RAND conducts a broad array of national security research for the U.S. Department of Defense and allied ministries of defense. RAND's three U.S. federally funded research and development centers (FFRDCs) explore topics from acquisition and technology to personnel and readiness.
Iran may feel more confident and gain a sense of prestige from a nuclear capability, but other factors, such as the regional geopolitical environment and Iran’s political, military, and economic capabilities, will have a greater bearing on Iranian calculations.
Describes RAND Arroyo Center's research activities in FY12 and summarizes noteworthy studies performed throughout the year.
This report challenges the assumption that the timing of deployments and their distribution over time are serially independent, arguing that military interventions occur in temporal clusters driven by the number of interventions in the recent past.
This report explores whether and when U.S. cyberattack capabilities can be demonstrated, then goes on to examine difficulties and drawbacks of doing so. Such brandishing is no panacea and could even backfire if misinterpreted.
Examines the British, French, and German armies' approaches to accommodating significant budget cuts while attempting to sustain their commitment to full spectrum operations.
To reduce costs and take advantage of commercial technology, the U.S. Navy is pursuing open-architecture software and other improvements to its Aegis combat system. This report examines the potential benefits and challenges of this new approach.
Based on a review of relevant research literature, this report examines ways to encourage the space community to share information that will help its members navigate increasing numbers of satellites and space debris.
Details a prototype computational model that seeks to explain, as a function of contributing factors, the extent of public support for insurgency and its use of terrorism. The model is believed to be reusable and suitable for composition.
While the DoD is under pressure to reduce costs, meaningful savings from overseas posture changes would require choosing from a small set of options, each presenting benefit trade-offs. U.S. military presence contributes to assurance of allies, deterrence, contingency responsiveness, and security cooperation.
This history looks at how humanity has cared for its war casualties and veterans, from ancient times through the aftermath of World War II.
To meet complex security challenges in the future, the Department of Homeland Security must develop integrated plans that set priorities, direct resources to programs and activities to achieve outcomes consistent with these priorities, and conduct evaluations to ensure these outcomes are realized.
The United States should respond to China's increasing sea power in the Western Pacific region by exploiting technology to make its naval forces less vulnerable, while also pursuing regional maritime security cooperation that includes China.
Shows that there is an optimum landing weight that allows for maximum cargo delivery on soft landing fields. This optimum weight is constant and independent of both aircraft ramp weight and the ability of the soil to resist compressive loads.
Addresses the challenges to team effectiveness caused by geographic diversity through an assessment of three modes of virtual collaboration.
This book examines the security of nuclear arsenals during revolts, coups, and civil wars.
Intratheater airlift delivers critical and time-sensitive supplies to deployed forces, but is it cost effective to use commercial, rather than organic Air Force, aircraft to supply this airlift?
RAND assessed the savings potential of reconfiguring the U.S. Air Force's combat-coded F-35s into larger squadrons and adjusting the Primary Aerospace Vehicle Authorized mix across the Active and Reserve Components.
RAND assessed the savings potential of reconfiguring the U.S. Air Force's combat-coded F-35s into larger squadrons and adjusting the Primary Aerospace Vehicle Authorized mix across the Active and Reserve Components.
Testimony presented before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats on March 21, 2013.
The U.S., while worried about a "9/11 in cyberspace," also ought to worry about what a "9/12 in cyberspace" would look like. The consequences of the reaction to a cyberattack could be more serious than the consequences of the original action itself.
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