Military intelligence includes information on other countries' military forces, plans, and operations gained through a variety of collection methods. RAND analyzes this intelligence to help civilian policymakers and military leaders understand political and military trends around the world, the sources of potential regional conflict, and emerging threats to the global security environment, and provides recommendations on how best to employ information-gathering techniques and technologies.
Commentary
The post-Vietnam “never again” attitude led to a severe atrophy of the U.S. military's counterinsurgency skills and it is quite possible that the U.S. military will go through a similar phase of unlearning over the next several years, writes James Dobbins.
Commentary
A constrictive rule book against direct-action counterterrorism techniques could be in tension with operational realities. But it would go some way toward establishing the legal and ethical framework under which such difficult decisions are made, writes Patrick Johnston.
Report
Explores occupational burnout and retention of Air Force intelligence analysts working in the Distributed Common Ground System.
Commentary
When terrorists are afraid to poke their heads above ground, it becomes exceedingly difficult for them to communicate, coordinate, and conduct attacks—especially sophisticated ones like 9/11, writes Patrick B. Johnston.
Report
This paper proposes a paradigm shift in how military intelligence is fused. The concept, behavioral intelligence analysis, provides a more complete picture of the complex counterinsurgency environment.
Report
Surveys the work of the RAND National Security Research Division from the spring of 2011 through the winter of 2012.
Report
This report examines how a military staff might assess freedom of movement as a strategic and tactical indicator in counterinsurgency, and specifically in Afghanistan.
Research Brief
Describes a framework for thinking about commanders' critical information needs in countersurgency operations and offers practical ways for commanders to integrate influence activities into combined arms planning and assessment.
Report
This book examines six case studies of insurgencies from around the world to determine the key factors in the successful transition from counterinsurgency toward stability.
Report
The existing subnational government across Afghanistan is too centralized and weak to fulfill two basic requirements of legitimacy: effective service provision and representation. Opportunities for improvement are outlined for international actors hoping to strengthen local government in recently cleared areas.
Report
Over the past decade, U.S. Marine Corps intelligence has had to tailor its organization to meet the evolving demands of the operational environment. A broad review of its design examined how to align it efficiently and effectively with current and future missions and functions.
Commentary
Questions not asked or stories not imagined by policy are not likely to be answered or developed by intelligence, writes Gregory F. Treverton.
Commentary
Wary of communicating with each other and with al Qaeda's field commands, al Qaeda central could become more isolated, more dependent on its affiliates, allied groups, and individual acolytes, writes Brian Michael Jenkins.
Commentary
Anyone concerned about nuclear proliferation or interested in the world of espionage will want to read Catherine Collins and Douglas Frantz's provocative new book, "Fallout: The True Story of the CIA's Secret War on Nuclear Trafficking," which tells a fascinating story whose characters come straight out of a spy novel, writes Brian Michael Jenkins.
Report
In order to improve the effectiveness of combined arms planning and assessment operations, ground commanders need information pertaining to cultural and other "soft" factors and practical ways to integrate such information into influence operations activities.
Report
Looking across a set of completed C4I upgrades to U.S. Navy ships, the authors uncovered mixed evidence of cost improvement, a high level of variability in costs, and a trend toward overestimating the installation-labor costs of certain upgrades.
Report
Describes an approach to develop systematic and effective career strategies for U.S. Air Force officers.
Report
Because terrorism is not confined to national boundaries, it puts pressure on the U.S. both at home and abroad, forcing intelligence and law enforcement—the CIA and the FBI—to work together in new ways. This requires new means of sharing not just information but also analysis across the federal system.
Report
With terrorism still prominent on the U.S. agenda, whether the country’s prevention efforts match the threat the United States faces continues to be central in policy debate. One element of this debate is questioning whether the United States should create a dedicated domestic intelligence agency. Case studies of five other democracies provide lessons and common themes that may help policymakers decide.
Report
As the U.S. military transforms to an information-based force, it will need to collect, combine, and utilize intelligence relying on the process known as ''fusion.'' This report describes one approach to capturing fusion in a constructive simulation.
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