This Memorandum deals mainly with U.S. policy toward the Geneva Conference on Indochina that convened its first plenary session on May 8, 1954. It deals mainly with U.S. policy toward the conference, the tactics employed during the negotiations, the interests and objectives of the nine participating nations, the reasons why the final settlement fell far short of a victor's peace, and the lessons of Geneva.
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