RAND is a world leader in research on terrorism, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, disaster management, and homeland security—topics that affect a wide variety of policy areas and challenge individuals and nations worldwide. As a public service, RAND disseminates all its unclassified research online or in printed documents.
This book examines six case studies of insurgencies from around the world to determine the key factors in the successful transition from counterinsurgency toward stability.
Despite al Qaeda's increasing use of the Internet to attempt to radicalize and recruit homegrown terrorists in the United States, the turnout has been tiny and mostly inept.
An analysis of the pre-attack behaviors of the most significant Jihadist terrorist groups in the UK found that there are certain distinctive behavioral characteristics displayed as a result of planning, preparing, and implementing an act of terrorism, but more research will be needed to identify "signal indicators."
A new collection of essays by experts from the RAND Corporation examines America in the decade since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, focusing a critical eye on the nation's actions since the attacks and outlining changes in strategy needed to improve efforts against jihadist groups.
Former Taliban and other insurgents provide an invaluable source of information on their previous colleagues, and can ultimately cause momentum to shift toward counterinsurgent forces. Steps can be taken to increase the likelihood of reintegrating fighters into their communities.
If "strategic communication" as a term is too vague or becomes politically untenable, abandon it. Just do not allow the underlying effort to coordinate government impact on the information environment to be lost too.
Although most European terrorism plots of jihadist inspiration over the last five years appear to have been conducted independently, the most serious ones have tended to involve operational connections to groups operating outside of Europe.
Document submitted on June 29, 2011 as an addendum to testimony presented before the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee on June 7, 2011.
An analysis of 30 insurgencies worldwide between 1978 and 2008 determined what factors were ultimately correlated with success or defeat. Comparing Afghanistan in early 2011 against this scorecard results in an uncertain outcome for the conflict there, but the findings may help provide additional guidance as operations continue.
We have greatly reduced al Qaeda's capacity for large-scale attacks, but the terrorist
campaign led by al Qaeda may go on for many years. It is fair to call it a war, without implying
that, like America’s past wars, it must have a finite ending.
Testimony presented before the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee on June 7, 2011.
Even after the death of Osama bin Laden, al Qa'ida and allied groups continue to present a grave threat to the United States and its allies by overseeing and encouraging terrorist operations, managing a robust propaganda campaign, conducting training, and facilitating financial assistance.
Air Force range managers schedule the infrastructure and airspace needed for realistic testing and training activities, which requires adequate information about the proposed maneuvers, the acceptable context, and understanding of the goals.
Describes a methodology for identifying areas where problem events are more pronounced and directing resources toward those areas.
The U.S. military strategy should transition to an Afghan-led counterinsurgency strategy which would involve decreasing the U.S. military footprint and relying on Special Operations Forces to help Afghans conduct counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations.
Testimony presented before the House Energy and Commerce Committee, Subcommittee on Energy and Power on May 5, 2011.
Even before the killing of Osama bin Laden, with the growing instability across the Arab world, some argued that the primary al Qa'ida threat now comes from the Persian Gulf or North Africa. While these regions certainly present a threat to Western security, al Qa'ida's primary command and control structure remains situated in Pakistan.
Passwords are proving less and less capable of protecting computer systems from abuse. Multifactor authentication (MFA) — which combines something you know (e.g., a PIN), something you have (e.g., a token), and/or something you are (e.g., a fingerprint) — is increasingly being required. This report investigates why organizations choose to adopt or not adopt MFA — and where they choose to use it.
The author explores air travel security performance since 9/11, identifies missed opportunities and innovations, and considers potential next steps.
Unstable and violent political environments often give rise to a range of complex problems for peaceful development. RAND Europe reviewed the state of the art in monitoring and evaluation in stabilization environments and found ways to improve practice.