funding and
personnel resources. When such additional resources were not forthcoming, some
districts did not operationalize the component of the plan that would have used
them. Other districts encountered difficulties working out the practical
details of implementing aspects of their plans.
- Overall, implicit policy changes may be as important as explicit ones. Many
judges and lawyers have commented in interviews that the process of
implementing the pilot plans has raised the consciousness of judicial officers,
clerks, and lawyers, with resulting subtle changes in how things are
done--perhaps fewer continuances, more attention to the cost of discovery, more
effort to settle cases.
The plans implemented in response to CJRA clearly have the potential to
significantly affect costs, timeliness, and satisfaction with outcomes. But
many of the 10,000 cases that ICJ staff are following are not yet closed, so
information on them is incomplete. Final answers to questions about cost,
delay, and satisfaction must await closure of these cases and results of the
survey. Whatever the outcomes, they will be controversial, potentially
intensifying the battle between Congress and the judiciary about who controls
the courts, and between judges and attorneys about who controls individual
cases.
Questions about this project may be addressed to the project director, Dr.
James S. Kakalik, at (310) 393-0411, ext. 7621 or at
James_Kakalik@rand.org
The mission of the Institute for Civil Justice is to help make the civil
justice system more efficient and more equitable by supplying policymakers and
the public with the results of objective, empirically based, analytic research.
ICJ research is supported by pooled grants from corporations, trade and
professional associations, and individuals; by government grants and contracts;
and by private foundations. The Institute disseminates its work widely to the
legal, business, and research communities, and to the general public.
For additional information about the Institute for Civil Justice, call Deborah
Hensler at (310) 393-0411, ext. 7803, or write to: 1700 Main St., P.O. Box
2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138. Internet: Deborah_Hensler@rand.org.
A profile of the ICJ, abstracts of its publications, and ordering information
can also be found on RAND's Institute for Civil Justice Home Page.
RAND research briefs summarize research that has been more fully
documented elsewhere. This research brief describes work dome in the
Institute for Civil Justice and published in the Stanford Law
Review, Vol. 46, No. 6, July 1994, pp. 1303-1338, © 1994, by the
Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University; also published
as RAND
RP-361. RAND
is a nonprofit institution that helps improve public policy through
research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the
opinions or policies of its research sponsors.
RB-9022 (1995)
RAND's Home Page