An empirical comparison of Chinese and Indian international strategic behavior is the first study of its kind, filling an important gap in the literature on rising Indian and Chinese power and American interests in Asia.
This briefing describes a suite of tools to help the Air Force think through future roles for remotely piloted aircraft.
The U.S. Department of Defense will receive more detailed, transparent, and credible assessments of its counterinsurgency campaigns by replacing its top-down approach with a bottom-up method driven by contextual, narrative reporting provided by commanders on the ground.
A new book by the late French scholar Thérèse Delpech provides a critical review and update of nuclear deterrence theory, focusing a critical eye on nuclear issues during the Cold War, examining the lessons of past nuclear crises, and outlining ways in which these lessons apply to major nuclear powers and nuclear pretenders today.
Evaluates the near-term and long-term risks and costs of the United States having little or no competition among companies involved with designing, developing, and producing fixed-wing military aircraft and related systems.
This report examines how a military staff might assess freedom of movement as a strategic and tactical indicator in counterinsurgency, and specifically in Afghanistan.
RAND's three federally funded research and development centers apply research capital they have developed over the years to help decisionmakers solve problems and often save money as well. This publication lists and briefly summarizes some RAND projects undertaken over the past ten years that have helped save the government money or that have identified ways to do so. Amounts saved are estimated.
This annual report describes selected RAND Project AIR FORCE research during 2011 in the areas of strategy and doctrine; force modernization and employment; manpower, personnel, and training; and resource management.
An attack on Iranian nuclear facilities by the United States or Israel would make it more, not less difficult to contain Iran's nuclear ambitions. The sympathy aroused for Iran would make containment of Iranian influence much more difficult for Israel, for the U.S., and for the Arab regimes currently allied with Washington.
As challenging as coalition warfare is during conventional conflicts, the difficulties are compounded in number and character when the contingency is instead a stability operation. The absence of a threat that puts survival interests at risk translates into weaker commitment and more-restrictive caveats on how a participant's capabilities are employed.
To avoid direct military conflict with China, the United States should adopt a parallel strategy that strengthens the defense capabilities of China's neighbors while inviting China into cooperative security endeavors that benefit the interests of both nations.
Supplies Air Force planners with information about resources for security cooperation, the rules that govern their use, and their application methods.
Using RAND's security cooperation framework, RAND assessed the U.S. Air Force's Building Partnerships Seminars to enhance program objectives and improve cooperation amongst partner-nation air forces.
Addressing the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction requires interagency and international cooperation. This report demonstrates how one assessment framework can be applied to security cooperation programs.
Examines Russia's evolving framework for nuclear deterrence and its implications for U.S. military operations in Europe.
The authors identify factors critical to the coalition victory over Jaish al-Mahdi in the 2008 Battle of Sadr City and describe a new model for dealing with insurgent control of urban areas.
Examines how the United States Air Force can sustain sufficient nuclear skills and experience within the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise.
Dissuading Iran from developing nuclear weapons faces major obstacles, but it's too soon to give up trying as it may still be possible to influence the outcome of Iran's internal political debate.
The U.S. military strategy should transition to an Afghan-led counterinsurgency strategy which would involve decreasing the U.S. military footprint and relying on Special Operations Forces to help Afghans conduct counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations.
U.S. defense planning is beset with technology-related problems for force projection, obsolescence of forces and concepts of operations, and the need for a new Asian-Pacific strategy. Finding the way ahead amidst fiscal constraints is challenging.