Nuclear disarmament refers to the act, by unilateral decision or international agreement, of reducing or eliminating the total number of nuclear weapons worldwide, with the end goal of a nuclear-free world. RAND research has provided policymakers with guidance and analysis on options for reduction or elimination of nuclear arsenals and the long-term enforcement of international nuclear disarmament.
Research conducted by: RAND National Security Research Division; Center for Global Risk and Security
All Items (11)
COMMENTARY
By refusing to face more squarely the probability that Iran will eventually acquire a nuclear weapons capability, the American and Israeli governments actually reduce their ability to dissuade Iran from crossing that threshold, writes James Dobbins.
COMMENTARY
Reaction to a strike against Iran among neighboring populations would be almost uniformly hostile. The sympathy thereby aroused for Iran would make containment of Iranian influence much more difficult for Israel, for the U.S., and for the Arab regimes currently allied with Washington, writes James Dobbins.
COMMENTARY
Published commentary by RAND staff.
COMMENTARY
commentaries by RAND Staff: insightful commentaries on current events, published in newspapers, magazines and journals worldwide.
COMMENTARY
Published commentary by RAND staff.
JOURNAL ARTICLE
Despite difficulties implementing the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program, the danger of nuclear proliferation from the Former Soviet Union requires continued funding of this initiative.
REPORT
Whatever behavior the Soviets might pursue in a nuclear crisis, the desirability of maintaining a U.S. selective options strategy need not hinge exclusively on the course and outcome of future developments in Soviet nuclear planning. Flexibility is a valuable asset to have whatever the other side does.
REPORT
Discusses Soviet doctrinal views on nuclear targeting restraint, the Soviet public reaction to the U.S. pursuit of limited nuclear options, and possible private Soviet attitudes regarding selective nuclear employment. Although they publicly reject the feasibility of controlled nuclear warfare and dwell heavily on massive nuclear operations with an implied endorsement of preemption, the Soviets are currently acquiring a force posture…
JOURNAL ARTICLE
This paper, which appears in slightly different form and under the title Some things to Think and Some to Do in the April 1981 issue of The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, is adapted and condensed from Mr. Katz's portion of a public debate on Disarmament and Security held in Santa Barbara, Calif., in April 1960. The author argues that there are several roads to, and several kinds of, disarmanent.
PEOPLE
Adjunct
A.B. in biology, University of Chicago
PEOPLE
Adjunct Staff
Ph.D. in nuclear engineering, University of California, Berkeley; M.S./M.P.P. in nuclear engineering & public policy, University of California, Berkeley; B.S. in nuclear & mechanical engineering, University of California, Berkeley
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