For much of the past century, the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians has been a defining feature of the Middle East. Depending on its trajectory, what are the conflict's net costs and benefits to both parties over the next ten years?
At the U.S. launch of The Costs of Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Study held at the Wilson Center on June 15, 2015, RAND senior researchers Charles P. Ries and C. Ross Anthony discussed the economic and non-economic factors surrounding the conflict and the long-term implications for Israel, the West Bank and Gaza, and the international community.
Today, more than 90 percent of Israelis and Palestinians were born after 1948 and have known nothing other than some version of the impasse. Both sides could be better off with a stable two-state solution. Prolonging the impasse for another generation would have real costs.
The Israeli economy stands to gain more than $120 billion over the next decade in a two-state solution, a possible resolution of the long-standing conflict between Israelis and Palestinians in which the Palestinians gain independence and relations between the Israelis and their neighbors normalize. Palestinians would gain $50 billion, with average per-capita income rising by about 36 percent.
The Israeli economy stands to gain more than $120 billion over the next decade in a two-state solution, a possible resolution of the long-standing conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. Palestinians would gain $50 billion, with average per-capita income rising by about 36 percent.
RAND authors analyze the options for using special warfare to fill the gap in coercive strategies between the costly commitment of conventional forces and the limits of precision-strike campaigns, including its characteristics, advantages, and risks.
President Obama said in June, “If you had to choose any moment to be born in human history…you'd choose this time. The world is less violent than it has ever been.” While his proposition may seem incongruous with the present crises across Eurasia, evidence suggests that the world is indeed becoming more secure.
In the face of adversaries exploiting regional social divisions by using special operations forces and intelligence services, and dwindling American appetite for intervention, the United States needs to employ a more sophisticated form of special warfare to secure its interests.
Locally focused stability operations (LFSO) to build security, development, and governance are difficult to assess because of the complexity of operational environments. This brief outlines creation of an assessment plan for a notional LFSO scenario.
This report describes how to best measure and assess the progress and outcomes of locally focused stability operations -- the missions, tasks, and activities that create stability by building security, governance, and development in a community.
This pocket guide describes a process for identifying adversary, friendly, and other key stakeholder centers of gravity to support the development of plans that will exploit adversary vulnerabilities while protecting friendly ones.
Mexico is not like any other case characterized by "warlordism," resource insurgency, ungoverned spaces, and organized crime. Despite the lack of a perfectly analogous case, Mexico stands to benefit from historical lessons from countries facing similar challenges.
Although there is no perfectly analogous case to Mexico's current security situation, historical case studies may offer lessons for policymakers as they cope with challenges related to violence and corruption in that country.
Mexico is not like any other case characterized by “warlordism,” resource insurgency, ungoverned spaces, and organized crime. Despite the lack of a perfectly analogous case, Mexico stands to benefit from historical lessons from countries facing similar challenges.
The history of “small-footprint approaches” should be sobering. It suggests that such approaches are good at preventing allied governments from losing against rebels, but are not very good at actually winning wars.