Afghanistan has long been a crossroads of world cultures, economies, politics, and militaries. RAND's early research on Afghanistan examined the 1980s Soviet military campaign and the subsequent fundamentalist Islamic regime. Since Operation Enduring Freedom, the 2001 U.S. military effort to rout the Taliban and find Osama bin Ladin's Al Qaeda network, RAND has engaged the new Afghan government, military, and people to support reconstruction, counterinsurgency, and nation-building efforts.
An analysis of U.S. military information operations and psychological operations in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2010 finds the efforts grew less successful over time, as disenchantment with foreign occupation grew. The most notable shortcoming was the inability to sufficiently counter the Taliban propaganda campaign against U.S. and coalition forces on the theme of civilian casualties.
While al Qaeda's capacity for large-scale attacks has been drastically reduced and the organization seriously weakened, the United States can expect to continue its battle with the terrorist group for many years to come.
Freedom of movement (FoM) is the actual or perceived degree to which individuals or groups can move from place to place within a given environment or into and out of that environment. Focusing specifically on Afghanistan, this examination considers actual and perceived FoM for a range of groups and profiles the factors that influence them and affect data reporting in potentially misleading ways.
Using the Battle of Wanat as a case study, the authors explore and evaluate a range of alternative technological and corresponding tactical improvements to help small unit operations in Afghanistan, particularly when the mission is to establish and protect combat outposts. The authors develop a tactical-level understanding of the circumstances and risks that a small unit faced as it transitioned from a vehicle patrol base to a combat…
An overview of Soviet efforts to improve and facilitate the training and development of Afghan security forces from 1920 to 1989 can inform U.S. and allied forces' current approaches to planning and operating with Afghan forces and overcoming cultural challenges.
Security force assistance (SFA) is a central pillar of the counterinsurgency campaign being waged by U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan. An analysis of SFA efforts documents U.S. and international approaches to building the Afghan National Security Forces from 2001 to 2009 and provides recommendations and their implications for the U.S Army.
This book examines six case studies of insurgencies from around the world to determine the key factors necessary for a successful transition from counterinsurgency to a more stable situation. The authors review the causes of each insurgency and the key players involved, and examine what the government did right — or wrong — to bring the insurgency to an end and to transition to greater stability.
A sustained focus on Afghanistan at all levels of the U.S. government is needed for the United States to make the most of its limited influence on the complex Afghan peace process.
The existing subnational government across Afghanistan is too centralized and weak to fulfill two basic requirements of legitimacy: effective service provision and representation. Opportunities for improvement are outlined for international actors hoping to strengthen local government in recently cleared areas.
Former Taliban and other insurgents provide an invaluable source of information on their previous colleagues, and can ultimately cause momentum to shift toward counterinsurgent forces. Steps can be taken to increase the likelihood of reintegrating fighters into their communities.
Iran's complex and, at times, contradictory set of cultural, religious, political, and security interests shapes its behavior in Afghanistan, to the benefit and detriment of U.S. objectives.
The U.S. military strategy should transition to an Afghan-led counterinsurgency strategy which would involve decreasing the U.S. military footprint and relying on Special Operations Forces to help Afghans conduct counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations.
Examines "reachback" -- the use of contracting capability outside of the theater of operations to accomplish contracting tasks for customers in-theater -- as a potential means for reducing the deployment burden on military contracting personnel. The authors find that reachback might improve performance in some areas and has the potential to reduce deployments, but other issues also need to be addressed to reduce stress on the contracting…
The "Americanization" of NATO's mission in Afghanistan may prove crucial to the future of Afghanistan, but the alliance could suffer long-term harm by being relegated to the position of junior partner to the United States.
The C-27J Spartan is a reasonable replacement for the C-23 Sherpa aircraft that now transport mission critical, time sensitive (MCTS) cargo and passengers to brigade combat teams in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Army's direct support approach for moving MCTS shipments using its organic aircraft is inherently more responsive than that of the Air Force, but both services should be able to improve the responsiveness of delivering MCTS shipments.
The Afghan government and NATO can improve security in Afghanistan by leveraging traditional policing institutions in rural villages and mobilizing the population against insurgents. However, action needs to happen quickly to take advantage of a growing amount of local resistance against the Taliban across Afghanistan.
Approaches to counterinsurgency from 30 recent resolved campaigns show that good counterinsurgency practices tend to "run in packs" and that historically, the balance of selected good and ineffective practices perfectly predicts the outcome of a conflict.
Some view DNA as a useful way for the U.S. Department of Defense to keep track of a large and ever-growing number of people as it executes its mission. However, serious questions remain about the technical requirements, policy and legal ramifications, and costs and benefits of this tool compared with other biometrics.
Militaries from the United States, Great Britain, Canada, Denmark, and Israel all see a role for heavy forces, including tanks, in irregular warfare and hybrid warfare environments because they reduce operational risk, minimize friendly casualties, and provide an intimidation factor against adversaries.
Building on a framework for integrating civil and military counterinsurgency (COIN), this volume presents an approach to the civil component, illustrated with three case studies from Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
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