Professional negligence by a health care provider has implications for both the health and legal professions: Preventable medical injuries increase the overall cost of treatment, while malpractice lawsuits have been blamed for further increasing the cost of health care in the United States. RAND researchers have examined medical malpractice legislation and its effects on stakeholders such as the health care consumer, the medical practitioner, and the legal community.
Research conducted by:
RAND Health;
RAND Justice, Infrastructure, and Environment;
RAND Institute for Civil Justice
Reports (13)
Investigates the relationship between safety outcomes in hospitals and malpractice claiming against providers, using administrative data and measures for California hospitals and insurers from 2001 to 2005.
This document explores how changing medical liability laws to reduce the frequency and severity of claims would affect health system performance along nine dimensions.
In order to examine the directions of change and how they may either conflict with or find support in current tort rules, the ICJ organized a conference on the topic of
Using medical malpractice claims data from the Medical Inter-Insurance Exchange of New Jersey, which insures approximately 70 percent of the physicians practicing in the state, this Note analyzes physician negligence.
Attempts to identify potentially preventable sources of medical injury in obstetrics and gynecology, general surgery, anesthesiology, and radiology.
Reports on the need for more research on outcomes and appropriateness of medical care to develop a more rational system for preventing, punishing, and compensating for medical malpractice.
This paper, originally presented as testimony before the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate, reviews the results of three studies on the frequency and severity of medical malpractice claims.
The main purpose of this paper is to present empirical estimates of a model of the disposition of claims through the courts. A second purpose of the paper is to provide evidence relevant to the policy debate over tort reform. The theoretical model i...
Merit rating is not widely used in setting medical malpractice insurance premiums. Consequently, merit rating deserves more serious attention in medical malpractice insurance.
Argues that experience-rate pricing of medical malpractice insurance could be a useful quality-control device by forcing bad doctors to pay insurance rates reflecting the true costs of malpractice.
Compares the costs of operating the tort liability system for four major branches of tort law: product liability, automobile liability, workers' compensation, and medical malpractice.
Analyzes the causes of the recent dramatic increase in malpractice insurance rates and contraction of the market in risk spreading, exemplified by the withdrawal of commercial carriers from some states, the growth of physician-owned mutuals, and the ...
Examines the impact of present and future malpractice systems on the quality of medical care.
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