RAND Review

Centerpiece

Iraq and Beyond

Recognizing Shortfalls in Performance, Identifying Options for Improvement

One Week into Operation Iraqi Freedom, Food and Water Supplies Were Thin, but Fuel Was Plentiful

Early in the Operations, Shipments from the United States to Designated Army Units in Iraq Often Contained Items Intended for Other Units

Stateside Personnel Shortages Led to Delivery Delays, Which Were Exacerbated by Mixed Shipments, Which ALso Led to Lost Materiel

War Reserve Shortages and Delayed Production Increases Caused the Backorder Rate for Army Repair Parts to Skyrocket in Late 2003 and 2004

AMONG THE ISSUES SPARKED BY THE IRAQ WAR are three distinctly practical ones: sustaining U.S. Army forces in combat, promoting reenlistments across the services, and rebuilding Iraqi security forces and institutions. At times, these efforts have been hampered by shortfalls in U.S. performance. As outlined in this series on “Iraq and Beyond,” the lessons learned can help to reduce the risks and costs in future contingencies.

The problems with sustaining army combat forces began right away, as depicted here. Just days after the ground advance started rolling on March 21, 2003, the on-hand supplies held by army ground forces were lower than planned for all commodities except fuel. There simply were not enough cargo trucks to move all of the needed supplies — both because of unforeseen demands on the trucks and because of a shortage of trucks. As a point of reference, there was only an estimated one truck for every 194 soldiers in Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, versus one truck for every 73 soldiers in Operation Desert Storm in 1991.

The most perilous of the early days came between March 24 and March 30, 2003. Unanticipated resistance from Iraqi irregulars, known as Fedayeen, conspired with a devastating sandstorm, known as a shamal, to halt the advance toward Baghdad for nearly a week. During this time, supplies held by the combat forces were nearly drained.

However, the logistics system weathered the challenge by keeping just enough critical supplies flowing north. Even when the shamal ended, though, the advance could not proceed until follow-on U.S. combat units could relieve the initial invasion forces of the unexpected requirement to secure the Fedayeen-defended urban areas of An Nasiriyah, As Samawah, and An Najaf astride the supply lines.

The supply of food and water improved quickly, but repair parts deliveries continued to be plagued by distribution problems, compounded by national supply shortages and delayed financing processes, as battles persisted into the fall of 2003 and beyond. The combination of problems left the repair parts supplies of many army units drained thin. It took close to a year before the repair parts supply chain became effective.

The good news is that there were no major operational consequences stemming from the problems with logistics processes, as distinct from, say, the need to secure supply lines. That is, there is no evidence of an inability to accomplish a tactical mission, a failure to achieve desired battlefield outcomes, a change in any course of action, or the foreclosure of a desired option as a result of logistics problems specifically.

However, what the problems did affect were assessments of risk. The combination of low levels of on-hand supplies, known distribution problems, and limited visibility of incoming supplies resulted in calculations of elevated risk in the minds of the commanders and soldiers engaged in combat operations.

The potential operational effects of the logistics problems were successfully mitigated through intensive management, creative adaptations, and the resolve of soldiers continually pushing themselves to the limit. But such actions might not be enough to overcome such problems in every situation. The perceived level of risk might have triggered more significant changes in courses of action in the face of a more capable enemy.