As part of peacekeeping efforts, stability operations—post-conflict military efforts to bring peace and security to a region or country—represent an ongoing challenge for both military planners and civilian policymakers. RAND research has provided effective strategic recommendations in many such operations, helping those involved in unified stabilization, peacekeeping and security, transition, and reconstruction.
REPORT
A statistical analysis of the relationship between land distribution and insurgency in South Vietnam.
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A discussion of arms control, limited war, and peacekeeping as they relate to current Soviet disarmament policy and to Soviet general aims and behavior in international affairs. The paper includes comments on GCD (General and Complete Disarmament) a...
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The second of three Memoranda on the evolution of a Vietnamese village. It deals with the history of Duc Lap village from the close of World War II to the start of the current pacification program in April 1964.
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A study of Viet Cong captives and defectors, civilian refugees, and North Vietnamese cadres and regulars. The Memorandum emphasizes the testimony of Viet Cong captives and defectors who came into government hands from June to December 1965.
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An examination of the Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) program established by the government of South Vietnam to induce Viet Cong defections and of the motives associated with defection, desertion, and surrender. It is based on interviews with many former Viet Cong and on the personnel data cards of over a thousand Viet Cong who rallied to the GVN in 1965-1966.
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Part of a 1965 study of the evolution of a rural Vietnamese village as it passes from insurgent control through pacification to government control. The environs of the village, its inhabitants, and the present situation are described.
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A study of U.S. economic assistance in Vietnam with recommendations for a reorientation of economic, political, and military programs toward achieving the U.S. objective of supporting the war effort in Vietnam.
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Discussion of the criteria for measuring success in counterinsurgency. The author concludes that a Viet Cong military victory in South Vietnam is not possible as long as the United States in supporting the government.
PEOPLE
Research Project Associate
M.P.A., John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University; M.Sc. in software engineering and information technology, National Center for Information Technology, Institute of Graduate Studies, Baghdad; B.S. in solid state and nuclear physics, Al-Nahrain University for Engineering and Science Technology
PEOPLE
Project Associate
M.A. in international relations, University of Saint Andrews; M.A. in international affairs, Columbia University
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Senior Political Scientist
B.S. in criminal justice, Arizona State University; Ph.D. in political science/international relations, University of California, Los Angeles
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Senior Policy Researcher
Ph.D. in American history, University of Kansas; M.S. in systems management, University of Southern California; M.S. in civil engineering and m.s. in operations research, Stanford University; M.M.A.S. in civil engineering and m.s. in operations research, School of Advanced Military Studies; B.S. in civil engineering and m.s. in operations research, United States Military Academy, West Point
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Project Associate
M.A. in Middle Eastern Studies, Johns Hopkins University; B.A. in international studies, Johns Hopkins University
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Senior Political Scientist
Ph.D., King's College London; M.P.P., John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University; B.A., Augustana College
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Senior Project Associate
B.S. in mathematics, Stanford University
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Defense Research Analyst; Professor, Pardee RAND Graduate School
Ed.D., University of Southern California; M.A. in military science, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College; B.S. in physics, U.S. Naval Academy
PEOPLE
Senior Adviser to the RAND President
M.A. in history, University of California, Los Angeles; B.A. in fine arts, University of California, Los Angeles
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Associate Political Scientist
Ph.D. in political science, Northwestern University
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Senior Political Scientist
Ph.D. and M.A. in political science, University of Chicago; A.B., Bowdoin College
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Senior Operations Researcher; Professor, Pardee RAND Graduate School
Ph.D. in mathematics, M.S. in computer and systems engineering, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute; M.A. in strategic studies, U.S. Army War College; B.S., United States Military Academy, West Point
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