A Two Party System, General Equilibrium, and the Voters' Paradox.

by Martin Shubik

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An application of the techniques of mathematical modeling and game theory to an investigation of the voting process and its function in the political economy of a democracy with competitive markets. The investigation is limited to the study of a two-party system in a very rudimentary form, operating in an environment in which the average individual acts as a passive voter and as a price-taker in the part of society that can be represented as a competitive market. Intransivity of preference among the policies offered by the political parties gives rise to a two-person game without a pure strategy equilibrium. In the symmetric situation, the parties must offer the same program; their expected "political profit" is zero, and they may try to appear to be "all things to all men" at the same time. 40 pp.

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