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     <title>RAND Research Topic: Military Tactics</title>
     <link rel="self" href="http://www.rand.org/topics/military-tactics.xml"/>
     <updated>2012-05-24T20:59:18Z</updated>
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     <rights>Copyright (c) 2012, The RAND Corporation</rights>
     <author>
       <name>RAND Corporation</name>
     </author>
     <id>http://www.rand.org/topics/military-tactics.html</id>
	 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">U.S. Military&apos;s Efforts to Influence Afghan Population Have Grown Less Effective Over Time</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1060.html</id>
   <published>Apr 30, 2012</published>
   <updated>Apr 30, 2012</updated>
   <summary type="html">An analysis of U.S. military information operations and psychological operations in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2010 finds the efforts grew less successful over time, as disenchantment with foreign occupation grew. The most notable shortcoming was the inability to sufficiently counter the Taliban propaganda campaign against U.S. and coalition forces on the theme of civilian casualties.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1060.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">Assessing Military Information Operations in Afghanistan, 2001-2010</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9659.html</id>
   <published>Apr 30, 2012</published>
   <updated>Apr 30, 2012</updated>
   <summary type="html">This research brief offers an overview of the effectiveness of U.S. psychological operations in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2010, with particular attention to how well messages and themes were tailored to target audiences.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9659.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">U.S. Military&apos;s Efforts to Influence Afghan Population Have Grown Less Effective Over Time</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/news/press/2012/04/30.html</id>
   <published>Apr 30, 2012</published>
   <updated>Apr 30, 2012</updated>
   <summary type="html">The efforts of U.S. military information operations and psychological operations in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2010 grew less successful over time, as disenchantment with foreign occupation grew.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/news/press/2012/04/30.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">Israeli Mistakes Against Hybrid Adversaries Serve as Cautionary Tale for U.S. Military</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1085.html</id>
   <published>Jan 20, 2012</published>
   <updated>Jan 20, 2012</updated>
   <summary type="html">A review of recent Israeli military conflicts indicates the United States may be ill-prepared for &quot;hybrid&quot; warfare against state-sponsored adversaries who have a modicum of training and small force numbers, but possess advanced weapons and enough expertise to challenge the U.S. military.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1085.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">Israeli Mistakes Against Hybrid Adversaries Serve as Cautionary Tale for U.S. Military</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/news/press/2012/01/20.html</id>
   <published>Jan 19, 2012</published>
   <updated>Jan 19, 2012</updated>
   <summary type="html">A review of recent Israeli military conflicts indicates the United States may be ill-prepared for &quot;hybrid&quot; warfare against state-sponsored adversaries who have a modicum of training and small force numbers, but possess advanced weapons and enough expertise to challenge the U.S. military.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/news/press/2012/01/20.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">Addressing Commanders&apos; Needs for Information on &quot;Soft&quot; Factors</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9628.html</id>
   <published>Dec 5, 2011</published>
   <updated>Dec 5, 2011</updated>
   <summary type="html">Describes a framework for thinking about commanders&apos; critical information needs in countersurgency operations and offers practical ways for commanders to integrate influence activities into combined arms planning and assessment.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9628.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">Standing Up a More Capable Joint Task Force Headquarters</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9625.html</id>
   <published>Nov 18, 2011</published>
   <updated>Nov 18, 2011</updated>
   <summary type="html">The U.S. Army needs to improve its ability to command and control joint, interagency, and multinational forces in diverse environments, and to prepare Army headquarters to perform as components of, or headquarters for, joint task forces.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9625.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">Economic Assistance During Stability and Support Operations</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9615.html</id>
   <published>Nov 16, 2011</published>
   <updated>Nov 16, 2011</updated>
   <summary type="html">Designed to help U.S. Army personnel more effectively use economic assistance to support economic and infrastructure development.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9615.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">Perspectives on the Battle of Wanat: Challenges Facing Small Unit Operations in Afghanistan</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP329z1.html</id>
   <published>Nov 3, 2011</published>
   <updated>Nov 3, 2011</updated>
   <summary type="html">Using the Battle of Wanat as a case study, the authors explore and evaluate a range of alternative technological and corresponding tactical improvements to help small unit operations in Afghanistan, particularly when the mission is to establish and protect combat outposts. The authors develop a tactical-level understanding of the circumstances and risks that a small unit faced as it transitioned from a vehicle patrol base to a combat outpost.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP329z1.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">Access Challenges and Implications for Airpower in the Western Pacific</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/rgs_dissertations/RGSD267.html</id>
   <published>Aug 15, 2011</published>
   <updated>Aug 15, 2011</updated>
   <summary type="html">Examines the risk of U.S.-China conflict based on a variety of theoretical works on conflict, applied to the U.S.-China relationship.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/rgs_dissertations/RGSD267.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">Reintegrating Afghan Insurgents into Their Local Communities</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP327.html</id>
   <published>Jul 21, 2011</published>
   <updated>Jul 21, 2011</updated>
   <summary type="html">Former Taliban and other insurgents provide an invaluable source of information on their previous colleagues, and can ultimately cause momentum to shift toward counterinsurgent forces. Steps can be taken to increase the likelihood of reintegrating fighters into their communities.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP327.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">Flawed Strategy, Not a &apos;Failure of Air Power,&apos; Led to Israel&apos;s Disappointing Performance in 2006 Lebanon War</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG835.html</id>
   <published>May 22, 2011</published>
   <updated>May 22, 2011</updated>
   <summary type="html">Israel&apos;s disappointing performance in its war against Hezbollah in Lebanon in 2006 did not reflect a &quot;failure of air power,&quot; but rather a failure of Israel&apos;s political and military leaders to properly assess the enemy, set achievable goals, apply an effective strategy and adequately manage public expectations.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG835.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">Flawed Strategy, Not a &apos;Failure of Air Power,&apos; Led to Israel&apos;s Disappointing Performance in 2006 Lebanon War</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/news/press/2011/05/23.html</id>
   <published>May 22, 2011</published>
   <updated>May 22, 2011</updated>
   <summary type="html">Israel&apos;s disappointing performance in its war against Hezbollah in Lebanon in 2006 did not reflect a &quot;failure of air power,&quot; but rather a failure of Israel&apos;s political and military leaders to properly assess the enemy, set achievable goals, apply an effective strategy and adequately manage public expectations.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/news/press/2011/05/23.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">Preserving Range and Airspace Access for the Air Force Mission: Striving for a Strategic Vantage Point</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR874.html</id>
   <published>May 17, 2011</published>
   <updated>May 17, 2011</updated>
   <summary type="html">Air Force range managers are responsible for scheduling the ranges and infrastructures units need for critical, realistic testing and training, sometimes on short notice. They must also supply associated requirements, which requires information and understanding. To aid this, the authors offer an example method that marries the Center Scheduling Enterprise with an update of an existing RAND tool (provided on CD).</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR874.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">Enhancing Army Joint Force Headquarters Capabilities</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG675.html</id>
   <published>Jul 7, 2010</published>
   <updated>Jul 7, 2010</updated>
   <summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;The research in this document is aimed at helping the Army improve its ability to command and control joint, interagency, and multinational forces to accomplish diverse missions in a range of settings. A particular emphasis was placed on suggesting innovative ways to prepare Army headquarters, including Divisions, Corps, and Theater Armies, to perform as components of, or headquarters for, joint task forces.&lt;/p&gt;</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG675.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">Understanding Commanders&apos; Information Needs for Influence Operations</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG656.html</id>
   <published>Nov 22, 2009</published>
   <updated>Nov 22, 2009</updated>
   <summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;In order to improve the effectiveness of combined arms planning and assessment operations, ground commanders need information pertaining to cultural and other &quot;soft&quot; factors and practical ways to integrate such information into influence operations activities.&lt;/p&gt;
</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG656.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">Controlling the Cost of C4I Upgrades on Naval Ships</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG907.html</id>
   <published>Sep 14, 2009</published>
   <updated>Sep 14, 2009</updated>
   <summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;C4I systems have evolved rapidly over the last few decades, and the cost of keeping these products up-to-date on new and in-service U.S. Navy ships is high due to configuration, integration, testing, and other challenges. Looking across a specific set of completed C4I upgrades, the authors found evidence of cost improvement, a high level of variability in costs, and a trend toward overestimating the installation-labor costs of certain upgrades.&lt;/p&gt;</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG907.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">U.S. Army Guidebook on Using Economic Development to Support Stability Operations</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR633.html</id>
   <published>Feb 20, 2009</published>
   <updated>Feb 20, 2009</updated>
   <summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;This guidebook instructs U.S. Army personnel on how to better use various economic assistance programs and projects to support economic and infrastructure development in the course of their operations. Suggestions efforts include the realms of humanitarian assistance, agriculture, natural resource management, and private sector activity.&lt;/p&gt;</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR633.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">U.S. Failed to Monitor and Adapt to Insurgent Trends in Iraq</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/news/press/2008/03/11.html</id>
   <published>Mar 11, 2008</published>
   <updated>Mar 11, 2008</updated>
   <summary type="html">The inability of the United States to monitor insurgent trends in Iraq and apply new counterinsurgency tactics led many Iraqi civilians to side with sectarian groups, propelling the country to the brink of civil war.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/news/press/2008/03/11.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">RAND Report Examines Need to Hold Down Civilian Deaths in U.S. Military Operations</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/news/press/2007/02/15/index1.html</id>
   <published>Feb 15, 2007</published>
   <updated>Feb 15, 2007</updated>
   <summary type="html">February 15, 2007 News Release: RAND Report Examines Need to Hold Down Civilian Deaths in U.S. Military Operations.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/news/press/2007/02/15/index1.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
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