The financial losses and claims on companies following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, led the United States to examine the role of terrorism risk insurance. RAND has researched and advised policymakers about terrorism risk management in general and, in particular, the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA), a U.S. law designed to limit insurers’ financial losses following acts of terrorism, which has been extended twice and is now due to expire in 2014.
The RAND Center for Catastrophic Risk Management and Compensation seeks to identify and promote laws, programs, and institutions that reduce the adverse social and economic effects of catastrophes.
In a week-long series, "Life in 9/12 America," Patt Morrison is interviewing RAND experts on the topics of their chapters in The Long Shadow of 9/11: America's Response to Terrorism on 89.3 KPCC, Southern California Public Radio.
Taxpayers save money and businesses are better protected with the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) in place than if the act is allowed to expire.
Taxpayers save money and businesses are better protected with the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) in place than if the act is allowed to expire. TRIA allows the insurance industry to play a larger role in compensating losses caused by smaller terrorist attacks by transferring some of the risk for the largest attack to the government.
Interim findings from a RAND Center for Terrorism Risk Management Policy project suggest that the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act performs well on outcomes examined for conventional attacks but not for chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear ones.
High take-up rates for terrorism insurance or other forms of compensation for terrorism losses can enhance economic resilience after an attack and encourage national cohesion and post-event solidarity.
This paper analyzes the normative role for civil liability in aligning terrorism precaution incentives, when the perpetrators of terrorism are unreachable by courts or regulators.
How does the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) align with the evolving terrorism threat? Transnational and domestic terrorism trends reveal that TRIA does not provide adequate financial protection, particularly in the face of economically motivated...
The pending expiration of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) of 2002 is the impetus for this assessment of how TRIA redistributes terrorism losses, helping to inform policymakers on whether to extend, modify, or terminate it.
Providing a description of the evolving terrorist threat, this book's goal is to compare the underlying risk of attack to the architecture of financial protection that has been facilitated by the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA).
Examines the central issues in the debate over whether to extend, modify, or end the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, which requires insurers to make terrorism coverage available to commercial policyholders
Difficulties involved with assessing and pricing terrorism risk are similar to those associated with assessing and pricing natural disaster risk.
This study simulates the expected losses from three modes of terrorist attacks and shows how the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) would distribute the resulting losses.
Investigates the rationale for government intervention in the market for terrorism insurance, focusing on the externalities associated with self-protection.
Director, RAND Center for Catastrophic Risk Management and Compensation; Senior Economist
Ph.D. in economics, University of California, Berkeley; B.A. in political science, B.S. in general engineering, Stanford University
Assistant Policy Analyst
B.S. in mathematics, Lander College for Men