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     <title>RAND Research Topic: Military Intelligence</title>
     <link rel="self" href="http://www.rand.org/topics/military-intelligence.xml"/>
     <updated>2012-05-24T14:57:07Z</updated>
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     <rights>Copyright (c) 2012, The RAND Corporation</rights>
     <author>
       <name>RAND Corporation</name>
     </author>
     <id>http://www.rand.org/topics/military-intelligence.html</id>
	 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">Assessing Freedom of Movement for Counterinsurgency Campaigns</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR1014.html</id>
   <published>Jan 12, 2012</published>
   <updated>Jan 12, 2012</updated>
   <summary type="html">Freedom of movement (FoM) is the actual or perceived degree to which individuals or groups can move from place to place within a given environment or into and out of that environment. Focusing specifically on Afghanistan, this examination considers actual and perceived FoM for a range of groups and profiles the factors that influence them and affect data reporting in potentially misleading ways.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR1014.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">Addressing Commanders&apos; Needs for Information on &quot;Soft&quot; Factors</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9628.html</id>
   <published>Dec 5, 2011</published>
   <updated>Dec 5, 2011</updated>
   <summary type="html">Describes a framework for thinking about commanders&apos; critical information needs in countersurgency operations and offers practical ways for commanders to integrate influence activities into combined arms planning and assessment.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9628.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">From Insurgency to Stability: Volume II: Insights from Selected Case Studies</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1111z2.html</id>
   <published>Sep 7, 2011</published>
   <updated>Sep 7, 2011</updated>
   <summary type="html">This book examines six case studies of insurgencies from around the world to determine the key factors necessary for a successful transition from counterinsurgency to a more stable situation. The authors review the causes of each insurgency and the key players involved, and examine what the government did right &amp;mdash; or wrong &amp;mdash; to bring the insurgency to an end and to transition to greater stability.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1111z2.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">Analysis of Subnational Government in Afghanistan Identifies Opportunities for Improvement</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP318.html</id>
   <published>Aug 10, 2011</published>
   <updated>Aug 10, 2011</updated>
   <summary type="html">The existing subnational government across Afghanistan is too centralized and weak to fulfill two basic requirements of legitimacy: effective service provision and representation. Opportunities for improvement are outlined for international actors hoping to strengthen local government in recently cleared areas. </summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP318.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">An Organizational Design Assessment of U.S. Marine Corps Intelligence</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1108.html</id>
   <published>Jul 13, 2011</published>
   <updated>Jul 13, 2011</updated>
   <summary type="html">Over the past decade, U.S. Marine Corps intelligence has had to tailor its organization to meet the evolving demands of the operational environment. A broad review of its design examined how to align it efficiently and effectively with current and future missions and functions.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1108.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">What Should We Expect of Our Spies?</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/commentary/2011/05/25/PM.html</id>
   <published>May 25, 2011</published>
   <updated>May 25, 2011</updated>
   <summary type="html">Questions not asked or stories not imagined by policy are not likely to be answered or developed by intelligence, writes Gregory F. Treverton.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/commentary/2011/05/25/PM.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">Al-Qaeda after bin Laden</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/commentary/2011/05/12/NJ.html</id>
   <published>May 12, 2011</published>
   <updated>May 12, 2011</updated>
   <summary type="html">Wary of communicating with each other and with al Qaeda&apos;s field commands, al Qaeda central could become more isolated, more dependent on its affiliates, allied groups, and individual acolytes, writes Brian Michael Jenkins.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/commentary/2011/05/12/NJ.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">Book Review: &apos;Fallout&apos; by Catherine Collins and Douglas Frantz</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/commentary/2011/01/09/LAT.html</id>
   <published>Jan 9, 2011</published>
   <updated>Jan 9, 2011</updated>
   <summary type="html">Anyone concerned about nuclear proliferation or interested in the world of espionage will want to read Catherine Collins and Douglas Frantz&apos;s provocative new book, &quot;Fallout: The True Story of the CIA&apos;s Secret War on Nuclear Trafficking,&quot; which tells a fascinating story whose characters come straight out of a spy novel, writes Brian Michael Jenkins.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/commentary/2011/01/09/LAT.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">Understanding Commanders&apos; Information Needs for Influence Operations</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG656.html</id>
   <published>Nov 22, 2009</published>
   <updated>Nov 22, 2009</updated>
   <summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;In order to improve the effectiveness of combined arms planning and assessment operations, ground commanders need information pertaining to cultural and other &quot;soft&quot; factors and practical ways to integrate such information into influence operations activities.&lt;/p&gt;
</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG656.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">Controlling the Cost of C4I Upgrades on Naval Ships</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG907.html</id>
   <published>Sep 14, 2009</published>
   <updated>Sep 14, 2009</updated>
   <summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;C4I systems have evolved rapidly over the last few decades, and the cost of keeping these products up-to-date on new and in-service U.S. Navy ships is high due to configuration, integration, testing, and other challenges. Looking across a specific set of completed C4I upgrades, the authors found evidence of cost improvement, a high level of variability in costs, and a trend toward overestimating the installation-labor costs of certain upgrades.&lt;/p&gt;</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG907.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">Improving Development and Utilization of U.S. Air Force Intelligence Officers</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR628.html</id>
   <published>Jul 14, 2009</published>
   <updated>Jul 14, 2009</updated>
   <summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;The U.S. Air Force faces a shortage of general officers with the necessary experience to fill senior leadership positions in Air Force, joint, and interagency intelligence organizations and functions. This technical report presents an analysis of the competencies required for intelligence jobs and compares the qualifications in the officer supply with the qualifications that the jobs demand.&lt;/p&gt;</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR628.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">Intelligence for an Age of Terror: New Book Examines Implications of Terrorism for U.S. Intelligence</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/commercial_books/CB415.html</id>
   <published>Jun 22, 2009</published>
   <updated>Jun 22, 2009</updated>
   <summary type="html">Because terrorism is not confined to national boundaries, it puts pressure on the U.S. both at home and abroad, forcing intelligence and law enforcement&#8212;the CIA and the FBI&#8212;to work together in new ways. This requires new means of sharing not just information but also analysis across the federal system.
</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/commercial_books/CB415.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">Considering the Creation of a Domestic Intelligence Agency in the United States: Lessons from the Experiences of Australia, Canada, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG805.html</id>
   <published>Feb 19, 2009</published>
   <updated>Feb 19, 2009</updated>
   <summary type="html">With terrorism still prominent on the U.S. agenda, whether the country&#8217;s prevention efforts match the threat the United States faces continues to be central in policy debate. One element of this debate is questioning whether the United States should create a dedicated domestic intelligence agency. Case studies of five other democracies provide lessons and common themes that may help policymakers decide.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG805.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">The Knowledge Matrix Approach to Intelligence Fusion</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR416.html</id>
   <published>Sep 4, 2007</published>
   <updated>Sep 4, 2007</updated>
   <summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;As the U.S. military transforms to an information-based force, it will need to collect, combine, and utilize intelligence. The process known as &lt;i&gt;fusion&lt;/i&gt; will help determine whether this intelligence is used in the most beneficial manner. Fusion is the process of combining pieces of information to produce higher-quality information. This report describes one approach to capturing the fusion process in a constructive simulation.&lt;/p&gt;
</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR416.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">Iran&apos;s Covert War in Iraq</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/commentary/2007/03/16/WT.html</id>
   <published>Mar 16, 2007</published>
   <updated>Mar 16, 2007</updated>
   <summary type="html">Published commentary by RAND staff: Iran&apos;s Covert War in Iraq, in the Washington Times.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/commentary/2007/03/16/WT.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">Media Leaks Hinder Intelligence Gathering</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/commentary/2007/03/11/WT.html</id>
   <published>Mar 11, 2007</published>
   <updated>Mar 11, 2007</updated>
   <summary type="html">Published commentary by RAND staff: Media Leaks Hinder Intelligence Gathering, in the Washington Times.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/commentary/2007/03/11/WT.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">Lessons for Intelligence in the Campaign Against al Qaeda</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/commentary/2006/03/01/VC.html</id>
   <published>Mar 1, 2006</published>
   <updated>Mar 1, 2006</updated>
   <summary type="html">Published commentary by RAND staff:  Lessons for Intelligence in the Campaign Against al Qaeda, in Vanguard magazine.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/commentary/2006/03/01/VC.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">The Role of Intelligence in Deciding the Battle of Britain</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/external_publications/EP20060616.html</id>
   <published>Dec 31, 2005</published>
   <updated>Dec 31, 2005</updated>
   <summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;The successful employment of German air power in the Battle of Britain was greatly hindered by abysmal intelligence. The Luftwaffe never developed an accurate picture of enemy strengths and weaknesses, and this contributed to preventing it from bringing force to bear at the decisive point of battle. Although certain aspects of British intelligence were equally flawed, it ultimately proved itself to be an indispensable adjunct to the operational success of Fighter Command. This article focuses on the contribution made to Luftwaffe and RAF operations during the Battle of Britain by their respective intelligence gathering institutions. It is an investigation into the extent to which activities in the realm of intelligence can explain the eventual British victory.&lt;/p&gt;</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/external_publications/EP20060616.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">Next Steps in Reshaping Intelligence</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP152.html</id>
   <published>Oct 31, 2005</published>
   <updated>Oct 31, 2005</updated>
   <summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;The creation of the Director of National Intelligence position reshaped how U.S. intelligence is organized. The next steps are transforming how it does business by improving analysis; shaping intelligence by mission or issue rather than collection source or agency; and more.&lt;/p&gt;</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP152.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">True Intelligence Reform Is Cultural, Not Just Organizational Chart Shift</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/commentary/2005/01/13/CSM.html</id>
   <published>Jan 13, 2005</published>
   <updated>Jan 13, 2005</updated>
   <summary type="html">Published commentary by RAND staff.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/commentary/2005/01/13/CSM.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
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