<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom">

     <title>RAND Research Topic: Intelligence Community</title>
     <link rel="self" href="http://www.rand.org/topics/intelligence-community.xml"/>
     <updated>2012-05-24T14:22:55Z</updated>
     <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" hreflang="en" href="http://www.rand.org/topics/intelligence-community.html" />
     <rights>Copyright (c) 2012, The RAND Corporation</rights>
     <author>
       <name>RAND Corporation</name>
     </author>
     <id>http://www.rand.org/topics/intelligence-community.html</id>
	 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">Prolific Profanities Seemed to Predict Prominent Protests</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/2012/spring/tweets.html</id>
   <published>May 11, 2012</published>
   <updated>May 11, 2012</updated>
   <summary type="html">Twitter and other social media reportedly played a big role in the protests following the 2009 Iranian presidential election. Analysis of word usage in millions of tweets about the election and its aftermath reveals that spikes in the use of swear words could forecast the outbreak of large-scale protests.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/2012/spring/tweets.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">New Counterinsurgency Assessment Methods Are Needed to Better Inform Policymakers</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/news/press/2012/05/03.html</id>
   <published>May 3, 2012</published>
   <updated>May 3, 2012</updated>
   <summary type="html">The U.S. Department of Defense will receive more detailed, transparent and credible assessments of its counterinsurgency campaigns by replacing its top-down approach with a bottom-up method driven by contextual, narrative reporting provided by commanders on the ground.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/news/press/2012/05/03.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">New Counterinsurgency Assessment Methods Are Needed to Better Inform Policymakers</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1086.html</id>
   <published>May 3, 2012</published>
   <updated>May 3, 2012</updated>
   <summary type="html">The U.S. Department of Defense will receive more detailed, transparent, and credible assessments of its counterinsurgency campaigns by replacing its top-down approach with a bottom-up method driven by contextual, narrative reporting provided by commanders on the ground.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1086.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">Improving Counterinsurgency Campaign Assessment: The Importance of Transparency in the Fog of War</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9645.html</id>
   <published>Apr 13, 2012</published>
   <updated>Apr 13, 2012</updated>
   <summary type="html">Current processes used by the U.S. military do not provide accurate assessments of counterinsurgency campaigns. A new process that adds transparency and context to assessments would make them more credible and useful at all levels of decisionmaking.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9645.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">Making Strategic Analysis Matter</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF287.html</id>
   <published>Mar 9, 2012</published>
   <updated>Mar 9, 2012</updated>
   <summary type="html">These proceedings present the topics and findings discussed at a July 2010 workshop convened to examine how consumers of intelligence might be better served by analysis whose focus is longer term or more strategic than the current reporting that dominates today&apos;s intelligence production. An appendix presents relevant lessons from the private sector.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF287.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">The Future of Air Force Motion Imagery Exploitation: Lessons from the Commercial World</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR1133.html</id>
   <published>Mar 6, 2012</published>
   <updated>Mar 6, 2012</updated>
   <summary type="html">The information explosion resulting from vast amounts of new motion imagery threatens to leave Air Force intelligence analysts drowning in data. One approach to meeting this challenge is to implement certain process changes and adopt a new organizational construct to improve the effectiveness of Air Force intelligence analysts while confronting the reality of limited resources.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR1133.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">Reducing Attrition in Selected Air Force Training Pipelines</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR955.html</id>
   <published>Feb 2, 2012</published>
   <updated>Feb 2, 2012</updated>
   <summary type="html">The Air Force has a continuing interest in reducing high attrition and training-block failure (washback) rates, as both increase training and recruiting costs. This report describes research into these issues for nine career fields.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR955.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">Tracking Public Sentiment in Iran After the Contested 2009 Election with Twitter </title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR1161.html</id>
   <published>Jan 17, 2012</published>
   <updated>Jan 17, 2012</updated>
   <summary type="html">Social media was used in the 2009 protests to organize and communicate under government censorship. An analysis of more than 2.5 million tweets discussing the Iran election holds promise for such policy uses as assessing public opinion and forecasting events such as large-scale protests.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR1161.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">Assessing Freedom of Movement for Counterinsurgency Campaigns</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR1014.html</id>
   <published>Jan 12, 2012</published>
   <updated>Jan 12, 2012</updated>
   <summary type="html">Freedom of movement (FoM) is the actual or perceived degree to which individuals or groups can move from place to place within a given environment or into and out of that environment. Focusing specifically on Afghanistan, this examination considers actual and perceived FoM for a range of groups and profiles the factors that influence them and affect data reporting in potentially misleading ways.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR1014.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">The Characteristics of Cyberspace Pose Challenges to Those Who Seek to Defend It</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP342.html</id>
   <published>Dec 22, 2011</published>
   <updated>Dec 22, 2011</updated>
   <summary type="html">It has become clear that Stuxnet-like worms pose a serious threat even to critical U.S. infrastructure and computer systems that are not connected to the Internet. However, defending against such attacks involves complex technological and legal issues.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP342.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">Addressing Commanders&apos; Needs for Information on &quot;Soft&quot; Factors</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9628.html</id>
   <published>Dec 5, 2011</published>
   <updated>Dec 5, 2011</updated>
   <summary type="html">Describes a framework for thinking about commanders&apos; critical information needs in countersurgency operations and offers practical ways for commanders to integrate influence activities into combined arms planning and assessment.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9628.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">From Insurgency to Stability: Volume II: Insights from Selected Case Studies</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1111z2.html</id>
   <published>Sep 7, 2011</published>
   <updated>Sep 7, 2011</updated>
   <summary type="html">This book examines six case studies of insurgencies from around the world to determine the key factors necessary for a successful transition from counterinsurgency to a more stable situation. The authors review the causes of each insurgency and the key players involved, and examine what the government did right &amp;mdash; or wrong &amp;mdash; to bring the insurgency to an end and to transition to greater stability.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1111z2.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">Al Qaeda&apos;s Efforts to Recruit Homegrown Jihadists in America Remain Largely Ineffective</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/news/press/2011/08/31.html</id>
   <published>Aug 31, 2011</published>
   <updated>Aug 31, 2011</updated>
   <summary type="html">Despite al Qaeda&apos;s increasing use of the Internet to attempt to radicalize and recruit homegrown terrorists in the United States, the turnout has been tiny and mostly inept.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/news/press/2011/08/31.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">Al Qaeda&apos;s Efforts to Recruit Homegrown Jihadists in America Remain Largely Ineffective</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP343.html</id>
   <published>Aug 31, 2011</published>
   <updated>Aug 31, 2011</updated>
   <summary type="html">Despite al Qaeda&apos;s increasing use of the Internet to attempt to radicalize and recruit homegrown terrorists in the United States, the turnout has been tiny and mostly inept.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP343.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">Analysis of Subnational Government in Afghanistan Identifies Opportunities for Improvement</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP318.html</id>
   <published>Aug 10, 2011</published>
   <updated>Aug 10, 2011</updated>
   <summary type="html">The existing subnational government across Afghanistan is too centralized and weak to fulfill two basic requirements of legitimacy: effective service provision and representation. Opportunities for improvement are outlined for international actors hoping to strengthen local government in recently cleared areas. </summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP318.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">Reintegrating Afghan Insurgents into Their Local Communities</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP327.html</id>
   <published>Jul 21, 2011</published>
   <updated>Jul 21, 2011</updated>
   <summary type="html">Former Taliban and other insurgents provide an invaluable source of information on their previous colleagues, and can ultimately cause momentum to shift toward counterinsurgent forces. Steps can be taken to increase the likelihood of reintegrating fighters into their communities.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP327.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">An Organizational Design Assessment of U.S. Marine Corps Intelligence</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1108.html</id>
   <published>Jul 13, 2011</published>
   <updated>Jul 13, 2011</updated>
   <summary type="html">Over the past decade, U.S. Marine Corps intelligence has had to tailor its organization to meet the evolving demands of the operational environment. A broad review of its design examined how to align it efficiently and effectively with current and future missions and functions.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1108.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">The Universal Core Information Exchange Framework: Assessing Its Implications for Acquisition Programs</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR885.html</id>
   <published>Jun 1, 2011</published>
   <updated>Jun 1, 2011</updated>
   <summary type="html">Universal Core (UCore) 2.0 is a Department of Defense (DoD) and intelligence community information exchange framework that can improve interoperability between DoD information systems. This report reviews UCore pilot programs, implementation issues, and bandwidth demands and identifies issues that should be addressed before UCore implementation is mandated for DoD programs.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR885.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">What Should We Expect of Our Spies?</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/commentary/2011/05/25/PM.html</id>
   <published>May 25, 2011</published>
   <updated>May 25, 2011</updated>
   <summary type="html">Questions not asked or stories not imagined by policy are not likely to be answered or developed by intelligence, writes Gregory F. Treverton.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/commentary/2011/05/25/PM.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">Al-Qaeda after bin Laden</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/commentary/2011/05/12/NJ.html</id>
   <published>May 12, 2011</published>
   <updated>May 12, 2011</updated>
   <summary type="html">Wary of communicating with each other and with al Qaeda&apos;s field commands, al Qaeda central could become more isolated, more dependent on its affiliates, allied groups, and individual acolytes, writes Brian Michael Jenkins.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/commentary/2011/05/12/NJ.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 </feed>

