REPORT
Examines contracting alternatives for the full deployment phase of the U.S. Navy's Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services (CANES) system, which is intended to give the Navy a common set of key command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence networks across the fleet. Recommends a multiple-contract model that assigns the technical, production, and installation functions to the organizations that can provide the…
RESEARCH BRIEF
To design a new naval submarine domestically, Australia's industry and Government will need about 1,000 skilled draftsmen and engineers. Cultivating this workforce could take 15-20 years; partnering with foreign designers could expedite the process.
NEWS RELEASE
When it comes to designing a new submarine, Australia has considerable expertise, but some gaps still exist.
REPORT
The Royal Australian Navy intends to acquire 12 new submarines to replace its Collins-class vessels. RAND assessed the domestic engineering and design skills that Australian industry and government will need to design the new submarine, identified the skills they currently possess, and evaluated how to fill any gaps between the two.
REPORT
Large, complex submarine design and construction programs demand personnel with unique skills and capabilities supplemented with practical experiences in their areas of expertise. Recognizing the importance of past experiences for successful program management, the governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Commonwealth of Australia asked the RAND Corporation to develop a set of lessons learned from previous submarine…
REPORT
This volume presents a set of lessons learned from the United Kingdom's Astute submarine program that could help inform future program managers. Designing and building a submarine requires careful management and oversight and a delegation of roles and responsibilities that recognizes which party — the shipbuilder or the government — is best positioned to manage risks.
REPORT
The U.S. Navy asked the RAND Corporation to develop a set of lessons learned from previous submarine programs that could help inform future program managers. This volume presents lessons from three U.S. submarine programs. The RAND team looked at how the programs were managed, the issues that affected management decisions, and the outcomes of those decisions. An overarching lesson from the three programs is the importance of program…
REPORT
This volume presents a set of lessons learned from Australia's Collins submarine program that could help inform future program managers. Collins was the first submarine built in Australia. RAND investigated how operational requirements were set for the Collins class; explored the acquisition, contracting, design, and build processes that the program employed; and assessed the activities surrounding integrated…
REPORT
An examination of five submarine programs in the three countries—the UK's Astute program; the U.S. Navy's Ohio, Seawolf, and Virginia programs; and Australia's Collins program—identifies lessons that could help inform future program managers.
REPORT
Congressional concern with cost overruns, or breaches, in several major defense acquisition programs led the authors, in a partnership with the Performance Assessments and Root Cause Analysis Office in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, to investigate root causes by examining program reviews, analyzing data, participating in contractor briefings, and holding meetings with diverse stakeholders.
REPORT
Department of Defense policies, procedures, and organizations for program management and oversight of defense acquisition programs do not align well with shipbuilding. Ship acquisition programs have characteristics that deviate from the normal framework in significant ways, resulting in disconnects and some confusion. The authors examine these differences and suggest policies that can better account for them.
REPORT
Some recent shipbuilding programs in the United States and Europe have involved multiple shipyards constructing major modules of each ship for final integration and testing at one shipyard. The Navy needs to decide what it wants from a shared-build strategy, then monitor and manage the program to ensure that it delivers the required outcome, as well as the vessels called for in the program.
REPORT
The Secretary of Defense's plans to shift Navy aircraft carrier acquisition to every five years should have little impact on force structure and the industrial base in the next decade—but after that, the force structure shrinks, as does the chance of meeting goals for the number of deployed aircraft carriers.
REPORT
Draws from RAND's international submarine experience to discuss the benefits of long-range planning, ways to improve efficiency, the need to sustain hard-to-replace resources, the importance of testing, and potential policy implications for Australia as the Commonwealth plans to build its new submarine.
REPORT
The Navy is increasingly dependent on networks and associated net-centric operations to conduct military missions, so a vital goal is to establish and maintain dependable networks for ship and multiship networks. The authors develop a framework for measuring the dependability of naval networks and describe a software tool for modeling the impact that individual network components have on overall mission operational availability.
REPORT
Navy and Marine Corps Sea Basing concepts envision the rapid deployment, assembly, command, projection, reconstitution, and re-employment of expeditionary forces from the sea. RAND researchers assessed alternative structures for the proposed Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future), or MPF(F), squadron and their effects on operational support. For example, eliminating large-deck ships could be offset by substituting CH-53K helicopters for…
REPORT
C4I systems have evolved rapidly over the last few decades, and the cost of keeping these products up-to-date on new and in-service U.S. Navy ships is high due to configuration, integration, testing, and other challenges. Looking across a specific set of completed C4I upgrades, the authors found evidence of cost improvement, a high level of variability in costs, and a trend toward overestimating the installation-labor costs of certain…
REPORT
In testimony presented before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Cortez A. Cooper ties China's re-emergence as a naval power to its expanding economic and security interests.
REPORT
RAND identifies seven military missions for unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs) — mine countermeasures, deployment of leave-behind surveillance sensors or sensor arrays, near-land and harbor monitoring, oceanography, monitoring undersea infrastructure, anti-submarine warfare tracking, and inspection/identification — that appear most promising to pursue in terms of military need, operational and technical risks, non-UUV…
REPORT
Much of the training for the engineering watchstanders of Arleigh Burke-class destroyers that is currently done underway could be done in port. Training could also be done on simulators at considerable savings in time, money, fuel, and ship wear and tear. This monograph discusses how training simulator use could improve engineering watchstanders' proficiency before ships go to sea, reserving time at sea for fine-tuning the training.
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