RAND Research Topic: Military Ships and Naval Vessels

CANES Contracting Strategies for Full Deployment

May 24, 2012

Examines contracting alternatives for the full deployment phase of the U.S. Navy's Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services (CANES) system, which is intended to give the Navy a common set of key command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence networks across the fleet. Recommends a multiple-contract model that assigns the technical, production, and installation functions to the organizations that can provide the best value.

Ken Munson

Senior Management Systems Analyst
M.S. in operations research, Naval Post Graduate School; M.B.A. in business administration, Texas Christian University; B.S. in electrical engineering, Pennsylvania State University

Australia's Domestic Submarine Design Capabilities: Options for the Future Submarine

Dec 22, 2011

To design a new naval submarine domestically, Australia's industry and Government will need about 1,000 skilled draftsmen and engineers. Cultivating this workforce could take 15-20 years; partnering with foreign designers could expedite the process.

RAND Issues New Study on Australia's Submarine Design Capabilities and Capacities

Dec 15, 2011

When it comes to designing a new submarine, Australia has considerable expertise, but some gaps still exist.

Australia Has Considerable Expertise in Submarine Design, but Gaps Still Exist

Dec 15, 2011

The Royal Australian Navy intends to acquire 12 new submarines to replace its Collins-class vessels. RAND assessed the domestic engineering and design skills that Australian industry and government will need to design the new submarine, identified the skills they currently possess, and evaluated how to fill any gaps between the two.

Learning from Experience

Dec 9, 2011

Large, complex submarine design and construction programs demand personnel with unique skills and capabilities supplemented with practical experiences in their areas of expertise. Recognizing the importance of past experiences for successful program management, the governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Commonwealth of Australia asked the RAND Corporation to develop a set of lessons learned from previous submarine programs that could help inform future program managers. The four volumes in this set present lessons learned from the Ohio, Seawolf, and Virginia programs of the United States; the Astute program of the United Kingdom; and the Collins program of Australia.

Learning from Experience: Volume III: Lessons from the United Kingdom's Astute Submarine Program

Nov 16, 2011

This volume presents a set of lessons learned from the United Kingdom's Astute submarine program that could help inform future program managers. Designing and building a submarine requires careful management and oversight and a delegation of roles and responsibilities that recognizes which party — the shipbuilder or the government — is best positioned to manage risks.

Learning from Experience: Volume II: Lessons from the U.S. Navy's Ohio, Seawolf, and Virginia Submarine Programs

Nov 16, 2011

The U.S. Navy asked the RAND Corporation to develop a set of lessons learned from previous submarine programs that could help inform future program managers. This volume presents lessons from three U.S. submarine programs. The RAND team looked at how the programs were managed, the issues that affected management decisions, and the outcomes of those decisions. An overarching lesson from the three programs is the importance of program stability.

Learning from Experience: Volume IV: Lessons from Australia's Collins Submarine Program

Nov 16, 2011

This volume presents a set of lessons learned from Australia's Collins submarine program that could help inform future program managers. Collins was the first submarine built in Australia. RAND investigated how operational requirements were set for the Collins class; explored the acquisition, contracting, design, and build processes that the program employed; and assessed the activities surrounding integrated logistics support for the class.

Lessons from the Submarine Programs of the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia

Nov 16, 2011

An examination of five submarine programs in the three countries—the UK's Astute program; the U.S. Navy's Ohio, Seawolf, and Virginia programs; and Australia's Collins program—identifies lessons that could help inform future program managers.

Root Cause Analyses of Nunn-McCurdy Breaches, Volume 1: Zumwalt-Class Destroyer, Joint Strike Fighter, Longbow Apache, and Wideband Global Satellite

Nov 7, 2011

Congressional concern with cost overruns, or breaches, in several major defense acquisition programs led the authors, in a partnership with the Performance Assessments and Root Cause Analysis Office in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, to investigate root causes by examining program reviews, analyzing data, participating in contractor briefings, and holding meetings with diverse stakeholders.

Are Ships Different? Policies and Procedures for the Acquisition of Ship Programs

Nov 3, 2011

Department of Defense policies, procedures, and organizations for program management and oversight of defense acquisition programs do not align well with shipbuilding. Ship acquisition programs have characteristics that deviate from the normal framework in significant ways, resulting in disconnects and some confusion. The authors examine these differences and suggest policies that can better account for them.

Shared Modular Build of Warships: How a Shared Build Can Support Future Shipbuilding

Mar 25, 2011

Some recent shipbuilding programs in the United States and Europe have involved multiple shipyards constructing major modules of each ship for final integration and testing at one shipyard. The Navy needs to decide what it wants from a shared-build strategy, then monitor and manage the program to ensure that it delivers the required outcome, as well as the vessels called for in the program.

The Effects of Changing Aircraft Carrier Procurement Schedules

Mar 21, 2011

The Secretary of Defense's plans to shift Navy aircraft carrier acquisition to every five years should have little impact on force structure and the industrial base in the next decade—but after that, the force structure shrinks, as does the chance of meeting goals for the number of deployed aircraft carriers.

Industry and Infrastructure for Future Submarines: An International Perspective

Jan 28, 2011

Draws from RAND's international submarine experience to discuss the benefits of long-range planning, ways to improve efficiency, the need to sustain hard-to-replace resources, the importance of testing, and potential policy implications for Australia as the Commonwealth plans to build its new submarine.

Roland J. Yardley

Senior Defense Research Analyst
M.S. in management, Naval Postgraduate School; B.B.A. in human resource management, University of New Mexico

John F. Schank

Senior Operations Research Analyst
M.S. in operations research, University of Pennsylvania

John Birkler

Senior Management Systems Analyst
M.S. in physics, University of South Carolina; B.S. in physics, Roanoke College

Navy Network Dependability: Models, Metrics, and Tools

Aug 6, 2010

The Navy is increasingly dependent on networks and associated net-centric operations to conduct military missions, so a vital goal is to establish and maintain dependable networks for ship and multiship networks. The authors develop a framework for measuring the dependability of naval networks and describe a software tool for modeling the impact that individual network components have on overall mission operational availability.

Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) Capability Assessment: Planned and Alternative Structures

May 11, 2010

Navy and Marine Corps Sea Basing concepts envision the rapid deployment, assembly, command, projection, reconstitution, and re-employment of expeditionary forces from the sea. RAND researchers assessed alternative structures for the proposed Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future), or MPF(F), squadron and their effects on operational support. For example, eliminating large-deck ships could be offset by substituting CH-53K helicopters for MV-22s.