RESEARCH BRIEF
To design a new naval submarine domestically, Australia's industry and Government will need about 1,000 skilled draftsmen and engineers. Cultivating this workforce could take 15-20 years; partnering with foreign designers could expedite the process.
NEWS RELEASE
When it comes to designing a new submarine, Australia has considerable expertise, but some gaps still exist.
REPORT
The Royal Australian Navy intends to acquire 12 new submarines to replace its Collins-class vessels. RAND assessed the domestic engineering and design skills that Australian industry and government will need to design the new submarine, identified the skills they currently possess, and evaluated how to fill any gaps between the two.
REPORT
Large, complex submarine design and construction programs demand personnel with unique skills and capabilities supplemented with practical experiences in their areas of expertise. Recognizing the importance of past experiences for successful program management, the governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Commonwealth of Australia asked the RAND Corporation to develop a set of lessons learned from previous submarine…
REPORT
This volume presents a set of lessons learned from the United Kingdom's Astute submarine program that could help inform future program managers. Designing and building a submarine requires careful management and oversight and a delegation of roles and responsibilities that recognizes which party — the shipbuilder or the government — is best positioned to manage risks.
REPORT
The U.S. Navy asked the RAND Corporation to develop a set of lessons learned from previous submarine programs that could help inform future program managers. This volume presents lessons from three U.S. submarine programs. The RAND team looked at how the programs were managed, the issues that affected management decisions, and the outcomes of those decisions. An overarching lesson from the three programs is the importance of program…
REPORT
This volume presents a set of lessons learned from Australia's Collins submarine program that could help inform future program managers. Collins was the first submarine built in Australia. RAND investigated how operational requirements were set for the Collins class; explored the acquisition, contracting, design, and build processes that the program employed; and assessed the activities surrounding integrated…
REPORT
An examination of five submarine programs in the three countries—the UK's Astute program; the U.S. Navy's Ohio, Seawolf, and Virginia programs; and Australia's Collins program—identifies lessons that could help inform future program managers.
REPORT
Draws from RAND's international submarine experience to discuss the benefits of long-range planning, ways to improve efficiency, the need to sustain hard-to-replace resources, the importance of testing, and potential policy implications for Australia as the Commonwealth plans to build its new submarine.
REPORT
RAND identifies seven military missions for unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs) — mine countermeasures, deployment of leave-behind surveillance sensors or sensor arrays, near-land and harbor monitoring, oceanography, monitoring undersea infrastructure, anti-submarine warfare tracking, and inspection/identification — that appear most promising to pursue in terms of military need, operational and technical risks, non-UUV…
REPORT
To preserve its ability to design, build and support complex warships and submarines, the UK's Ministry of Defence (MOD) asked RAND Europe for help with identifying labour implications for its shipbuilding programme. Research indicates that MOD will need to preserve and sustain several key technical skills, especially detailed designers and professional engineers for various stages of surface ship and submarine acquisition and support.
RESEARCH BRIEF
To preserve its ability to design, build, and support complex warships and submarines, the UK's Ministry of Defence (MOD) will need to preserve and sustain several key technical skills in the maritime domain. In particular, it will need detailed designers and professional engineers for various stages of surface ship and submarine acquisition and support. Although the MOD has taken into account the requirement for these skills, its future…
NEWS RELEASE
May 7, 2007 news release: Navy Should Start Next Nuclear Submarine Design Phase Early to Prevent Engineering Brain Drain, RAND Study Finds.
REPORT
The U.S. Navy should start designing the next class of nuclear submarines five years ahead of schedule and stretch out the design period to prevent a critical erosion of skilled submarine designers and engineers.
REPORT
Nuclear submarine design resources at the shipyards, their suppliers, and the Navy may erode for lack of demand. Analysis of alternative workforce and workload management options suggests that the U.S. Navy should stretch out the design of the next submarine class and start it early or sustain design resources above the current demand, so that the next class may be designed on time, on budget, and with low risk.
RESEARCH BRIEF
This research brief summarizes an analysis of workforce and workload management options to suggest ways to constrain the cost, schedule, and risk involved in the design of the U.S. Navy's next nuclear submarine class.
REPORT
The United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence (MOD) moved from a position of significant authority and responsibility in submarine design and development to one in which its acquisition responsibilities were largely transferred to a prime contractor. Now it is trying to reengage. This book recommends measures and structures the UK Ministry of Defence can adopt to better manage its risks and responsibilities in the acquisition of nuclear…
REPORT
Cost increases in maintaining regulating licenses at BAE Systems’ Barrow-in-Furness shipyard and Devonport Management Limited’s (DML’s) facility have led the UK Ministry of Defence to consider the possibility of consolidating its nuclear fuel-handling capabilities at DML. This report assesses where the United Kingdom’s nuclear fuelling of submarines should occur to best minimise cost and schedule risks, particularly…
REPORT
The complexity and uniqueness of a nuclear submarine requires special skills, facilities, and oversight not supported by other shipbuilding programmes. There is particular concern about the future vitality of the United Kingdom’s submarine industrial base. This report looks at what actions should be taken to maintain the country’s nuclear submarine design capabilities and how nuclear submarine production should be scheduled for…
COMMENTARY
Published commentary by RAND staff.
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