To reduce costs and take advantage of commercial technology, the U.S. Navy is pursuing open-architecture software and other improvements to its Aegis combat system. This report examines the potential benefits and challenges of this new approach.
Surveys the work of the RAND National Security Research Division from the spring of 2011 through the winter of 2012.
Examines contracting alternatives for the full deployment phase of the Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services system, intended to give the U.S. Navy a common set of key command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence networks.
The Royal Australian Navy intends to acquire 12 new submarines to replace its Collins-class vessels. RAND assessed the domestic engineering and design skills that Australian industry and government will need to design the new submarine, identified the skills they currently possess, and evaluated how to fill any gaps between the two.
The governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Commonwealth of Australia asked the RAND Corporation to develop a set of lessons learned from previous submarine programs that could help inform future program managers.
This volume presents an overview of lessons learned from three U.S. Navy submarine programs that could help inform future program managers.
This volume presents a set of lessons learned from the United Kingdom's Astute submarine program that could help inform future program managers.
This volume presents a set of lessons learned from Australia's Collins submarine program that could help inform future program managers.
An examination of five submarine programs in the three countries—the UK's Astute program; the U.S. Navy's Ohio, Seawolf, and Virginia programs; and Australia's Collins program—identifies lessons that could help inform future program managers.
Congressional concern with cost overruns in some major defense acquisition programs led to an investigation of root causes by examining program reviews, analyzing data, participating in contractor briefings, and holding meetings with stakeholders.
The policies and procedures established by the Department of Defense for program management and oversight can be tailored to meet the unique needs of ship acquisition programs without compromising oversight.
Some recent shipbuilding programs have had multiple shipyards construct major modules of each ship. Opting for a shared-build strategy makes it necessary to monitor and manage the program to ensure that it delivers all the required outcomes.
The Secretary of Defense's plans to shift Navy aircraft carrier acquisition to every five years should have little impact on force structure and the industrial base in the next decade—but after that, the force structure shrinks, as does the chance of meeting goals for the number of deployed aircraft carriers.
Presented at the Submarine Institute of Australia's 2010 Conference in Perth, Australia, this paper draws on RAND's international submarine experience to highlight policies that Australia may wish to consider in planning for its new submarine.
Develops a framework for measuring the dependability of naval networks and describes a software tool for modeling the impact that individual network components have on overall mission operational availability.
An assessment of the proposed MPF(F) Sea Basing squadron found alternative configurations with fewer ships and different air components that could still meet mission support counterinsurgency, special operations, and major combat operations.
Looking across a set of completed C4I upgrades to U.S. Navy ships, the authors uncovered mixed evidence of cost improvement, a high level of variability in costs, and a trend toward overestimating the installation-labor costs of certain upgrades.
Testimony presented before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission on June 11, 2009.
RAND identifies seven military missions for unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs) that appear most promising to pursue in terms of military need, operational and technical risks, non-UUV alternatives, and cost.
Increased use of training simulators could improve engineering watchstanders' proficiency before Navy destroyers go to sea, saving money and reserving time at sea for refined training.