Peacekeeping and Stability Operations

As part of peacekeeping efforts, stability operations—post-conflict military efforts to bring peace and security to a region or country—represent an ongoing challenge for both military planners and civilian policymakers. RAND research has provided effective strategic recommendations in many such operations, helping those involved in unified stabilization, peacekeeping and security, transition, and reconstruction.

Research conducted by: RAND National Security Research Division; RAND Arroyo Center; RAND Project AIR FORCE

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Rethinking Counterinsurgency to Respond to the Evolving Jihadist Insurgency

Despite great technological and military advances, British and U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) operations have been slow to respond and adapt to the rise of the global jihadist insurgency. Operational failures have highlighted the need for the West to rethink and retool its current COIN strategy.

Journal Articles (13)

The Future of Insurgency — Jan 1, 2013

What are key historical trends in insurgencies? And what do these finding suggest about the future of insurgency? We examine four aspects: causes of insurgency, outside support, strategies, and tactics.

Taking Syria Seriously — Aug 1, 2012

The United States is rapidly approaching a critical juncture in its policy towards Syria.

Qualitative Comparative Analysis of 30 Insurgencies, 1978-2008 — Jan 1, 2012

Useful recommendations for US engagement in and support for COIN operations.

What Are You Prepared to Do? NATO and the Strategic Mismatch Between Ends, Ways, and Means in Afghanistan — and in the Future — May 1, 2011

This article examines ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) operations in Afghanistan as a way to get at the strategic disconnects in ends, ways, and means.

Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Evidence of Effective Approaches to Counterinsurgency, 1978-2008 — Jan 17, 2011

Good COIN practices tend to "run in packs" and the balance of selected good and bad practices predicts insurgency outcomes. Data confirm the importance of popular support, but show that the ability to interdict tangible support (such as new personnel, materiel, and financing) is the single best predictor of COIN force success.

Evidentiary Validation of FM 3-24: Counterinsurgency Worldwide, 1978-2008 — Jan 1, 2011

Discusses the demonstrated efficacy of the COIN principles embodied in FM 3-24, historical evicence and data collected from 30 case studies for recent resolved insurgencies. The vast majority of governments and COIN forces that adhered to multiple tenets of the field manual prevailed over the insurgencies they opposed.

The Just Conduct of War Against Radical Islamic Terror and Insurgencies — Jan 1, 2007

The author's analysis considers justice from the eyes of the people among whom terrorist and insurgents hide.

Mission Not Accomplished: What Went Wrong with Iraqi Reconstruction — Jan 1, 2006

This article argues that the prewar planning process for postwar Iraq was plagued by myriad problems, including a dysfunctional interagency process, overly optimistic assumptions, and a lack of contingency planning for alternative outcomes.

Preventing Insurgencies After Major Combat Operations — Jan 1, 2006

Discusses how to minimize the development of insurgencies during foreign interventions.

Strengthening the Partnership — Jan 1, 2005

The partnership between nongovernmental aid organizations and the military illustrates a novel approach to post-conflict settings; however, it comes with a set of unique institutional challenges that must be analyzed to ensure success.

Force Requirements in Stability Operations — Jan 1, 1996

This article investigates the numbers required for stability operations, both for entire countries and individual cities, and explores the implications of those numbers for deployment, rotation, readiness, and personnel retention.

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