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     <title>RAND Research Topic: Terrorism Financing</title>
     <link rel="self" href="http://www.rand.org/topics/terrorism-financing.xml"/>
     <updated>2012-05-24T14:57:58Z</updated>
     <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" hreflang="en" href="http://www.rand.org/topics/terrorism-financing.html" />
     <rights>Copyright (c) 2012, The RAND Corporation</rights>
     <author>
       <name>RAND Corporation</name>
     </author>
     <id>http://www.rand.org/topics/terrorism-financing.html</id>
	 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">Osama a Wizard of Illusion and Rhetoric</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/commentary/2011/06/01/PJ.html</id>
   <published>Jun 1, 2011</published>
   <updated>Jun 1, 2011</updated>
   <summary type="html">Bin Laden was chairman of the board, not CEO, using his moral authority to urge his tiny army forward, pointing out new ways to kill Americans, encouraging followers to think outside the typical terrorist playbook, writes Brian Michael Jenkins.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/commentary/2011/06/01/PJ.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">Glimpse of bin Laden Techniques in Captured Records of al-Qa&apos;ida in Iraq</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/commentary/2011/05/27/GS.html</id>
   <published>May 27, 2011</published>
   <updated>May 27, 2011</updated>
   <summary type="html">Captured financial documents of al-Qa&apos;ida&apos;s Iraq affiliate in Anbar Province revealed its internal operations and enabled one of the most comprehensive assessments of an al-Qa&apos;ida linked group, write Benjamin Bahney, Renny McPherson, and Howard J. Shatz.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/commentary/2011/05/27/GS.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">How Might bin Laden&apos;s Demise Affect Business?</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/commentary/2011/05/25/GS.html</id>
   <published>May 25, 2011</published>
   <updated>May 25, 2011</updated>
   <summary type="html">Given how markets are responding thus far, Osama Bin Laden&apos;s death is likely to have a modestly positive and buoyant effect on equity markets, writes Charles Wolf, Jr.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/commentary/2011/05/25/GS.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">Financial Records of al-Qa&apos;ida in Iraq Reveal Vulnerabilities and Information about the Group</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1026.html</id>
   <published>Dec 22, 2010</published>
   <updated>Dec 22, 2010</updated>
   <summary type="html">An analysis of the financial operations and economics of al-Qa&apos;ida in Iraq in Anbar province indicates that members were poorly compensated and suggests that they were not motivated primarily by money to join the group.</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1026.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">The Economic Cost of Harboring Terrorism</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/external_publications/EP20100027.html</id>
   <published>Dec 31, 2009</published>
   <updated>Dec 31, 2009</updated>
   <summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;The literature on conflict and terrorism has paid little attention to the economic costs of terrorism for the perpetrators. This article aims to fill that gap by examining the economic costs of harboring suicide terror attacks.&lt;/p&gt;</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/external_publications/EP20100027.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
 <entry>
   <title type="html">Understanding Proto-Insurgencies</title>
   <id>http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP178.html</id>
   <published>Oct 3, 2007</published>
   <updated>Oct 3, 2007</updated>
   <summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;The most effective U.S. counterinsurgency action would be to anticipate the possibility of insurgencies developing; it could then provide training and advisory programs and inhibit outsides support.&lt;/p&gt;</summary>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/xhtml" hreflang="en" title="Read More" href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP178.html" />
   
 </entry>
 
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