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     <title>RAND Research Topic: Psychological Warfare</title>
     <link rel="self" href="http://www.rand.org/topics/psychological-warfare.xml"/>
     <updated>2012-05-24T14:57:29Z</updated>
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     <rights>Copyright (c) 2012, The RAND Corporation</rights>
     <author>
       <name>RAND Corporation</name>
     </author>
     <id>http://www.rand.org/topics/psychological-warfare.html</id>
	 
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   <title type="html"></title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org.html</id>
   <published></published>
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   <summary type="html"></summary>
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   <title type="html">U.S. Military&apos;s Efforts to Influence Afghan Population Have Grown Less Effective Over Time</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1060.html</id>
   <published>Apr 30, 2012</published>
   <updated>Apr 30, 2012</updated>
   <summary type="html">An analysis of U.S. military information operations and psychological operations in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2010 finds the efforts grew less successful over time, as disenchantment with foreign occupation grew. The most notable shortcoming was the inability to sufficiently counter the Taliban propaganda campaign against U.S. and coalition forces on the theme of civilian casualties.</summary>
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 <entry>
   <title type="html">Assessing Military Information Operations in Afghanistan, 2001-2010</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9659.html</id>
   <published>Apr 30, 2012</published>
   <updated>Apr 30, 2012</updated>
   <summary type="html">This research brief offers an overview of the effectiveness of U.S. psychological operations in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2010, with particular attention to how well messages and themes were tailored to target audiences.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9659.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">U.S. Military&apos;s Efforts to Influence Afghan Population Have Grown Less Effective Over Time</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/news/press/2012/04/30.html</id>
   <published>Apr 30, 2012</published>
   <updated>Apr 30, 2012</updated>
   <summary type="html">The efforts of U.S. military information operations and psychological operations in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2010 grew less successful over time, as disenchantment with foreign occupation grew.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/news/press/2012/04/30.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">Le concept de communication strat&amp;eacute;gique de l&apos;OTAN et sa pertinence pour la France</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR855z1.html</id>
   <published>Nov 12, 2010</published>
   <updated>Nov 12, 2010</updated>
   <summary type="html">Study of NATO Strategic Communications and relevance for France. Looks at: definition, objectives, scope, terminology, command structure, resources. Concludes concept is relevant to France in crisis situations and offers ways to implement it.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR855z1.html" />
   
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 <entry>
   <title type="html">NATO&apos;s Strategic Communications concept and its relevance for France</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR855z2.html</id>
   <published>Nov 12, 2010</published>
   <updated>Nov 12, 2010</updated>
   <summary type="html">Study of NATO Strategic Communications and relevance for France. Looks at: definition, objectives, scope, terminology, command structure, resources. Concludes concept is relevant to France in crisis situations and offers ways to implement it.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR855z2.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">Countering Insurgency in the Muslim World: Rethinking U.S. Priorities and Capabilities</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9326.html</id>
   <published>Feb 4, 2008</published>
   <updated>Feb 4, 2008</updated>
   <summary type="html">This research brief summarizes a RAND report that analyzes insurgencies such as those in Afghanistan and Iraq and calls for a major shift in investment priorities to give the United States the capabilities it needs for effective counterinsurgency.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9326.html" />
   
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 <entry>
   <title type="html">RAND Recommends U.S. Military Adopt Consumer Marketing Strategies to Reach Iraqi and Afghan Civilians</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/news/press/2007/07/17.html</id>
   <published>Jul 17, 2007</published>
   <updated>Jul 17, 2007</updated>
   <summary type="html">RAND Recommends U.S. Military Adopt Consumer Marketing Strategies to Reach Iraqi and Afghan Civilians.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/news/press/2007/07/17.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">Applying Madison Avenue Principles and Recent Operational Experience to Counterinsurgency and Stability Operations</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9268.html</id>
   <published>Jul 11, 2007</published>
   <updated>Jul 11, 2007</updated>
   <summary type="html">This research brief summarizes a study that examined successes from the commercial marketing industry and how those lessons might assist U.S. and coalition forces to improve shaping campaigns during stability operations.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9268.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
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   <title type="html">Obituary: RAND Analyst Konrad Kellen Helped Explain Motivation of Terrorists and Other U.S. Foes</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/news/press/2007/04/12/index2.html</id>
   <published>Apr 12, 2007</published>
   <updated>Apr 12, 2007</updated>
   <summary type="html">April 12, 2007 news release: Obituary: RAND Analyst Konrad Kellen Helped Explain Motivation of Terrorists and Other U.S. Foes.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/news/press/2007/04/12/index2.html" />
   
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 <entry>
   <title type="html">Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG478-1.html</id>
   <published>Jun 23, 2006</published>
   <updated>Jun 23, 2006</updated>
   <summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;When Algerian nationalists launched a rebellion against French rule in November 1954, France was forced to cope with a varied and adaptable Algerian strategy. In this volume, originally published in 1963, David Galula reconstructs the story of his highly successful command at the height of the rebellion. This groundbreaking work, with a new foreword by Bruce Hoffman, remains relevant to present-day counterinsurgency operations.&lt;/p&gt;
</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG478-1.html" />
   
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 <entry>
   <title type="html">Lessons for Intelligence in the Campaign Against al Qaeda</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/commentary/2006/03/01/VC.html</id>
   <published>Mar 1, 2006</published>
   <updated>Mar 1, 2006</updated>
   <summary type="html">Published commentary by RAND staff:  Lessons for Intelligence in the Campaign Against al Qaeda, in Vanguard magazine.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/commentary/2006/03/01/VC.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">Understanding and Preparing for the Psychological Consequences of Terrorism</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/RP1217.html</id>
   <published>Feb 10, 2006</published>
   <updated>Feb 10, 2006</updated>
   <summary type="html">Describes the psychological consequences of terrorism and outlinesstrategies for dealing with them.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/RP1217.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">Strategy: Political Warfare Neglected</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/commentary/2005/06/26/DUT.html</id>
   <published>Jun 26, 2005</published>
   <updated>Jun 26, 2005</updated>
   <summary type="html">Published commentary by RAND staff.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/commentary/2005/06/26/DUT.html" />
   
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 <entry>
   <title type="html">Dissuading Terror:  Strategic Influence and the Struggle Against Terrorism</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG184.html</id>
   <published>Jan 21, 2005</published>
   <updated>Jan 21, 2005</updated>
   <summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;U.S. government decisionmakers face a number of challenges as they attempt to form policies that aim to dissuade terrorists from attacking the United States, divert youths from joining terrorist groups, and persuade the leaders of states and nongovernmental institutions to withhold support for terrorists. The successes or failures of such policies and campaigns have long-lasting effects. The findings of this research help U.S. decisionmakers more closely refine how and in what circumstances strategic influence campaigns can best be applied.&lt;/p&gt;</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG184.html" />
   
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 <entry>
   <title type="html">Urban Battle Command in the Twenty-First Century</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG181.html</id>
   <published>Jan 13, 2005</published>
   <updated>Jan 13, 2005</updated>
   <summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;In every operation, the functions of command, control, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and communications are all fundamental to success. But in cities, the dense population, many manmade structures, and other challenges act to severely impede these functions in several ways. This monograph contemplates the nature of those challenges and proposes several recommendations to surmount them in both the short and longer terms.&lt;/p&gt;</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG181.html" />
   
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 <entry>
   <title type="html">Missed Opportunities</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/commentary/2004/09/05/SFC.html</id>
   <published>Sep 5, 2004</published>
   <updated>Sep 5, 2004</updated>
   <summary type="html">Published commentary by RAND staff.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/commentary/2004/09/05/SFC.html" />
   
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 <entry>
   <title type="html">Understanding and Preparing for the Psychological Consequences of Bioterrorism: Executive Summary</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/drafts/DRU2919z1.html</id>
   <published>Dec 31, 2002</published>
   <updated>Dec 31, 2002</updated>
   <summary type="html">This issue paper describes some of the major challenges that the psychological consequences of a bioterror attack will pose, and proposes specific strategies for dealing effectively with those challenges.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/drafts/DRU2919z1.html" />
   
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 <entry>
   <title type="html">Countering al-Qaeda: The Next Phase in the War</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/commentary/2002/09/08/SDUT.html</id>
   <published>Sep 8, 2002</published>
   <updated>Sep 8, 2002</updated>
   <summary type="html">Published commentary by RAND staff.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/commentary/2002/09/08/SDUT.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">The Eye of the Believer: Psychological Influences on Counter-Terrorism Policy-Making</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/rgs_dissertations/RGSD166.html</id>
   <published>Dec 31, 2001</published>
   <updated>Dec 31, 2001</updated>
   <summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Examines the social and psychological aspects of foreign and counterterrorism policymaking processes and presents common psychological biases that affect how we understand the behavior of foreign actors and substate terrorist groups. Using three illustrative historical case studies, the author demonstrates how often-imperceptible psychological biases affected the actors involved and suggests that counter-bias strategies might have led to different sets of decisions.&lt;/p&gt;</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/rgs_dissertations/RGSD166.html" />
   
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