To accomplish their missions, military leaders must be able to command and control the many activities of their forces. RAND has applied strategic analysis since its earliest work on game theory to develop scenarios and guide military and civilian decisionmakers on the most effective employment of command and control (C2) principles and technologies, and continues to do so with C4I (command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence).
Report
Describes agile combat support (ACS) process gaps and recommends ways to improve Air Force command and control through enhanced ACS planning, execution, monitoring, and control processes.
Research Brief
Describes a framework for thinking about commanders' critical information needs in countersurgency operations and offers practical ways for commanders to integrate influence activities into combined arms planning and assessment.
Research Brief
The U.S. Army needs to improve its ability to command and control joint, interagency, and multinational forces in diverse environments, and to prepare Army headquarters to perform as components of, or headquarters for, joint task forces.
Report
The U.S. Army needs to improve its ability to command and control joint, interagency, and multinational forces in diverse environments, and to prepare Army headquarters to perform as components of, or headquarters for, joint task forces.
Report
In order to improve the effectiveness of combined arms planning and assessment operations, ground commanders need information pertaining to cultural and other "soft" factors and practical ways to integrate such information into influence operations activities.
Report
Looking across a set of completed C4I upgrades to U.S. Navy ships, the authors uncovered mixed evidence of cost improvement, a high level of variability in costs, and a trend toward overestimating the installation-labor costs of certain upgrades.
Commentary
Published commentary by RAND staff: Changes From Command Transfer, in Korea Times.
Report
Develops operational architecture to guide the development of combat support command and control (CSC2).
Report
The principal objective in this work was to improve the Army's Program Objective Memorandum (POM) development process.
Report
Examines the achievement of the principle of unity of effort from a narrow focus on the command and control of U.S. joint tactical air operations in four campaigns (Midway, the Solomons, Korea, and Vietnam) from 1942 to 1968...
People
Senior International Policy Analyst
M.A. in Asian Studies, University of Hawaii; B.A. in psychology, Davidson College
People
Senior Physical Scientist; Professor, Pardee RAND Graduate School
Ph.D. in theoretical physics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; B.S. in physics, Stanford University
People
Senior Engineer
Ph.D. in engineering and public policy, Carnegie Mellon University; M.S. in engineering mechanics, Pennsylvania State University; B.S. in aerospace engineering, Pennsylvania Sate University
People
Senior Operations Researcher; Professor, Pardee RAND Graduate School
Ph.D. and M.S. in mathematical statistics, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; B.S. in mathematics, Villanova University
People
Senior Information Scientist; Professor, Pardee RAND Graduate School
Ph.D. in information technology, George Mason University; M.S. in operations research, Tulane University; M.B.A. in management science, Tulane University; B.A. in mathematics and economics, Northeastern University
People
Senior Management Scientist
Ph.D. in business administration, University of Minnesota; M.S. in business administration, B.S. in metallurgical engineering, Michigan Technological University
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