The act of collecting intelligence about individuals, groups, or states of interest has come under increasing scrutiny since September 11, 2001. RAND has examined how nations successfully collect intelligence, how the U.S. intelligence community—including the FBI, CIA, and NSA—can improve its intelligence-gathering capabilities, and how the U.S. military can make better use of its limited land-, sea-, and air-based intelligence collection assets in the rapidly changing battlefields of the future.
NEWS RELEASE
The U.S. Department of Defense will receive more detailed, transparent and credible assessments of its counterinsurgency campaigns by replacing its top-down approach with a bottom-up method driven by contextual, narrative reporting provided by commanders on the ground.
REPORT
The U.S. Department of Defense will receive more detailed, transparent, and credible assessments of its counterinsurgency campaigns by replacing its top-down approach with a bottom-up method driven by contextual, narrative reporting provided by commanders on the ground.
RESEARCH BRIEF
Current processes used by the U.S. military do not provide accurate assessments of counterinsurgency campaigns. A new process that adds transparency and context to assessments would make them more credible and useful at all levels of decisionmaking.
REPORT
The Air Force has a continuing interest in reducing high attrition and training-block failure (washback) rates, as both increase training and recruiting costs. This report describes research into these issues for nine career fields.
REPORT
Former Taliban and other insurgents provide an invaluable source of information on their previous colleagues, and can ultimately cause momentum to shift toward counterinsurgent forces. Steps can be taken to increase the likelihood of reintegrating fighters into their communities.
COMMENTARY
Questions not asked or stories not imagined by policy are not likely to be answered or developed by intelligence, writes Gregory F. Treverton.
REPORT
Because terrorism is not confined to national boundaries, it puts pressure on the U.S. both at home and abroad, forcing intelligence and law enforcement—the CIA and the FBI—to work together in new ways. This requires new means of sharing not just information but also analysis across the federal system.
REPORT
With terrorism still prominent on the U.S. agenda, whether the country’s prevention efforts match the threat the United States faces continues to be central in policy debate. One element of this debate is questioning whether the United States should create a dedicated domestic intelligence agency. Case studies of five other democracies provide lessons and common themes that may help policymakers decide.
REPORT
The Collection Operations Model (COM) is a stochastic, agent-based simulation that supports the analysis of command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C3ISR) processes. Written for the System Effectiveness Analysis Simulation environment, the COM models the real-time interaction of many players to help answer questions about force mix, system effectiveness, concepts of operations, and basing and…
REPORT
In the wake of 9/11, Congress directed the Department of Homeland Security to evaluate whether the U.S. needs a dedicated domestic intelligence agency, separate from law enforcement, to deter terrorism. DHS asked RAND not to offer specific recommendations, but to make clear what should be considered in the creation of such an agency.
REPORT
In testimony presented before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Terrorism and Unconventional Threats and Capabilities, Seth Jones discusses how to defeat terrorist groups through a strategy based on careful police and intelligence work rather than military force.
RESEARCH BRIEF
This research brief discusses the pros and cons of creating a new domestic intelligence agency, separate from law enforcement, to address the threat of terrorism and describes a technique called break-even analysis that can help inform the debate.
NEWS RELEASE
Current U.S. strategy against the terrorist group al Qaida has not been successful in significantly undermining the group's capabilities.
REPORT
The U.S. Air Force has greatly increased the number of operational surveillance sensors and its ability to process data from these sensors. However, along with the increased number of sensors comes an increase in the complexity of the tasking of these assets.
RESEARCH BRIEF
This research brief summarizes research detailing a methodology for assessing the benefits and costs of U.S. Air Force intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance employment strategies.
REPORT
While the initiatives set in motion by the December 2004 intelligence reform legislation are promising, they are just the beginning. Intelligence analysis needs improvement across U.S. intelligence agencies to account for a world of threats very different from that of the Cold War.
PROJECT
The RAND Center for Global Risk and Security draws on RAND's unparalleled breadth of expertise to provide a focal point for cross-cutting, multi-disciplinary research and analysis on the increasingly complex issue of global security.
REPORT
Precluding terrorists from getting the technology they want is impractical, and developing direct counters is unlikely to yield high payoffs. Instead, counterterrorism programs should exploit the technologies and the information such technologies use to enable more direct security force operations.
COMMENTARY
Risks and Riddles in Smithsonian Magazine
JOURNAL ARTICLE
Shows how counterintelligence collection efforts must diverge significantly from ''classical'' collection methods when fighting an insurgency.
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