Military intelligence includes information on other countries' military forces, plans, and operations gained through a variety of collection methods. RAND analyzes this intelligence to help civilian policymakers and military leaders understand political and military trends around the world, the sources of potential regional conflict, and emerging threats to the global security environment, and provides recommendations on how best to employ information-gathering techniques and technologies.
REPORT
Freedom of movement (FoM) is the actual or perceived degree to which individuals or groups can move from place to place within a given environment or into and out of that environment. Focusing specifically on Afghanistan, this examination considers actual and perceived FoM for a range of groups and profiles the factors that influence them and affect data reporting in potentially misleading ways.
RESEARCH BRIEF
Describes a framework for thinking about commanders' critical information needs in countersurgency operations and offers practical ways for commanders to integrate influence activities into combined arms planning and assessment.
REPORT
This book examines six case studies of insurgencies from around the world to determine the key factors necessary for a successful transition from counterinsurgency to a more stable situation. The authors review the causes of each insurgency and the key players involved, and examine what the government did right — or wrong — to bring the insurgency to an end and to transition to greater stability.
REPORT
The existing subnational government across Afghanistan is too centralized and weak to fulfill two basic requirements of legitimacy: effective service provision and representation. Opportunities for improvement are outlined for international actors hoping to strengthen local government in recently cleared areas.
REPORT
Over the past decade, U.S. Marine Corps intelligence has had to tailor its organization to meet the evolving demands of the operational environment. A broad review of its design examined how to align it efficiently and effectively with current and future missions and functions.
COMMENTARY
Questions not asked or stories not imagined by policy are not likely to be answered or developed by intelligence, writes Gregory F. Treverton.
COMMENTARY
Wary of communicating with each other and with al Qaeda's field commands, al Qaeda central could become more isolated, more dependent on its affiliates, allied groups, and individual acolytes, writes Brian Michael Jenkins.
COMMENTARY
Anyone concerned about nuclear proliferation or interested in the world of espionage will want to read Catherine Collins and Douglas Frantz's provocative new book, "Fallout: The True Story of the CIA's Secret War on Nuclear Trafficking," which tells a fascinating story whose characters come straight out of a spy novel, writes Brian Michael Jenkins.
REPORT
In order to improve the effectiveness of combined arms planning and assessment operations, ground commanders need information pertaining to cultural and other "soft" factors and practical ways to integrate such information into influence operations activities.
REPORT
C4I systems have evolved rapidly over the last few decades, and the cost of keeping these products up-to-date on new and in-service U.S. Navy ships is high due to configuration, integration, testing, and other challenges. Looking across a specific set of completed C4I upgrades, the authors found evidence of cost improvement, a high level of variability in costs, and a trend toward overestimating the installation-labor costs of certain…
REPORT
The U.S. Air Force faces a shortage of general officers with the necessary experience to fill senior leadership positions in Air Force, joint, and interagency intelligence organizations and functions. This technical report presents an analysis of the competencies required for intelligence jobs and compares the qualifications in the officer supply with the qualifications that the jobs demand.
REPORT
Because terrorism is not confined to national boundaries, it puts pressure on the U.S. both at home and abroad, forcing intelligence and law enforcement—the CIA and the FBI—to work together in new ways. This requires new means of sharing not just information but also analysis across the federal system.
REPORT
With terrorism still prominent on the U.S. agenda, whether the country’s prevention efforts match the threat the United States faces continues to be central in policy debate. One element of this debate is questioning whether the United States should create a dedicated domestic intelligence agency. Case studies of five other democracies provide lessons and common themes that may help policymakers decide.
REPORT
As the U.S. military transforms to an information-based force, it will need to collect, combine, and utilize intelligence. The process known as fusion will help determine whether this intelligence is used in the most beneficial manner. Fusion is the process of combining pieces of information to produce higher-quality information. This report describes one approach to capturing the fusion process in a constructive simulation.
COMMENTARY
Published commentary by RAND staff: Iran's Covert War in Iraq, in the Washington Times.
COMMENTARY
Published commentary by RAND staff: Media Leaks Hinder Intelligence Gathering, in the Washington Times.
COMMENTARY
Published commentary by RAND staff: Lessons for Intelligence in the Campaign Against al Qaeda, in Vanguard magazine.
JOURNAL ARTICLE
The successful employment of German air power in the Battle of Britain was greatly hindered by abysmal intelligence. The Luftwaffe never developed an accurate picture of enemy strengths and weaknesses, and this contributed to preventing it from bringing force to bear at the decisive point of battle. Although certain aspects of British intelligence were equally flawed, it ultimately proved itself to be an indispensable adjunct to the…
REPORT
The creation of the Director of National Intelligence position reshaped how U.S. intelligence is organized. The next steps are transforming how it does business by improving analysis; shaping intelligence by mission or issue rather than collection source or agency; and more.
COMMENTARY
Published commentary by RAND staff.
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