After nearly 25 years of Saddam Hussein's rule, Iraqis generally welcomed his overthrow during the 2003 invasion, but the post-Saddam years have seen increased religious conflicts, economic struggles, insurgency, and the continued and divisive presence of occupying forces. RAND research on the Gulf Wars and nation-building efforts in Iraq have helped to inform and advise both the U.S. government and military, and the nascent Iraqi government.
Past efforts to resolve ethno-territorial conflicts in Brčko, Mostar, Northern Ireland, and Jerusalem provide insights that could facilitate a negotiated settlement regarding the disputed Iraqi city of Kirkuk. The case studies show that Arabs, Kurds, and Turkomen must emphasize governance over symbols of sovereignty, develop adaptable power-sharing mechanisms, marginalize spoilers, empower local leaders, and create multi-ethnic…
This book examines six case studies of insurgencies from around the world to determine the key factors necessary for a successful transition from counterinsurgency to a more stable situation. The authors review the causes of each insurgency and the key players involved, and examine what the government did right — or wrong — to bring the insurgency to an end and to transition to greater stability.
Using primary sources and interviews with those involved in the fighting and its aftermath, the authors describe the 2008 Battle of Sadr City, analyze its outcome, and derive implications for the conduct of land operations. Their analysis identifies factors critical to the coalition victory over Jaish al-Mahdi and describes a new model for dealing with insurgent control of urban areas.
Continuing tensions between Arab and Kurdish communities in Iraq could lead to inadvertent armed conflict unless Iraqi leaders resolve outstanding disputes regarding federalism, the legal and political status of disputed territories, and the management of northern Iraq's oil and gas resources.
Prisoner-of-war and detainee operations are a crucial component in the successful prosecution of a conflict — particularly in counterinsurgency operations — and should be upgraded to receive more attention and better advance preparation.
Examines "reachback" -- the use of contracting capability outside of the theater of operations to accomplish contracting tasks for customers in-theater -- as a potential means for reducing the deployment burden on military contracting personnel. The authors find that reachback might improve performance in some areas and has the potential to reduce deployments, but other issues also need to be addressed to reduce stress on the contracting…
An analysis of the financial operations and economics of al-Qa'ida in Iraq in Anbar province indicates that members were poorly compensated and suggests that they were not motivated primarily by money to join the group.
The C-27J Spartan is a reasonable replacement for the C-23 Sherpa aircraft that now transport mission critical, time sensitive (MCTS) cargo and passengers to brigade combat teams in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Army's direct support approach for moving MCTS shipments using its organic aircraft is inherently more responsive than that of the Air Force, but both services should be able to improve the responsiveness of delivering MCTS shipments.
Approaches to counterinsurgency from 30 recent resolved campaigns show that good counterinsurgency practices tend to "run in packs" and that historically, the balance of selected good and ineffective practices perfectly predicts the outcome of a conflict.
Some view DNA as a useful way for the U.S. Department of Defense to keep track of a large and ever-growing number of people as it executes its mission. However, serious questions remain about the technical requirements, policy and legal ramifications, and costs and benefits of this tool compared with other biometrics.
Effective counterinsurgency is dependent on understanding the local population. A survey of those living in Iraq's Anbar Province (once one of the country's most violent areas), reveals both the many improvements that have occurred, as well as the extent to which these Iraqis have suffered from the effects of war.
Militaries from the United States, Great Britain, Canada, Denmark, and Israel all see a role for heavy forces, including tanks, in irregular warfare and hybrid warfare environments because they reduce operational risk, minimize friendly casualties, and provide an intimidation factor against adversaries.
As U.S. forces withdraw from Iraq, significant changes can be expected throughout al-Anbar Province in security, political, economic, and even cultural relationships. RAND convened a series of three one-day workshops at which participants identified five relatively distinct futures, or scenarios, for al-Anbar that provide plausible but alternative trajectories for the province between early 2009 and the end of 2011.
Building on a framework for integrating civil and military counterinsurgency (COIN), this volume presents an approach to the civil component, illustrated with three case studies from Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
While most U.S. government officials working in Iraq believe the use of armed private security contractors has been a useful strategy, many worry that the contractors have not always had a positive effect on U.S. foreign policy objectives.
The increased use of cash bonuses by the U.S. Department of Defense to encourage military enlistment and reenlistment had a positive effect on recruiting and retention in the armed forces. Until recently, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have placed greater stress on military recruitment and retention.
The U.S. must determine how best to promote long-term security and stability in the Persian Gulf region while seeking to reduce the risks and costs imposed by its role as a permanent regional power—particularly vis-à-vis Iraq's future, the role of Iran, asymmetric threats, regional tensions, and the roles of other external actors.
From the lessons of the Vietnam War to the recent downfall of the Tamil Tigers in Southeast Asia, conflicts between insurgencies and governments tend to follow certain patterns as they arc toward their endings. This planning framework for both policymakers and strategists will help design counterinsurgency campaigns and mitigate the kind of false expectations at work in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The 2003 invasion of Iraq and the ensuing conflict in that country fostered the rise of Iranian power in the region, but with more limitations than is commonly acknowledged. It also diminished local confidence in U.S. credibility and created opportunities for China and Russia.
As it withdraws troops from Iraq, the United States must work not only to maintain security in that nation, but also focus on how the action will impact other regional interests.
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